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Decentralisation has not only transformed the structure of government but
has also fundamentally altered the political landscape in Uganda. Since
1986, the country has witnessed a gradual but comprehensive transfer of
power, responsibilities and resources from the centre to local governments.
The exercise began as a shift from appointed to elected councillors and
leaders, initially of resistance committees, and then later of local councils
that have been formed in rural areas and urban wards as vehicles for local
government and popular participation.
Decentralisation has also appeared in the form of devolution of major
functional responsibilities such as primary education, health, water and
sanitation, and rural feeder roads from the centre to local governments.
Indeed scholars and planners who subscribe to the ideology of
centrifugalism as a prominent management and planning discourse have
seen this level of decentralization as a fundamental point of departure
towards institutionalization of a level of reform which seeks to transfer
political, administrative, financial and planning authority from the centre to
local governments. Many have also seen it as the right direction towards
the promotion of popular participation, empowering local people to make
their own decisions and generally enhancing the levels of accountability
and responsibility within the local communities.
Nevertheless the process of decentralisation has not entirely been a bed of
roses. Despite the existence of abundant goodwill on the part of the
national political leadership, lack of civic competence, apathy,
disillusionment and fatigue are some of the debilitating factors that have
combined to render citizen participation generally unattainable. Moreover,
because decentralisation has tended to be a top-down approach,
participation has largely been seen as a government obligation rather than
as a people-driven process.
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Lack of both financial and human resources have compounded the
situation. Districts have consistently lacked sufficient financial resources to
run decentralised functions because of a tax base, which is so narrow that
revenue to districts is basically limited to graduated personal tax and grants
from the Central Government.
Inspite of the existence of the above shortcomings, democratic
decentralisation remains the only viable answer in the quest for good
_governance, active local government and an empowered local population.
This study analyses the process of devolution in Uganda with the aim of
identifying the underlying constraints that continue to impinge on it, and
proposing ways and means of ameliorating them. Using Hoima district
local _government as a case study and results from the national service
delivery survey conducted by the Uganda Ministry of Public Service in the
year 2000, the study highlights most of these constraints, prominent among
which are poor service delivery, lack of community participation,
inadequate financial and human resources, a narrow local tax base, a weak
civil society, and underscores the need to ameliorate them if devolution is
to attain the anticipated results.
The first part of the study examines some of the theories, concepts and
views that underpin the policy of decentralisation and sets the pace for its
contextualisation.
The second part looks at the deeper process of decentralisation by
analyzing the structures and institutionalization of local government in
Uganda and highlighting critical issues that are pertinent in local
government management and development. The study argues that while
enormous goodwill exists on the part of the national political leadership,
devolution in Uganda and local government development generally are still
beset by a range of factors that include weaknesses within the institutional
structures mandated to actualize the policy. Centric tendencies are still
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pervasive with the unfortunate results of stalling the pace of transformation
especially in the financial sector.
The third part dwells on the research methodology used, the nature and
extent-of data collected, the sampling techniques applied and how these
affected the outcome of the study. This part also highilg!lts the findings of
the study, which are discussed and the-causative factors analyzed.
The fourth and last part focuses mainly on recommendations arising out of
the conclusions, with particular emphasis on key areas that require urgent
action. It also identifies areas for further research and suggests how such
research would assist in expanding the scope and understanding of the
subject under study.
This study cautions against the tendency to .romanticise devolution as the
new-found solution for past and current institutional and socio-economic
distortions and argues that devolution itself can make state institutions
more responsive to the needs of the communities, but only if it allows local
people to hold public servants accountable and ensures their participation
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We live in an era in which virtually all political men claim they are for the
economic development of their own country and the world. Yet we know
that the reality is that over the past few centuries a few countries have
developed far more rapidly than the rest of the world, and that, at present
by a host of indicators, the economic gap between the more and the less
developed countries seems to be increasing rather than narrowing despite
the presumed efforts of multitudes of groups and governments
(Wallerstein, 1971:277)1. The need to circumvent the above trend has led
to numerous calls for reappraisal and review of the role and nature of the
state in the developmental sphere, especially in less-developed countries.
The undercurrents of these phenomena have necessitated a new thinking
about the state and its developmental role and democratic nature. In
reconstructing the theoretical inquiry the question has been; what role
should the central government play in shaping people's daily lives and to
what extent should the people be empowered to determine their own
destiny? The recognition of this theoretical dichotomy is producing different
responses and results (Sabiti-Makara, 1998:31). More significant is the
emerging consensus among scholars and developmental analysts that the
top-down method hitherto employed by the so-called developmental state,
on its own can no longer fulfil its intended goals (Sabiti-Makara, 1998:31).
The current trend of thought is therefore refocusing on a bottom-up
approach to questions of local government, democratisation and
development. Wallis (1989:124) sets the tone:
The argument for local government, however, has an ethical element as
well, and is linked to questions ofhuman rights and democracy. There is a
1 Paper presented ata special session on Sociology in the second Development Decade, 7'Jl World Congress
ofSociology. Varna, Bulgaria, 15September 1970. .
1
widely accepted notion that people should have the opportunity to
participate in public affairs, especially where they are directly affected by
whatever decisions are made and implemented. Thus, the stifling of local
participation can be condemned from an ethical, as well as a pragmatic
standpoint.
This study examines the concepts of devolution, empowerment and local
government in Uganda using of one of the district local governments as a
case study. Specifically, focus is put on the centre-local relations of the
state by examining more importantly how the interface between the centre
and the local loci of power has conditioned the evolution, organisation,
activity and sustenance of the civil society, if at all, as well as the promotion
of good governance through decentralisation and democratisation. Further
more, emphasis is directed in a more critical way at intra-local government
relations by examining how the relationship between higher and lower tiers
of local government have nurtured, or inhibited the blossoming of
participation and empowerment as the epitome of devolution.
1.2 Background to and Rationale for the Study
Up until recently, the trends of most newly-established states, at least in
Africa, initially concentrated on a strong central authority (Monteiro,
1993:12). The political and bureaucratic elite were mostly made up of
managers trained in the School of nationalism and their first priority upon
attainment of independence was to take over the institutions that had been
externally managed and identify these with national aspirations and the
development of a national conscience (Monteiro, 1993:12). A number of
other factors supported this strong centralising force, and these included:
• The perception that development objectives could be achieved more
quickly through central leadership;
• A progressive transfer of competent managers from the local to the
central level;
• Intervention by the central government in local decision-making in
order to produce good results;
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• The importance given to the state in contemporary international
organisation; and
• External dependence of local institutions on the central budget as well
as inadequate attention paid by the central administration to the
building up of local managerial capacities.
This centripetal bias of development dominated the ideological mindset of
the post-independence Uganda leadership and was subsequently to be
instrumental in the configuration of the country's political landscape in the
later years. Kabwegyere (2000:13-14) attests to this reality when he
recalls how the 1962 Independence Constitution that had devolved
significant powers to local authorities and granted them sufficient revenue
to enable them deliver services efficiently, was abrogated and replaced
with the 1967 Republican Constitution, whose effects were practically the
reverse. The latter ushered in the 1967 Local Administrations Act that
centralised powers and severely constrained local authorities
(Kabwegyere, 2000:14). Between 1967 and 1970 local governance
deteriorated rapidly as local administration political offices became
appointive. Lubanga (1998:49) notes that without direct accountability to
the electorate for efficient and effective provision of services, the discipline
of local government councils degenerated and so did the services. With
the loss of legitimacy by the local political leadership, enforcement of by-
laws became ineffective while self-help and community development
projects ground to a halt leading to general decay of the socio-economic
infrastructure (Lubanga, 1998:50).
The Amin2 regime (1971-1979), which replaced the first Obote government,
dissolved District and Municipal Councils in 1971, suspended the
constitution, abolished Parliament and proceeded to rule by decree. In
1973, Amin re-organised local administration into ten provinces headed by
governors appointed by himself and largely drawn from the army. District
2 Generalldi Amin was commander ofthe army when he overthrew the first post-independence government of
Milton Obote in 1971. He presided over one of Africa's bloodiest and most autocratic regime, and was
deposed in 1979 by a force ofTanzania troops and Uganda exiles.
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Commissioners largely drawn from the traditional civil service headed the
districts, while counties, sub-counties, parishes and sub-parishes were
-- -._- headed by paramilitary chiefs who had undergone specific military training
-.. _---- to reorient their thinking towards the miiitary. During the military regime,
directives flowed from the military government to all levels of local
governance. In his analysis of the situation, Nsibambi (1998:14) observes
that during this period, the state was so authoritarian that for all practical
purposes civil society had ceased to exist. The second Obote"
government, whose tenure lasted five years between 1980 and 1985, did
not make any effort to revive democratic local governance. Instead the
regime set out to monopolise the control and distribution of resources at
both the local and national levels, partly to acquire a decisive capacity to
starve opponents into submission and partly to reward proven party
functionaries and loyalists. To paraphrase Nsibambi (1998:15), the main
characteristics of the relationship between local administrations and central
government before 1986 reflect a pathetic picture of local governments that
had little power and impact on the population and this was exemplified by
the following fact:-
• The Minister of Local Government had to approve all budgets of local
governments councils;
• The Ministry of Local Government had to approve the local
government councils' by-laws and had power to revoke them if need
arose;
• Immediate accountability for transferred resources was to the Minister
of Local Government and not to the local people;
• The Minister of Local Government had power to terminate the
mandate of local councillors and to dissolve local government
councils where and when the need arose and;
3 After the overthrow ofAmin, Milton Obote was returned to power in1980 and ruled Uganda up to 1985 when
he was militarily overthrown byGeneral Tito Okello.
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• Local government councils had little power over their employees as
even the lowest-ranking employee in local government was appointed
by the President.
Nsibambi (1998:12) further observes that the cumulative effect of over-
centralisation was a weak civil society that could not check the excessive
powers of the state nor enforce accountability of public officials. The state
and its institutions continued to dominate and infiltrate the civil society and
this not only led to lack of democracy, but also incapacitated the
emergence of organisations to champion and articulate citizen interests at
the local level (Nsibambi, 1998:12).
Another effect of over-centralisation that Kabwegere (2000:74) highlights
was the emergence of a dependence syndrome whereby citizens had
always looked to the state as the provider of everything.
This background forms the basis for Uganda's adoption of devolution as
the bedrock of its decentralisation strategy which, according to Bidandi
Ssali (1993:29-30), was driven by five main motives enumerated below:
• To develop, broaden and deepen political and administrative
competence in the management of public affairs by transferring real
power to local governments and reducing the workload on remote and
under-resourced central government officials;
• To free managers in local governments from constraints of central
authorities and as a long-term goal allow them to develop
organisational structures that are tailored to local circumstances;
-. To promote good governance by bringing political and administrative
control over services to the point where they are actually delivered,
thereby improving accountability, effectiveness and promoting a





To improve financial accountability and responsible use of resources
by establishing a clear link between the payment of taxes and the
provision of services they finance and finally;
To improve the capacity of local councils to plan, finance and manage
the delivery of services to their constituents.
While this study appreciates the extent of Uganda's devolution of authority
to various tiers of local government, the level of empowerment of the local
population through democratisation, participation, accountability,
responsibility, efficiency and effective use of resources is still a matter of
serious debate, given that the best outcome of decentralisation for any
people ought to be their political, economic and managerial empowerment.
The sharing of functions under the 1995 Constitution and the Local
Governments Act, 1997 requires that line Ministries should focus on setting
broad policies, legislation and standards for public programmes leaving the
determination and implementation of local policies and the delivery of
services to local councils. In true devolution, local actors should
progressively take the lead in service delivery, while central government
agencies and external partners back their efforts to assume greater
responsibility for their own development (Bidandi-Ssali, 2001:5). This is
one of the fundamental challenges introduced by devolution because it
implies a loss of certain powers previously held by the ministries. It also
brings in the reality of comprehending inter-governmental relations within
the principle of non-subordination.
The principle of non-subordination has however been negated by the fact
that, although in the past five years line ministries have put in place sector
strategies, and in particular sector wide approaches (SWAPS), these
programmes have tended to promote vertical reporting and accountability
arrangements which inadvertently encourage centralisation and weaken
accountability towards local government institutions (Bidandi-Ssali,
2001 :5). Despite various sensitisation efforts that have been made to
inform key stakeholders, notably the elected councillors, central and local
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government staff and the local population generally, most civic groups do
not have a sufficient understanding of decentralisation and local
-- governance processes, while key local staff are new and lack basic skills
(Bidandi~Ssali, 2001:5). The sequencing and design of systems and
procedures has so far concentrated on the district, while a more detailed
specification of guides, taking-into account the capacities of lower local
councils is y-et to be developed. Another significant discrepancy in
Uganda's decentralisation implementation process is that financial
decentralisation has lagged behind political and personnel decentralisation
(Commonwealth Local Government Forum, 2002:103). Although a host of
service delivery responsibilities have been devolved to local governments
by law, and although former central government employees have been
ceded to local governments under the separate personnel systems, the
implied expenditure has not been accompanied by matching grants from
the Centre." As local governments have repeatedly noted, over 70 per cent
of the development budget is still handled by the Centre instead of local
governments that are mandated to implement devolution (Kiwanuka-
Musisi, 1999:9).
There continues to be a visible absence of defined career paths for
devolved personnel, while low local revenue collection, slow absorption
rate of resources and delayed accountabilities, misunderstandings of the
roles of councillors and technical staff, and misunderstandings between
different councils about their roles are some of the practical problems that
still jeopardise the decentralisation process in Uganda.
Matters are further complicated by the fact that the development planning
process is still lopsided and haphazardly done. Given that, both the central
government (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development)
and district local governments are all planning levels, a new dichotomy in
the national planning process has now emerged, with the overall effect of
compromising efficiency and focus in the entire process. In principle,
4 Approximately 25,000 officials formerly employed by the central government were automatically transferred
to local governments as a result ofdecentralisation.
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planning should start at village level and move upwards. Village
development plans are incorporated into parish development plans, which
are in turn incorporated into sub-county plans, which are themselves
incorporated into district development plans. Parish development plans in
urban areas are incorporated into division plans, which are then
incorporated into municipal or city plans. The requirement is that an
independent National Planning Authority (NPA) should incorporate the
district/city- plans into a single national development plan in order to
complete the 'bottom-up' planning process. The LGA (1997), requires
higher local governments to mentor and provide assistance to lower ones
to enable them carry out their mandated functions, includinq development
planning. To that end, District Planning Units (OPUs) were set up to
facilitate the planning process at district level and to assist sub-county and
division local governments as well. However, most OPUs have limited
capacity to do the work effectively due to both inadequate financial
resources, and lack of comprehensive, timely and accurate data
(Commonwealth Local Government Forum, (2002:104). It is these, and
other capacity-related problems, that render a research project like this all
the more necessary.
1.3 Research Questions
This study is underpinned by the following research questions:
• What has been the role of major stakeholders notably the Central
and Local Government Officials, Politicians, Civic, NGO and
Community Leaders in the entire decentralisation process?
• Have the broad aims and objectives of decentralisation through
devolution and empowerment been achieved in Helma District
Local Government?
• How can successful decentralisation also ensure successful socio-
economic development?
• What is the visible impact on the civil society resulting from the
decentralisation process, and how relevant are these in the
enhancement of civic competence and promotion of community-
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•
based development initiatives that are vital for the consolidation of
the process of-local government democratisation?
What are some of the major impediments/obstacles to the
decentralisation process, and how will they be overcome?
Are there in-built structures witbin the process of decentralisation,
or the existing legislation sufficient to resolve obstacles
encountered on the way, or will recourse to external solutions be
inevitable?
1.4 Focus of the Study-
This study basically focuses on the operation of the local government
system in Uganda within the broad framework of devolution and
empowerment at the various levels of participation. Using Hoima District
Local Government as a case study, and the twelve-year life span of the
policy as the point of departure, the study analyses the process of
devolution with a view to establishing whether or not decentralisation has
increased the efficiency of the central and local governments and if the
latter are now empowered with the capacity to mobilise and secure
adequate resources to carry on their new load of work; secondly whether
local councils have political and administrative control over services
delivered in their areas of jurisdiction and if local ownership of programmes
has been attained; thirdly whether local governments have eventually
developed organisational structures tailored to local circumstances and if
decentralisation has now increased participation of local people, especially
women and other interest groups; and finally whether decentralisation has
increased the capacity of local councils for self-reliance and if local councils
now have the capacity to plan, finance and manage the delivery of
services.
The study covers all the 11 sub-counties of Hoima District, one of the 56
district local governments under the current local government system.
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1.5 Objectives of the Study --- - --
The main objectives of the study are:
--. To critically examine the historical
----~._-~-~--- decentralisation process in Uganda,
empowerment and strong local governance.
To evaluate- the impact of the decentralisation policy and process
within the broad framework of the need for improved service
delivery, good governance and strong civil society, and using
Hoima District Local Government as a reference point, to assess
the extent to which the policy has been able to strengthen human
and institutional capacities of local councils, thereby enabling them
to meet internal challenges and avert the failures of
decentralisation.
To identify the shortcomings of the decentralisation process using
Hoima District Local Government as a case study and propose a
viable political and management discourse for sustainable local
governance.
• To draw on the lessons of decentralisation in order to address the
challenges facing local governments in Uganda and, more
particularly, Hoima District Local Government.
1.6 Research Methodology
Along the phenomenological paradigm that is used in its design and
general framework, the study also adopts the methodofogical triangulation
approach by combining both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of
data collection in varying degrees.
The critical incident technique is used to assist in eliciting data, especially
during personal in-depth interviews, while a positivist approach is used to
conduct structured interviews. The critical incident technique is a procedure
for gathering certain important facts concerning behaviour and events in
defined situations, and is renowned for its flexible principles which can be
modified and adopted according to circumstances.
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The research instruments used are of two categories, namely the interview
guide to be administered to key informants, namely the local council
politicians and managers (civil servants) at various levels, and the interview
schedule forstructured interviews to be administered to civic and opinion
leaders.
1.6.1 P~imary Data
The study draws on two sources of primary data. The first source is in the
form of findings of the research conducted in Hoima District on the
relevance and effectiveness of-the local government system in Uganda in
relation to the goals of devolution, empowerment, and general level of
service delivery.
The second source of primary data is in the form of findings of the Uganda
national service delivery survey (NSDS) conducted by the Ministry of Public
Service in August 2000, with the aim of collecting information on
perceptions of Ugandans regarding the quantity and quality of services
delivered by government in the areas of crime prevention and delivery of
justice, good governance, education, health services, water and sanitation,
and agricultural extension services.
1.6.2 Secondary Data
Secondary data is obtained from various sources of literature connected
with the research topic. Stakeholder institutions relevant to the process of
devolution constitute fundamental sources in this regard and these include
the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development; the Local
Government Finance Commission; the Population Secretariat; the Uganda
Bureau of Statistics; and biannual status reports from the Decentralisation
Secretariat, Ministry of Local Government, on the implementation of the
decentralisation programme. Some additional key data is also obtained
from district local governments, such as Kibaale, Kabarole, and Kampala
City Council, besides minutes and reports from various fora and institutions
within Hoima District Local Government.
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1.7 Limitations ofthe study
Due to the domination of the phenomenological paradigm in the process of
data collection and analysis, some shortcomings of this paradigm could not
be avoided. For example because the study was taking place in a natural
setting Le, in the field, the researcher had to contend with the effects of
various socio-cultural stereotypes that would naturally impinge on the
attitudes of respondents in such an environment.
The phenomena under study also posed its own set of problems.
Decentralisation and good governance being fairly recent phenomena on
the Ugandan political landscape meant that most of the responses from
respondents were heavily subjective in the sense that they depended on
individualistic experiences and perspectives which, besides spanning over
a shorter period, could be different from the real situation on the ground.
Such a trend could negatively affect the level of reliability of the research
findings.
The study was carried out in an environment of limited financial resources
and this grossly affected the size of the sample. It would never have been
possible to guarantee the attendance of participants without an undertaking
by the researcher to compensate them for their time and resources spent in .
order to be available for the interviews. The need for funds therefore to pay
out transport and lunch refund to respondents meant that the sample size
had to be kept at the minimum.
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1.8.2 Clarification of Terms
ASSEFA - Association of Sarva Seva Farms is a Hindu expression that
refers to movements started by followers of Mahatma Gandhi with the aim
of developing the lands donated for the use of India's millions of the
landless through the Bhoodan or land gift movement.
BHOODAN - Literally means a land gift or donation. As it evolved, India's
caste system generated socio-economic strata within the population,
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resulting-in a small percentage of rich high-caste landowners amid a sea of
poor low-caste landless people. Bhoodans are donations of land by
individual rich landowners to the landless in order to improve the quality of
the latter's lives.
CCFD FRANCE - An International Non-Governmental Donor Organization
from France.
DECENTRALIZATION - Is defined from an administrative perspective as
the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and
allocation of resources from the Central Government and its agencies to
field units of governmental agencies, subordinate units or levels of
government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, area-
wide regional or functional authorities, or non-governmental private or
voluntary organizations. Decentralization is of four major categories
namely: Deconcentration; Delegation; Privatisation; and Devolution.
Deconcentration is the handing over of some administrative authority or
responsibility to lower levels within Central Government ministries and
agencies - a shifting of workload from Centrally located officials to staff or
offices outside the national capital;
Delegation is the transfer of managerial responsibility for specifically
defined functions to organizations outside the regular bureaucratic
structure. It implies that a sovereign authority transfers to an agent
specified functions and duties which the agent has broad discretion to carry
out;
Privatisation is a process through which governments have divested
themselves of responsibility for functions either by transferring them to
voluntary organizations or by allowing them to be performed by private
enterprises; and
Devolution is the creation and strengthening, financially and legally, of sub-
national units of government, whose activities are substantially outside the
direct control of the Central Government. In this thesis, the term
decentralization denotes devolution and the two are used interchangeably.
15
DEMOCRATISATION - Is defined as a process of putting in place
systems, structures and practices of government which answer the
following: freedoms (of opinion, association, press and worship), periodic
free and fair elections of national and local leaders, decent living standards
for every member of society and accountable administration.
GRAM SABHA - A Hindu terminology used to refer to Local Council(s) that
handle local affairs and disputes and plans other schemes to improve the
Village, including small Aqro-based Industries to provide employment and
increase incomes.
GRAM SWARAJ - A Hindu terminology used to refer to village self-rule. It
is a form of empowerment whereby the rural poor collectively participate in
schemes to improve their villages, increase their incomes and in so doing,
create self-reliant communities.
GRAMDAN VILLAGES - A Hindu terminology used to refer to areas where
land has been donated collectively by landowners.
ICCO HOLLAND An International Non-Governmental Donor
Organization from the Netherlands.
INTER PARES CANADA - An International Non-Governmental Donor
Organization from Canada.
MSP ITALY - Movimento Sviluppo e pace. An International Non-
Governmental Donor Organization from Italy.
SARVODAYA - A Hindu term which means "the welfare of all".
1.9 Chapterisation Summary
The study is organised in seven chapters. Chapter one conveys the
general introductory background. It narrates the genesis of local
governance in Uganda against the backdrop of the country's turbulent
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political history. Secondly, it highlights some of the initiatives towards
democratic decentralisation that were inherited from the colonial period and
later negated through the centralising influence of subsequent centrist
regimes of Milton Obote and Idi Amin. In particular, the chapter outlines the
ambivalence and volatility that has characterised the central-local relations
in much of Uganda's post-colonial era. Also included in the same chapter
are a statement of the research problem, the research questions to be
answered, the focus of the study and an outline of the study objectives. It
concludes with a chapterisation summary.
Chapter two deals with conceptual and theoretical perspectives. It defines
decentralisation and local government and outlines the conceptual
framework within which both paradigms should be understood. It further
defines other related concepts of good governance, democratisation and
the civil society within the broad context of devolution and outlines key
legislations that have been enacted to nurture and emasculate local
governance in Uganda. Using analogies based on views of various writers
and authorities on local government and decentralisation, the chapter
outlines the trend of central-local government relations and intra-local
government relations with a view to establishing the extent and nature of
cooperation within the context of the principle of non-subordination.
Chapter Three deals with the general trend of Local Government in
Uganda, and traces the policy right from Independence in 1962 to the
present day. Among the major issues highlighted are: the history and
evolution of local government, its institutional and operative aspects and
the nature and extent of local government financing. Chapter Three also
highlights the dilemma caused by the principal-agent problem in the
delivery of services in local governments, and concludes with the emphasis
on the role of gender in the empowerment process.
The research methodology is dealt with in Chapter Four which also
includes detailed aspects of the study design, pre-testing of questionnaires,
sampling techniques, data-gathering methods used, types of data
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gathered, problems faced in data collection and how they were overcome,
plus a detailed explanation of how the data collected was analysed.
--- -------- The presentation of research results is done in Chapter Five under eleven
broad themes as enumerated below:
1. Understanding of stakeholders responsibilities under devolution;
2. Understanding of central government roles;
"-"---"-~""--~-- 3. Understanding of local government (district, sub-county) roles;
4. Attitudes towards the effectiveness of service delivery;
5. Attitudes towards community participation;
6. Knowledge of effective planning and budgeting skills;
7. Attitudes towards adequacy of local financial resources;
8. Visibility and strength of the civil society;
9. Awareness of democratic methods of work;
10. Presence of Non-Governmental Organisations and;
11. Knowledge of the existing devolution obstacles.
Chapter Six discusses the results, and finally Chapter Seven presents the
main conclusions and recommendations arising out of the findings of the
study. It also provides recommendations on the improvement of devolution
as a policy and topics which could be covered by further research.
In summary, the Government of Uganda is pursuing a policy of deepening
decentralisation as one of the ways of empowering its people. The transfer
of power and resources to the local level will help to empower communities
to work together to define and resolve their problems. Decentralised
structures can bring the government closer to the people and has the
potential for enhancing efficiency and democratic accountability (Reddy,
1999:27). The local government system is characterised by a multi-layered
structure to achieve economies of scale, while its representative nature is
designed to promote inclusiveness and gender-sensitive decision-making.
Nevertheless, local government activities continue to be hampered by
limited capacity for planning, budgeting and resource mobilisation.
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1.10 Projections for the Next Chapter
Chapter two will outline the general theoretical and contextual framework
. within which the various terms connected with devolution and local
government are conceptualised. The key concepts to be analysed will
include local government democracy, democratisation, decentralisation and
how these interface with good governance and the Civil Society in order to
empower local people. The chapter will also highlight the role of ethics in
service delivery and how public integrity is fundamental in the efficient and
effective delivery of public services in local governments.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES
2.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the theoretical and conceptual perspectives
regarding decentralisation and empowerment through local government.
An initially broad outlook on local governance gradually narrows down to
examining key concepts of democratisation, good governance and
participation including a critical analysis of some key linkages that
characterise good governance, decentralisation, democratisation and the
Civil Society. The theoretical context of empowerment as a concept is
analysed and so too are the key factors that underpin the process of
empowerment as a precursor to good governance, such as the role of
NGOs. The key role played by participation in local government
development is stressed and conceptual differences existing between
participation and involvement highlighted. The chapter ends with an
analysis of the debilitating role of local elites and the extent to which their
power and influence undermine the organisational and operative capacities
of local communities. It also highlights the dangers posed by corruption,
both political and bureaucratic, to local government development and
emphasises the importance of public integrity on the part of actors and
stakeholders in local government to ensure effective utilisation of resources-
in the delivery of services to the community.
2.2 The Case for Local Government
Local governance is a system or level of government deliberately created
to bring government to the local population as well as give its members a
sense of involvement in the political processes that control their daily lives
(Reddy, 1999:9). The basic economic argument for local government,
however, rests on the inherent inability of central governments to deliver
many public services efficiently (Bird, 1990:279). Since people have
different preferences for public services-some may be more concerned with
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good roads and others with good schools-and since many services,
including roads and schools, are consumed in a spatially-differentiated
pattern, the most efficient allocation of public sector resources can in
principle be secured only if such services are provided and paid for by
governments responsible to those most directly affected (Tiebout,
1956:47). Economic analysis, like democratic theory, thus provides a
rationale for the establishment of local governments that are responsible to
the wishes of their citizens instead of being simply the instruments of
central planners. Local self-government and decentralisation can support
the process of democratic consolidation by, arnongother things, improving
the relationship between the government and the governed, changing the
relationships between different social groups from confrontation to
cooperation, supporting the formation of democratic institutions, particularly
political parties, and by enhancing development, generally (Schmidt,
1997:43). Although recent debates about the role, form and function of
local government have tended to focus on local authorities as mechanisms
for delivering services, it has been argued for some years now that while
local government does offer a range of ways of providing good quality
services, it is about much more than service delivery (Hambleton,
1988:125; Hambleton & Hoggett, 1990:18). If local government stands for
a notion of community, if it is concerned to foster a vigorous civic culture
and to improve the quality of life in the broadest sense, then attention must
focus on the welfare of the local polity. Councillors and officers need to
devote energy, time and resources to strategies designed to improve the
quality of government, as well as the quality of services (Hambleton &
Hoggett, 1990:22).
This is because local government has a crucial role to play in protecting
political liberties. By supporting political diversity especially in situations of
political pluralism it is able to moderate a tendency towards autocracy
which is itself destructive of good government. Hambleton & Hoggett
argue that local government contributes enormously to political education
because it provides a setting in which democratic habits are acquired,
practised and advanced. They further observe that it is a central means by
which collective goals are set and, if it works well, it enables the views and
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concerns of citizens and communities to be injected into the process of
local policy-making. They conclude that in view of all these reasons the
quality of local government is just as important as the quality of service
delivery. This is an argument that extends well beyond the local level
becausa local democracy contributes directly to the health of the national
polity and any valid theory of local-government cannot be built on
management theory alone, but must bear in mind the broad political
dispensation.
2~3 Defining Local Government
According to the International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,
Volume 9 (1968:451), local government may be loosely defined as a public
organisation authorised to decide and administer a limited range of public
policies within a relatively small territory which is a sub-division of a
regional or national government. Local government is at the bottom of a
pyramid of governmental institutions, with the national government at the
top and intermediate governments, states, regions or provinces occupying
the middle range. Normally, local government has general jurisdiction and
is not confined to the performance of one specific function or service. This
simple definition obscures wide variations in local government systems and
operational patterns, and should be supplemented by a system of
classification for both description and analysis. Chandler (1993:3) uses
the term, local government, to refer to political institutions that are subject
to directly-elected policy makers. According to him local government is
distinguishable from federal government in that, in a federal system, the
Constitution of the State divides power so as to prevent either the federal or
state governments eroding each other's powers. He adds that local
governments, be they small or large, are established by national or federal
polities that retain the right to regulate through legislation the power and
functions of their subordinate local units. On his part, Meyer (1978:10)
defines local government as, 'local democratic units within the democratic
system which are subordinate members of the government vested with
prescribed, controlled governmental powers and sources of income to
render specific local services and to control and regulate the geographic,
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social and economic development of defined local areas.' Reddy (1999:10)
extenuates the above definitions further by identifying five key
characteristics of local government. Firstly, locality, local government must
have relevance for a particular geographical area. Secondly, legal
personality, the local government system owes its existence to the law.
Powers should be clearly defined in laws based on relevant clauses of the
country's Constitution. Thirdly, autonomy, the ability to make binding
decisions and policy choices within a legally stipulated framework and to
allocate resources and provide services other than those of the central
government. Fourthly, governmental power, the authority to carry out
formal governmental functions, notably coercive-revenue raising, staff
decisions, implementation of binding by-laws and allocation of resources.
Finally, participation and representation, these would be promoted by local
government because those making decisions or directing its affairs are
either elected or appointed from the community it serves.
Several other important theories on the nature of local government and the
state, within a broader framework of democracy and democratisation, have
been developed. Several neo-Marxist writers such as Castells (1977:69)
and Saunders (1981 :34) have developed important and challenging
theories on the nature of the state, based largely on analyses of urban
politics. They argue that local government plays an important role within the
capitalist state by helping to provide the conditions necessary for the
maintenance of a workforce sufficiently healthy and well educated to keep
the wheels of industry in motion. In contrast, public choice theorists such as
Peterson (1981 :88) have constructed models of urban development and
decision-making that depict the process as a product of economic self-
interest. Several writers Mahwood (1993:4), Meenakshisundaram
(1994:11), Nzouankeu (1994:213), Mushi (1992: 28-30) and Olowu
(1995:5) to mention but a few, believe that there is still a need for some
working definition of the paradigm of local government in developing
countries which would distinguish it from bodies which are representative
but have only minimal or specialised responsibility. Given the assumption
that a local government has its own budget and a separate legal existence,
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with authority granted to it by the central government to allocate substantial
material resources on a range of different functions, the definitions of local
government by Mahwood (1993:4) and Meyer (1978:10) will be adopted in
this thesis with some modification to the extent that local government
should s€e its power not as an end in itself, but as a resource to be shared
and used in conjunction with groups and social movements in civil society
(Katiza, 1995:107).
2.4 Local Government Democracy
Local government, or decentralised decision-making and management, is
the level of democracy that is closest to the people and allows the local
populace to actively participate in affairs which affect them directly. Local
governments can regulate matters that pertain to their local citizenry, within
the framework set by the law, using their own knowledge and local
expertise and consulting a democratically-elected local representative
body. Reddy & Sabelo (1997:573-575) have identified five ingredients
which they describe as the hallmarks of classical representative local
government democracy as practiced in many countries. The first is popular
consultation; the implication here is that government requires the consent
of the citizens whose rights it is bound to respect and protect. The dignity of
the individual is best manifested in the determination and control of the
own affairs. Therefore that form of government which best projects the
dignity of the individual, protects and fosters it, is what Reddy & Sabelo
(1997:573) propose to call democracy. In a nutshell, democracy cannot be
said to exist where the majority of the people in a political system are
denied a say in the process of governance. There must be a constant
dialogue between the governors and governed at all times. Only then can
peoples' views and aspirations be ascertained and taken into account in
the policy-making process.
The second is popular participation, implying that individual full participation
in making societal choices and decisions is a natural outcome of the
endowment of individual dignity because it contributes to individual self-
development. Responsibility for the governing of one's own conduct
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develops one's dignity. In particular, full individual participation within the
local government context contributes to the creation of community solidarity
because everyone feels involved in what is going on relative to their
welfare. Reddy & Sabelo (1997:574) add further, that individual full
participation boils down to popular participation where the largest
proportion of the citizenry is invited and expected to express their wishes
on issues of governance. In this regard, on every issue, the views of the
majority should prevail. This popular participation may be achieved through
meetings in small and large communities, through ratepayers association,
neighbourhood groups, and other social and political associations (Reddy
& Sabelo, 1997:574).
Consequently, public or popular participation in decision-making is an
imperative tenet for democratic local governments (Gildenhuys et.al.,
1991:124). However, in order not to deny the majority its right of self-
assertion, it is also a democratic imperative that while the majority would
have its way, the minority must also have its say. In return the minority
must accept the majority decision, once that decision has been freely
arrived at.
The third is competition, whereby people with varying political views or
ideological standpoints must be allowed to articulate these views and
canvass support for them on the platform of the political party of their
choice. It is absurd to talk of democracy in a situation where individuals
with particular political interests or views are denied the opportunity to
compete for popular support as long as such views and interests are not
inimical to the survival of the entire political community. Within the context
of democracy therefore, elections are viewed as an important vehicle for
the free exchange of views in which the voter can make a choice.
The fourth is freedom of expression. According to Reddy & Sabelo
(1997:575), another consequence of the right to self-determination and
popular participation is the necessity for freedom of expression. Individuals
must be free to express themselves on those issues of the day, as they
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cannot fully influence the course of events, especially governmental
policies, without this freedom. Indeed there is no way to ascertain the
popular will if the individual citizen is not free to express his or her opinion.
The availability of wide-ranging views provides vital information and assist
in that popular control of government by creating a well informed citizenry.
The fifth is equality. The argument of equality is premised on the concept of
creation, that since all men are created equal, they should also be treated
equally before the law, irrespective of gender, ethnicity, reiigion, economic,
class or social stratification. Equality before the law naturally extends to
political equality, as all citizens should have equal access to political power
and influence in shaping policy. Ayoade Mni et.al. (1992:11-12) states that
in modern times the notion of equality has been expanded to include
equality of opportunity in many important aspects of life. In that respect,
equality aims at equality of opportunity in education, employment and
social justice for the oppressed, neglected and disadvantaged. This
expansion of the notion of equality is to ensure that each person has an
equal opportunity to develop his/her naturally endowed potential to
maximum capacity.
In concluding on this point, it is vital to highlight one of the crucial factors
that impinge greatly on local governments, and in particular the extent to
which the same local governments are able to act as vehicles of
transformation at the periphery. This factor is ideology. As Wallis
(1989:126) observes, ideologies can have implications for the kinds of
institutions a regime decides to create to facilitate local participation. In
Uganda for example, the local government structure based on the Local
Council (LC) system has been heavily influenced by the non-partisan,
broad-based" ideology of the NRM Government, whereby since 1986, in
contrast to the views of Reddy &Sabelo (1997:575), political parties have
5 On assuming power inJanuary 1986 the NRM formed abroad-based government whereby various members
from the broad spectrum of society, inclUding political party activists were given ministerial posts in the new
government. The position remained virtually unchanged up to the 1996 general elections. There has since .~. .-t.,"""
been apersistent purging of pro-pluralism elements leaving only hard-core believers in the monolithic political r..
orientation.
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had absolutely no role to play. The dilemma often posed in such cases is
that governments will want strong local participation which is supportive of
their particular ideological standpoints, but may become uneasy if these
grass-roots become focal points for dispute and confrontation with the
centre (Wallis, 1989:126). This is also true for Uganda where in spite of an
all-embracing local council system, the government has for long been
mistrustful of local councils in the northern part of the country, often
accusing them of rebel collaboration ostensibly on- the grounds of the
region's perceived disposition as a bulwark of support for ousted political
groups opposed to the NRM Government. It is however still premature at
this stage to determine whether or not the absence of political pluralism in
Uganda has an important bearing on the vibrancy and activism of local
governments especially within the context of bottom-up policy formulation
and decision-making. Such a position will emerge in chapter six when
research findings arising_ out of the case study in Hoima district local
government are discussed.
2.5 Democratisation
Nsibambi (1998:7) describes democratisation as a process of putting in
place systems, structures and practices of government which answer the
following: freedoms (of opinion, association, press and worship), periodic
free and fair elections of national and local leaders, decent living standards
for every member of society and accountable administration. He further
posits that democratisation transforms political and administrative
institutions as well as behaviour directing them towards the empowerment
of people to participate effectively in shaping their economic, political and
cultural well-being.
According to Rueschemeyer et.al, (1992:63-68), democracy is above all a
matter of power; democratisation accordingly must involve a substantial
increase in political equality. Consequently, the possibility of democracy is
a function of power relations and they advance three salient dimensions to
these relations: the balance of power between different social classes; the
structure, strength and autonomy of the state apparatus and its interrelation
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with the civil society..and thirdly, the impact on the first two dimensions of
trans-national power relations.
Still more famous is Moore's (1993:418) emphasis on the role of the
bourgeoisie as the bearers of the democratic project, 'no bourgeois, no
~ democracy'. In this respect he disagrees fundamentally with the argument
propounded by Rueschemeyer et.al, who in setting out their proposed
theoretical framework suggest that rather than the bourgeoisie, which may
fear threats to its interests posed by an enfranchised working class, it is the
working classes themselves who have most to gain and are thus the most
likely agents of democratisation. Secondly, Rueschemeyer et.a!. maintain
that the consolidation of state power is an essential pre-requisite to
democracy. They conceptualise this largely in terms of state autonomy
from social forces and they stress the need to operate with a differentiated
conception of society. Inthis regard, Rueschemeyer et.al. completely part
company with Nsibambi (1998:7), Reddy (1999:39), Reddy & Sabelo
(1997:577), and Olowu (1995:5) all of whom look at dispersal of state
power to local governments through decentralisation as a key ingredient
and prerequisite to democratisation.
Beetham (1993:56-57) in a summary of views that he terms as the 'liberal
democratic conjunction', identifies four major benchmarks that are essential
for the democratisation process to take root and blossom. He outlines
these as:
• The securing of the freedom of expression, movement and
association as individual rights subject to special legal or
constitution protection. He argues that while not all individual rights
are democratic rights, without access to information to persuade
others as well as to vote, democracy would be meaningless.
Democratic rights in other words are those individual rights which
are necessary to serve popular control over the process of
collective decision-maklnq on an on-going basis, and which need
protection especially when their exercise involve opinions or actions
that are unpopular either with government or society at large.
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• The institutional separation of powers between the executive,
legislature and judiciary without which the idea of the rule of law,
and all that it embraces such as the protection of individual rights,
the guaranteeing of free and fair trial, the subordination of state
officials to the rule of law and the availability of legal redress against
mal-administration or abuse of office, would be illusory.
• The existence of a representative assembly, elected on a
. geographical basis through universal adult suffrage, with powers to
approve all taxation and legislation and to scrutinize the actions of
the executive. In comparison with the direct assembly of all citizens,
the representative assembly is justifiable as the most effective
device for reconciling the requirements of popular control and
political equity with the exigencies of time and the conditions of the
modern territorial state.
• The existence of good will and knowledge among the population.
This view is grounded in the epistemological premise that the only
criterion for the public good is what the people, freely organised, will
choose and not what some expert or prophet decrees on the basis
of superior knowledge. In this regard, the anti-paternalistic view of
democracy is identical with that of liberalism and both rest on the
same epistemological foundations (Beetham, 1993: 56-57).
Leeds (1981: 39) also identifies four conditions necessary for a democracy,
namely tolerance, widespread participation, political consensus and diverse
institutions which he goes on to enumerate as universal adult suffrage, a
legislature, the executive and an independent judiciary. He observes that
for a democracy to be consolidated, the country should not be too large or
populous, there should be a wide distribution of wealth and property
ownership, and the electorate should be well informed.
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2.5.1 Multi-Party Democracy: Opportunities, Constraints and
Prospects
According to Diamond et al (1989:11), multi-party democracy or political
pluralism denotes a system of government that meets three essential
conditions. The first is competition. There- should be meaningful and
extensive competition among individuals and organised groups, especially
political parties, for all effective positions of governmental power. The
second is political participation. There should bea highly inclusive level of
political participation in the selection of leaders and policies through regular
and fair elections in a way that does not exclude any social group. The third
and last is the existence of civil and political liberties. There should be a
high level of civil and political liberties, such as the freedom of expression,
freedom of the press and freedom to form and join organisations such as
political parties so as to promote political competition. Barya (2000:25)
summarises the functions of political parties as follows:
• Aggregation of different interests into common realisable goals
In modern societies it is not possible for every individual to analyse and
comprehend society on his or her own and to act and effect change.
Political parties keep people informed of developments, changes and
issues and pinpoint the wrongs that tend to be committed by the party in
government. In essence political parties play an educative and
conscientising role. Individuals cannot perform this role nor can a single
political organisation check itself.
• Political parties provide choice to the electorate
Democracy cannot exist without a free choice by the citizens between
several different and alternative political programmes presented to them. In
other words, democracy is not a choice between different individuals but
rather what they represent in terms of ideology, interests and programmes.
Without the opposition, any failing, repressive, non-developmental or
undesirable regime cannot be removed peacefully or democratically and
this creates room for undemocratic and violent methods of changing
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government to evolve. Democracy cannot be nurtured under such
circumstances.
• Political parties provide ideological alternatives
Since political parties provide alternatives at the level of ideology, values,
programmes and leadership, they put pressure on the incumbent
government to be accountable and responsive to people's interests and
demands. In the process they become effective guarantors of democracy
and human rights and operate as a protection against dictatorship. Without
the fear of a possible loss of power to the opposition, there is no incentive
for the group in power to be responsive to people's demands, needs and
interests. It is the fear of losing power to a visible, organised and credible
opposition that keeps any government in check, responsive and on its toes.
• Political parties ensure the quest for excellence
The existence of political parties and pluralist political competition at all
levels of society, central and local, ensures that each party strives to the
best of its capabilities to develop programmes that appeal to the electorate.
Under competitive multiparty politics, the ruling party would strive to excel
so that it is re-elected. On the other hand opposition parties would do
everything possible to correct past mistakes and develop credible policies
that would propel them to power in the next elections. It is this kind of
competition that has the potential to stimulate and accelerate development
and democratisation.
2.5.2 No-Party Democracy: The case of Uganda
Advocates of the no-party democracy which is also referred to as the
Movement type of democracy have consistently argued that a poor and
backward country like Uganda, recovering from decades of state-
sponsored violence and economic decay, cannot afford the luxury of
multipartyism. Kabwegyere (2000: 32), one of the key proponents of this
view, argues that when political parties were allowed to operate, both in the
1960s and 1980s, they were simply breeding grounds for religious, ethnic
and tribal cleavages. In his view there is need for more time for the country
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to restore political sanity, forge national unity, reconstruct the economy,
inculcate democratic values and practices, and build viable and sustainable
democratic institutions. Wapakhabulo (2000:80), another strong proponent
of -me Movement type- of democracy identifies three essential elements
which are pertinent to this type of democracy and any meaningful practice
of democracy. According to him these are:-
Parliamentary democracy, popular democracy and a decent level of living
for every Ugandan. In other words, there should be an elected parliament,
elected at regular intervals and such elections must be free from corruption
and manipulation of the population. In addition to this exercise, there must
be people's committees at the village, parish, sub-county, county and
district level.
In spite of the above justification, critics of the no-party democracy insist
that it is a negation of the fundamental human right of association. They
argue, and rightly so, that no-party democracy is simply a one-party
dictatorship whose aim is to crowd out from the political arena views of
opposing political organisations. In his vehement opposition to the
Movement type of democracy, Kasfir (2000:5) contends that although it
began as a radical and unprecedented attempt to empower ordinary
Ugandans both in towns and the countryside, over the years it has been
abused by the NRM government to enhance its legitimation and deepen its
position of power rather than to extend the frontiers of democracy. In his
view, the original good intentions have been reduced to self-perpetuation
and entrenchment by the group in power.
This thesis agrees with Kasfir to some extent, and argues that while the
Movement system has increased the scope for democratic participation
through, for example, the proliferation of democratic councils in villages,
sub-counties up to district level, which in itself constitutes a radical change
in Uganda's politics, the presence of these institutions has not led to any
further creative political applications. A close analysis will reveal that
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energy comparable to that put in their formation has not been invested in
teaching villagers to use their new positions to reform their own lives nor to
use their councils to form their own views on national issues. The role of
ParliamentiTas tended to be fused with the activities of the Executive thus
negating the principle of the separation of powers-which is a key pre-
requisite of any meaningful democracy. Ultimately, this has affected
consolidation of the devolution process because both the centre and the
periphery have been deprived of the multiple platforms necessary for
initiation, synthesizing, aggregation and advocacy of alternative values and
interests that are critical to the process of local government
democratisation and development. A review of literature of various authors
on the subject matter have highlighted the right of association through
political parties, and popular participation in the decision-making process
by the population as basic denominators in any process of democratic
governance. In essence, the continuing absence of political pluralism in
Uganda would in this regard be viewed as a major aberration in respect of
a truly democratic dispensation.
2.6 Defining Decentralisation
Conyers (1983:101), like Rondinelli (1981:137), defines decentralisation
in a broad sense to refer to any transfer of the authority to plan, make
decisions and manage public functions from the national level to any
organisation or agency at the sub-national level. These include semi-
autonomous public corporations, area wide or regional development
authorities, non-governmental organisations and autonomous local
governments. According to Rondinelli (1981:137), the degree of political
and legal power that is transferred or delegated with the authority to plan,
decide or manage, depends on the form of decentralisation used and the
amount of support that the central government provides to other
organisational units in carrying out decentralised functions. He outlines
three forms of decentralisation namely:-
• Deconcentration, which he defines as the shifting of workload from
central government ministry headquarters to staff located in offices
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outside of the national capital through a system of field administration
which allows the field staff some degree of decision-making discretion
that can enable them to make routine decisions and adjust the
implementation-of central directives to local conditions.
• Delegation, which he defines as the transfer of decision-making and
management authority for specific functions to organisations that are
only under the indirect control of central government ministries. Such
organisations or agencies to which public functions are delegatee tend
to have semi-independent authority to perform their responsibilities and
may not even be located within the regular government structure, and
• Devolution, which is the most extreme form of decentralisation and
denotes the creation and consolidation of independent levels and units
of sub-national government. Devolution implies the divestment of
functions by the central government and the creation of new units of
governance outside the control of central authority.
Reddy (1999:16), citing White (1959:23), defines decentralisation as the
transference of authority, legislative, judicial or administrative from a higher
level of government to a lower level. Referring to a United Nations study
Reddy (1999:16) gives two distinct applications for the term
decentralisation which they categorise as; de-concentration of decision-
making authority to dependant field units of the same department or level
of government, which put alternatively, implies delegation to civil servants
working in the field, of power to make decisions in the execution of central
government policies; and of devolution of decision-making authority,
including restricted policy making power, to relatively autonomous regional
or local governments or to special statutory bodies. The study refers to the
former as administrative decentralisation and the latter as political
decentralisation.
Besides the above two applications for the term, both
Meenakshisundaram (1994:11) and Kotze (1997:25-26) introduce
another two; delegation, the transferring of responsibility for specifically-
defined functions to organisations that are outside the regular bureaucratic
structure and are only indirectly controlled by the central government; and
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privatisation, the passing of responsibility for functions to non-governmental
organisations or private enterprises independent of the government.
According to Nsibambi (1998:6), decentralisation is a term that
presupposes centralised and unitary states and describes a process by
which powers, political, financial and managerial, are transferred from the
centre to local governments (corporate bodies) giving them more autonomy
and liberty to manage their local affairs within the framework of a unitary
state. A successful decentraiisation policy therefore must respect national
unity and indivisibility as well as local diversity and autonomy (Nsibambi,
1998:6). Within these parameters, decentralisation should not be seen as a
struggle between central and local governments but rather as a reform
process geared towards redesigning the profile of the state to enable it
exercise its essential functions while letting local governments complete the
delivery of services to local populations effectively.
In a closely related observation, Burki et.al. (1999:31) argue that
decentralisation is also important because it increases local influence over
the centre. They insist that if decentralisation does not increase local
influence over the public sector, then the principal case for decentralisation,
other than political stability, vanishes. The presumption of some
decentralisation advocates is that decentralisation automatically increases
the influence of all strata of society. But there is an equal possibility that
decentralisation simply transfers power from national to local elites, and
that improved access of local elites to public resources simply increases
opportunities for corruption. This fear is also echoed by Bardhan
(1997:53) who observes that while decentralisation can be powerful for
achieving development goals in ways that respond to the needs of local
communities by assigning control rights to people who have the information
and incentives to make decisions best suited to those needs, and who
have the responsibility for the political and economic consequences of their
decisions, it also has important caveats and the most important is that
decentralisation can bolster the power of elites in settings with highly
unequal power structures.
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While in principle, decentralisation itself would be expected to increase
local participation, writers on institutional economics have long observed
that peoples' wiilingness to participate will vary according to their
perception of how much impact such participation will have (Hirschman,
1970:62 North, 1990:38 Ostrom et.aI.1993:112). Individuals who are
expected to invest resources, including their own time and labour, must
believe that the benefits they receive will exceed the costs of doing so. The
more interest groups perceive that they can influence political decisions,
the more likely they will be to mobilise (Smith, 1996:169). It is for this
reason that Bamberger et.al. (1996:62) look at decentralisation as
probably the most often advocated path to increased popular participation
in decision-making and development. This policy, they argue, allows more
people to participate in the development process while making their voice
heard through the political system. Popular participation in this case may
be seen either as a desirable end in itself (a basic component of
democracy), or as a means of improving the management of development
programmes by making them more relevant to the local needs and
increasing local commitment to and involvement in them. Through popular
participation government can foster economic growth and spread the
benefits to those groups traditionally by-passed by economic progress.
Bamberger et al. are supported in their line of thinking by former World
Bank President Robert S. McNamara who noted that if governments were
serious about distributing the benefits of development more equitably, then
"experience shows that there is greater chance of success if institutions
provide for popular participation, local leadership and decentralisation of
authority" (World Bank, 1996:62). Hubert Allen (World Bank, 1996:63)
was even more succinct when he said, "in all systems everything depends
on people's participation, which can enable the most inept structure to
succeed and cause the most admirable model to fail". In this thesis, the
term "decentralisation" denotes devolution and the two are used
interchangeably. Secondly, given that the system of local government in
Uganda is created by the Constitution (Chapter 11), which in Article 176 (2)
(a) states inter alia that,
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the local government system shall be such as to ensure that the functions,
powers and responsibilities are devolved and transferred from the
Government to local government units in a coordinated manner,
it is postulated that the decentralised system of governance-in Uganda is
based on the principle of devolution, and this is also enshrined in the
preamble of the Local Governments Act (1997) where the objectives of the
Actare stated as the" consolidation and streamlining of the existing law on
local governments in line with the Constitution to give effect to the
decentralisation and devolution of functions, powers and services; and to
provide for devolution at all levels of local governments to ensure good
governance and democratic participation in, and control of decision making
by the people".
2.7 Good Governance
A Ugandan working group coordinated by the Ministry of Justice and
composed of various representatives from government ministries, NGOs,
donors, the police and prisons that met to discuss ways of strengthening
instruments of governance in Uganda gave the following definition and
benchmarks of good governance:
Good governance is the exercise of politico-administrative and managerial
authority and order, which is legitimate, accountable, transparent,
democratic, efficient and equitable in resource allocation and utilisation,
and responsive to the critical needs of promoting human welfare and
positive transformation of society. It manifests itself through benchmarks
which include: a Constitution, pillars of the state derived from the
Constitution (i.e the Executive, Parliament, the Judiciary, including local
councils), mechanisms of checks and balances on governments, security,
good leadership, rule of law, participation by the people, freedom of
expression, transparency, accountability, legitimacy, devolution of power,
informed citizenry, strong civil society, protection of basic human rights,
regular free and fair elections, political stability and protection of life and
property.
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Though generic and all-encompassing, the above definition nevertheless
brings out three distinctive aspects of good governance around which the
entire descriptive paraphernalia seem to revolve, and these are;
constitutionalism manifesting itself through the doctrine of the separation of
powers between the three pillars of the-state; participation of the people in
development programmes that affect their lives; and empowerment
manifesting itself through devolution of power and a strong civil society.
On the other hand, Dunn (1996:12) looks at good governance in terms of
organisational effectiveness. According to him good governance implies a
high level of organisational effectiveness and does not imply the choice of
a particular ideological model of state organisation. Hyden (1992:7-8) on
his part looks at good governance as the conscious management of regime
structures aimed at enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm. Le Roy
(1992:299-300),insists that the following factors must prevail if one is to talk
of good governance: legitimacy of authority, public responsiveness, public
accountability, and public tolerance of other actors with a public character,
information openness and public management effectiveness. He outlines
six other definitions of good governance as:
• authority or administrative order which is accountable, transparent,
democratic, and conforms to the rule of natural justice and
established norms acceptable to society.
• a system of managing society in such a way that resources are
responsibly used in a democratic and participatory manner for the
maximum realisation of human potential and people's aspirations.
• legitimate, responsible and efficient management of human and
material resources for the equitable and qualitative transformation of
society in a suitable manner.
• a process that allows for the establishment of a workable system of
managing public affairs under laws agreed upon by the community
where rulers are periodically elected through universal adult suffrage
and both the governors and the governed play their roles in a
perceived social contract.
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• the transparent, just and equitable exercise of authority by the
regularly and democratically elected representatives of the people
that ensures accountability, the rule of law, sustainable
development, national security and improved quality of life of the
people.
• a democratically established-system of conducting public affairs by a
society for their own welfare; it is a system that is responsive to the
critical need of transforming human welfare and positive
transformation of society. Such a system is characterised by
adherence to constitutionalism, the rule of law, accountability and
transparency in the conduct of public affairs.
Rosenau (1992:4) espouses a more conservative view of good
governance when he classifies it as a system of rule that works only if it is
accepted by the majority or at least by the most powerful of those it affects.
The UNDP (1994:22) in its publication, Background to the Global Research
Framework of Decentralised Governance Programme, has identified seven
features of sound good governance: legitimacy established through rule-
based opportunities for changing government in an orderly and predictable
manner, freedom of association and participation, fair and effective legal
frameworks and due processes, accountability of public office and service
and transparent processes for determining whether public trust was
respected, availability of valid and reliable information, effective and
efficient public sector management and cooperation between government
and civil society organisations. The World Bank (1989:73) argues in its
report, "Sub-Sahara Africa: From crises to sustainable growth", that good
governance must guarantee human rights, check corruption and promote
democratisation as well as accountability. The importance of these virtues
is echoed by Landell-Mills (1992:563) who look at the proliferation of
associations at all levels, rural and urban, and in a variety of forms and
types as a powerful factor constraining abusive central government
authorities and the predatory conduct of dominant elites. By empowering
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groups throughout society to voice their concerns and take direct action to
achieve their ends, the trend is strongly in favour of more participatory
politics, greater public accountability, and basic democracy. Looked at
analytically, all these definitions of good governance display an amazing
combination of political and leadership systems, both structural and
behavioural, public sector management, civil society development, and
efficiency in service delivery, but suffice it to mention though that good
governance must not only concentrate on mechanistic aspects of service
delivery but also focus attention on qualitative and equity aspects of
empowering the people. But whatever the relative merits of these various
viewpoints, it is evident that a modern state will only become and remain
democratic if there are strong, in-built systems of political and bureaucratic
accountability.
2.8 The Civil Society
The concept of Civil Society is difficult to employ as an analytical
tool. The problem partly lies in the complexity of its definitions. As a
concept however, it has lately acquired intellectual visibility in African
scholarship because of the related concept of governance. According to
Woods (1992:85), civil society implies a process of differentiation. Its
constitution is precisely about the separation of public/private, state/society
and economic interests with distinct spheres of action. This does not mean
that the process of differentiation is sharply dichotomised; however, it does
suggest that norms around which society is organised and how economic
interests are aggregated are the crudely reductionistic interests of social
classes.
According to Moyo (1996:19-21), the concept of civil society has three
definitions: civil society as free associations; civil society as self-
organisation; and civil society as political community. The first definition of
civil society as free associations presupposes the existence of free
associations such as political parties, trade unions, NGOs, Community-
Based organisations and church groups that are empirically seen to be free
from the control of the state. As regards the second definition, civil society
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exists where the public or political community as a whole is able to
organise itself and -coordinate its activities without the control of the State.
The third definition applies when the political community is composed of an.
ensemble of free associations which have the political and organisational
capacities to coordinate their activities and also to determine or influence
the type, sequence and development of state policy significantly. Within this
framework, the government of the day cannot rule arbitrarily because it is a
product of the political community as a whole. On the basis of the above
definitions, Moyo (1996:21) deduces the overall definition of a Civil Society
as a political community capable of accommodating a variety of individual
and associational interests within a pluralist or multi-centric social
framework in search of a greater common good.
On his part, Diamond (1994:10) defines civil society as a realm of
organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating, self-supporting,
autonomous from the State and bound by a set of shared rules. However, it
is necessary to emphasise that, although Civil Society stands apart from
the State, articulates and defends civil interests, it is not necessarily in
basic contradiction to the State. The major interest of the greater part of the
civil society is not to capture state power but to check its abuse as well as
to influence the formulation and implementation of public policy. This
distinguishes it from the general society, since the former refers to the
political realm and in particular the means and processes through which
citizens shape the character of political and economic life in their country.
The pressure and strength of the civil society will therefore be verified by
the existence and dynamism of organisations such as NGOs, Community-
Based organisations, professional and private sector associations and
trade unions. In sum, there is concurrence between the foregoing and the
view of Landeil-Mills (1992:552), that the interlocking formal and informal
associations of individuals pursuing common interests constitute the warp
and wool of Civil Society, that the key features are the shared values of
members, as well as their willingness to adhere to a set of rules governing
their organisation, and that these will inevitably be a reflection of their
cultural norms. Consequently, the strength of Civil Society will be
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determined by the richness of associational life, and hence governments
must be willing to accept the establishment of various groups and
institutions outside their control and to refrain from ~harassing them by
means of unnecessary regulation. From the above analysis, Landell-Mills
discerns four distinct ways for Civil Society to be nurtured. The first one is
by facilitating the dissemination of information; the second is by
strengthening the rule of law; the third is by expanding education so that
there are more people able both to understand what is happening and to
articulate clearly the interests of the groups to which they belong in a
language understood by state bureaucrats and the fourth is by generating
surplus resources in cash or kind to support associational activities without
compromising their autonomy. The situation in Uganda remains highly
desirous of the aforementioned conditions. This need can be discerned
from one of the documented conceptualisations of the problem:
The main challenges to institutionalising democratic governance are the
establishment of its ethos. The ethos of democratic governance flourishes
through the interface between institutions of governance and those of the
Civil Society. While decentralisation has reformed the institutions of
governance by entrusting powers and responsibility to local elected leaders,
Civil Society in Uganda remains weak. Local leaders remain trapped in old
practices and transparency is yet to come (Sabiti-Makara, 1998:44).
This lack of a strong Civil Society, particularly in the periphery, has
rendered the process of political and administrative empowerment of the
masses synonymous with unloading a heavy dose of unknown and
sometimes unwanted responsibility on unprepared shoulders.
While Kabwegyere (2000:95) attributes the fragility of Civil Society
institutions as pillars of democracy in Uganda, and indeed in Africa to the
colonial past, and wants us to understand the problem in the context of
colonialism which, he argues, disorganised and swallowed pre-colonial
states and disrupted kinship networks so severely that it took a long time
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for the people to re-organise themselves to fight against the colonial
system, this thesis disagrees with him to some extent and instead concurs
with Hadjor (1987:16) in his dual perception of the problemas being of
colonial creation but sustained or even entrenched over time by successive
Ugandan regimes.
The exclusion of the masses from political participation both during the
colonial period and after independence led to:
A growing concentration of power; the emergence of the omnipotent
president who holds the reins ofpower in his own hands; heavy dependence
on the army and the bureaucracy with, therefore, no independent support;
the leader becomes insecure and consequently real power resides in the
state machine. That is why so many of those in authority, who yesterday
were so powerful, now reside in exile pondering what went wrong (Sabiti-
Makara, 1998:44).
There is also evidence that as far back as the 1940s efforts were made by
the colonial government to listen to the needs of the people and to
encourage its officials and chiefs to explain various aspects of the colonial
policies and development programmes to the subjects. Thompson
(2003:307) observes that the establishment of the Public Relations and
Social Welfare Department of the Protectorate Government in late 1946
was a step in that direction. The purpose of the department was to serve as
a channel of information between the government and the people, and to
popularise and promote all measures directed to the social progress and
material welfare of the population.
Back in January 1945 the Chief Secretary had sent a memorandum to all
government departments urging them to keep" the African" informed and"
supplied with full explanations of measures that government is taking
affecting the African population, so as to anticipate wherever possible
misunderstanding or false rumour" (Apter, 1967:260). Indeed
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Hall's'ianalysis of the role of the Department of Public Relations and Social
Welfare at its establishment, included these words:
... .ignorance by the people of what their government is doing or attempting
to do for them, and for what object, and ignorance by the government of
what- the people are- wanting, saying and thinking, create
misunderstanding, suspicion and discontent which, starting as mere grit on
the wheels, can, if-neglected,become a large sized spanner in the works.
In almost every case they are avoidable (Quoted in Thompson, 2003:308).
On the basis of the above argument, it is therefore not prudent for
Kabwegyere to apportion all the blame for Uganda's weak Civil Society on
colonialism when it is clearly evident that instead of mobilising the people,
Uganda's post-colonial leaders relied on force and state bureaucracies,
resulting in popular apathy and cynicism. During the first Obote and Amin
eras, the people withdrew from the political arena, and it was dangerous to
question the decisions of the two regimes, let alone to take an independent
line or to offer contrary alternatives to official orthodoxy. Apart from the
authoritarianism of the State and its impact on the people, weak
organisational capacities of the people in Uganda is another possible
constraining factor-regarding the dynamism of the Civil Society. The formal
educational system that was established during the colonial period has
continued to pursue more or less the same objectives of producing an elite
uprooted from society. Ultimately the low quality of education has meant
that the mass of the people are not aware of their collective strength.
2.9 Problems of Accountability: Civil Society and the State
Lehmann (1990: 204) observes that many of the inefficiencies and biases
in resource allocations made by the State are not merely the effects of bad
decisions, but more fundamentally, consequences of the weakness or
absence of mechanisms through which society can hold the state
accountable for its actions, and demand from it policies and programmes
6 Sir John Harthorn Hall was Governor of the Uganda Protectorate from 1944 to1952.
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which meet societal needs. In support of this view, Healey & Robinson
(1992:90) note that a survey of the literature on governance and
democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa concluded that the general experience of
the African State has been quite different from that of the liberal western
model of the State as a neutral arena in which interest groups seek to
influence policy and resource allocation. Rather, the African State has
typically been controlled by small elites. They conclude that:
The apparently irrational policies of the 1970s seem to be partly explained
by the following features. Firstly, policies have been made in small,
exclusive political circles ...with little consultation of societal interests ...
Second, the most powerful influence seems to have been the search for
political legitimacy... through a patronage and clientelistic process rather
than through open politically competitive electoral systems... A third but
weaker influence on policy was the regime's ideology.
They further contend that such situations of extreme neglect by the State of
societal concerns are often due in part to the political and organisational
weakness of the Civil Society, and in particular, of the rural poor. The
significance of this factor is demonstrated by the determination with which
authoritarian and rightist regimes in Chile and Bolivia sought to destroy
peasant organisations, which had in earlier periods been strong enough to
gain policy concessions, as significant as land reform (Thiesenhusen,
1989:44 Lehmann, 1990:207 Caroil, 1964:37). In Africa the peasantry
has been consistently far weaker as a political force, and this has been
explained by several scholars as the cause of its inability to affect general
state policies (Hyden, 1983:70 Bates, 1981 :87 Healey & Robinson
1992:91).
It is in this vein that the governance debates have led both scholars and
reformers of the political landscape to focus more attention on local
governance and Civil Society. Many have suggested that if local
governments are strengthened by channelling funds through them and
45
increasing their control over development programmes, so too will be the
Civil Society as a whole.
2.10 The Civil Society and Self-Managed Development
According to Bebbington et.a/. (r993:12) the activities .of the institutions of
civil society have attracted the interests of analysts not only for their
potential to make the state more accountable, but also for their role in
development. They argue that many local organisations and agrarian
movements, besides being political agents, have assumed a self-help and
developmental role. In their view, these self-help actions represent an
attempt on the part of the grassroots to assert greater control over the
environments in which they live. In their contention Bebbington et.a/.
(1993:12) look at local self-development actions as contributing to a
process of collective self-empowerment in two senses. Psychologically
and organisationally they begin to build grassroots capacity to take hold of
local development problems - an issue on which Carroll (1992:53) also
places paramount importance. At the same time, they have a more obvious
economically-empowering role in reducing material poverty. However, in
principle the significance of this argument within the context of devolution is
that development should not only be about growth, but also about the
construction of a society that gives people more power to fashion and enjoy
the spaces in which they live. It should broaden democracy beyond the
simple right to vote in elections, into a direct democracy that would
increase the range of contexts outside politics where people can exercise
the right to vote while also taking on board wider issues of gender,
democracy, local development initiatives and sustainability.
On his part Friedmann (1992:77) observes that while the theory and
practice of development must recognise and develop human agency,
populist formulations that concentrate only on consciousness-raising, local
knowledge, and grassroots action, must be more politically realistic. They
must find ways to link local action with strategies to remove structural
obstacles to human development and this is where his argument turns to
grassroots organisations and those NGOs which give them support.
These, he asserts, are the organisations that can empower people both
economically and psychologically, developing their capacities and
_ _ __ .. determination to claim their rights; They also become vehicles, albeit
imperfectly so, for helping to link local action back into national and
structural change. Consequently, for Friedmann (1992:77) and Lehmann
.- (1990:84) localorganisations membership and non-membership inspire the
thinking behind a theoretical reformulation of development, and become
the vehicles through which the Civil Society both as free associations and
political community galvanise their efforts towards local development. On
the basis of the foregoing analysis, the linkage of NGO activity to the
debates on democracy, development and Civil Society becomes profound
and all-pervasive. Given that NGOs have the potential of reaching the
poorest strata of society, and of promoting the participation of rural people
in design, implementation and monitoring of local development
programmes, their presence in particular areas in the countryside has been
marked by an equally synergetic Civil Society, more efficient in resource
use and more effective in implementation of community programmes.
2.11 Interface Between Good Governance, Decentralisation,
Democratisation and Civil Society
When the paradigms of good governance, decentralisation,
democratisation and Civil Society are closely analysed, it becomes evident
that they all seek to empower people to exercise as much influence as
possible on their social, political and economic destiny. Put in another way,
economic, political, legal and social empowerment is the meeting point of
good governance, decentralisation, democratisation and Civil Society.
Decentralisation is thus a process that, depending on its objectives, the
way it is implemented, and the prevailing environment, may lead to the
installation of a politico-administrative framework conducive for good
governance. Nevertheless, decentralisation is not synonymous with good
governance, neither is it the same thing as democratisation. If
decentralisation does not lead to empowerment of the people, then it
cannot constitute an element of good governance, nor can it contribute to
democratisation or the strengthening of the Civil Society (Nsibambi,
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1998:9). When power which is decentralised to local governments is
monopolised at district level, decentralisation tn this context does not
necessarily lead to good governance. Decentralisation only serves as a tool
of empowerment and therefore enhances democracy and good
governance if local governments and institutions at lower levels as well as
people at the grass-roots are vested not only with responsibilities but also
with the legal authority to decide and commit allocated resources in
discharging those responsibilities. Good governance must therefore be
underpinned by a democratic system of government, but democracy cannot
thrive unless space is given to the Civil Society to operate effectively.
Indeed to emphasize the above, using LandeU-Mills (1992:552),
Democracy will not necessarily lead to rapid economic growth, nor to the
alleviation ofpoverty and protection ofthe weak, and it does not inevitably
lead to benevolent and efficient government. But if democracy is
underpinned by a strong and responsible civil society, it is likely to result in
more accountable government.
If one accepts the logic of the above analysis, the practical task both for
Ugandans wishing to build a more prosperous country, and for outsiders
committed to assisting its development, is to deepen and broaden the civil
society. This, in contrast to the argument of Brett (1992:24), requires much
more than giving political roles to hundreds of thousands of people in
resistance councils to stimulate growth in social responsibility. Conversely,
the solution lies in the proliferation of associations at all levels, rural and
urban, as a factor to constrain abusive central government authorities and
the predatory conduct of dominant elites. The bottom line for the political
relationship between the centre and the periphery is that rich associational
life fostered by decentralisation will help buttress a strong Civil Society that
will serve as the vanguard for the process of empowerment.
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2.12 Governance, Empowerment and Human Agency: The Role of
Non-Governmental Organisations
According to Bebbington et. al. (1993:21) and Annis (1987:131) a-certain
convergence is emerging between the concerns of those who talk of good
governance and democracy, those who talk of empowering local people,
and those who stress the need to respect local people as human agents
who can and should be allowed to take active roles in fashioning the
contexts in which they live. All are elaborating an argument that
development should be more participatory, diverse and all-inclusive than
has been the case in the past. All are questioning the dominance of the
economistic thinking in definitions of development. All have argued that for
future development to be reoriented so as to respect these concerns, more
spheres of local action and support should be passed over to non-
governmental institutions, and that the role of NGOs ought to be
strengthened. In accepting the proposition that NGOs are an essential
catalyst for spurring rural development and invigorating rural associational
life, hence building the Civil Society, the notion that they are the main
panacea to the problem of lack of empowerment wherever and whenever
this occurs, should to be accepted with caution. It is an argument of this
thesis that while they may be major players in stimulating grassroots
development directly through local action, success is actually dependent on
positive processes outside the sphere of local action. These processes
include cooperation from local beneficiaries and support from the state.
An example of ASSEFA - Association of Sarva Seva Farms in India will be
used to illustrate this point (Thomas 1992:118). This is one of the
movements in India through which followers of Mahatma Gandhi have
attempted to give practical expression to his vision of a non-violent
revolution leading to a new kind of society based on the concepts of Gram
Swaraj (Village self-rule) and Sarvodaya (the welfare of all). ASSEFA was
created in 1969 by a small group of Sarvodaya workers, with the aim of
developing the lands donated to the landless through the Bhoodan (land
gift) Movement and making them into self-reliant communities. Over 4
million acres of land have been donated since the 1950s by individual
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landowners, and there are also over 15,000 Gramdan villages, where land
has been donated collectively by a majority of the landowners.
Supported by Oxfam of UK, Movimento Sviluppo e Pace (MSP) of Italy,
CCFD France, Action Aid from UK, ICCO from Holland and Inter pares
Canada, ASSEFA grew steadily from one farm of 70 acres in 1969 to
encompass nearly 100 projects and almost 10,000 acres in seven states by
1985 (Thomas 1992:120). From an initial emphasis on settlement of
allottees and land development on Bhoodan plots, it has broadened its
approach to include rural industries and provision of education and health
facilities in a more-integrated concept of community development.
In view of the above analysis, this thesis concurs with an assertion made
by Poulton and Harris (1988:48-51) that empowerment at the grassroots
should be seen as a process that relates to other wider processes. In the
example of ASSEFA, it is apparent that success was actually dependent on
positive processes outside the sphere of direct local action. These included
the following:-
• Landowners individually and collectively were foregoing their
property rights.
• Resources were made available by the states and central
government. Secondly there was a process of legitimising certain
democratic forms of local government by allowing the Gram Sabha
to be recognised as representatives of local interests.
• Gandhian activist workers were recruited to work in ASSEFA, while
resources were also acquired from international NGOs.
Thomas (1992:121) looks at the above as representing three important
types of processes:
• The first relates to local community level processes of social
differentiation and changing power relations. This manifests itself in
terms of the dialogue and bondage that emerge between the
landless, low caste communities and rich high caste land owners;
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• The second relates to wider processes joining that community to
the state and society at large, including representation of interests,
broader social differentiation and democratisation; and
• The third relates to processes occurring within the NGO itself or
between NGOs, relating the local action to the parent NGO and
others, including both mechanisms of accountability and the means
by which material and staff resources for such local actions are
made available and maintained.
Figure 1
Grassroots Empowerment Through NGO Activities as a Process
Within Three Intersecting Arenas
Source: Wuyts, M. et at. (1992:122)
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According to Thomas (1992:121), these processes go on within three
intersecting arenas, as shown in Figure 1. In the event of an NGO
appearing to be successful on its own terms, it is likely to be because of
favourable circumstances in these arenas, as is notable from the ASSEFA
case.
On the basis of the foregoing, it will be argued in this thesis that the role of
NGOs as agents of grassroots empowerment ought to be analysed within
the context of the existing environment. Their absence from a particular
locality may affect development in that area, in terms of reduced capacity to
organise and articulate societal interests and priorities so as to have them
addressed by the State, but their presence is not necessarily a guarantee for
local development, especially if there are no favourable circumstances in the
three intersecting arenas as depicted in figure 1. It is argued further that
NGOs need to recognize and address some of the acute limitations they
face if they are to be effective in the empowerment process of the local
population. Some of these limitations include their small size, restricted
impact, distance from policy decisions, poor co-ordination, problems of
representativeness and accountability, and professional and technical
limitations. Discussion of these failings ironically lead the discussion back to
the state - for in different ways it has been suggested that some of these
limitations could be addressed if NGOs engaged in more co-ordinated
relationships with public sector organisations. Nevertheless they still remain
important as conduits or intermediaries to close the gap between the centre
and the periphery by encouraging local communities to participate in
developmental activities in their areas of abode.
2.13 Empowerment
Thomas (1992:132), gives a brief definition of empowerment as a desired
process by which individuals, typically including the poorest of the poor,
take direct control over their lives, thus becoming agents of their own
development. Whereas local governance for some has to an extent been
seen in a residual role, filling in gaps in human and political needs not
adequately covered by the State and the market, for others local
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governance has potentially much more importance as the promoter of a
distinctive form of development (Wuyts et. al. 1992:118). The argument
here focuses on two interrelated notions of grassroots development and
empowerment. Grassroots development implies' direct improvement in
living standards of groups of the poor and under-privileqed in local
~ communities. Promoting development at this level means working directly
with such groups on projects designed and run collaboratively with them.
The phrase of Chambers (1983) "putting the last first", encapsulates this
way of thinking. The idea of empowerment takes the notion of collaboration
a stage further by indicating that development should be undertaken with
the direct aim of increasing the power and control of communities of
intended beneficiaries over the circumstances of their own lives to enable
them become their own development agents in future.
In reinforcing this view, the World Bank (1989:54-55), in a long-term
perspective study carried out in 1987, concluded thus:
Many basic services are best managed at the local level-even at the village
level-with the central agencies providing only technical advice and
specialised inputs. The aims should be to empower ordinary people to take
charge of their lives, to make communities more responsive for their
development, and to make governments listen to their people.
By empowering the people throughout society to voice their concerns and
take direct action to achieve their ends, the trend is strongly in favour of
more participatory politics, greater public accountability, and hence
establishment of basic democracy.
While Uganda, in spite of its elaborate devolution programme, still exhibits
some central government constraints on local decision-making especially in
areas of local taxation, including the capping of local tax levels, thus
affecting the resources available to support local development initiatives,
these constraints have not extinguished the desire to develop new ways of
involving people in the decisions that shape their lives at local level, and as
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Clarke & Stewart (1992:9) observe, empowerment is so much a theme of
our times that local authorities need to develop strategies which increase
public influence and control over the activities of their councils.
In order to develop effective approaches to local citizen empowerment,
Burns et. al. (1994:154) argue that it is important to reflect carefully on the
notions of choice, participation and control. They further argue that the
rhetoric of 'control ' is used across the political spectrum and is generally
perceived to be a desirable outcome of a local democratic process. They
note however that neither the political left nor right actually offers 'control'.
Rather, the right offers the extension of individual choice (largely by
undermining the political system and placing greater emphasis on the
economic system) and the left offers the extension of collective choice (by
attempting to increase participation in the system of representation). They
illustrate the distinction between choice, participation and control using the
analogy of a theatre performance.
A traditional play will be written by an author (read this to be a majority
political party) and performed by a group of actors (council officers) to the
audience (the public). The audience is not involved in either the writing or
the performance, except as the viewer. A more creative approach
introduces audience participation. Here there is still a script, but the actors
have a certain amount of freedom, and the audience is encouraged to
participate. However, if there is any danger of the script being undermined,
the involvement of the audience is diminished or withdrawn. The audience
can complain, but the most probable outcome of their complaint is that they
will be excluded from the theatre in the future. This according to Burns et
al. (1994:155) is managed participation. The dissatisfied audience could
alternatively go to another theatre but they would still have no involvement
in writing the script. This is what is meant by choice. If the choice the
audience wants is not available, then the exercise of choice does little to
empower the audience. The attempt to equate choice and participation with
control is then flawed because on the basis of the illustration expressed in
the above analogy, control means the power of directing. This would entail
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participation in the process of production (writing the script), and not only in
the process of consumption (watching or participating in some one else's
script).
Thus one might conclude that citizen control of the process of local
development can only-be achieved once the citizens can in the words of
Burns et al, (1994:155) 'get behind the scenes'. In many countries
however, including those pursuing ambitious local democratisation policies,
existing political arrangements keep the citizen in front of the stage and
offer only a passive role. While there may be binary political systems in
these countries in which, at root, the voter is able to say yes or no to a
particular party by either voting it in or out of power, the role of the citizen is
still almost entirely reactive because while the products or policies may be
packaged differently so that they appear to offer choice, it is a heavily
constrained choice.
In the final analysis, the key question that emerges from this discussion is
that if the state or indeed and public institution wishes to pursue a strategy
for empowering local people, it needs to decide whether or not, basing on
the above analogy, it really wants to invite citizens 'behind the scenes'. If it
does not want to move in this direction, it should not pretend that it does.
As Arnstein argued in her article on participation and empowering local
people, over thirty years ago,
There is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of
participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the
process. (Arnstein, 1971 :176).
Arnstein, in an effort to encourage a more enlightened dialogue, set out a
typology or ladder of citizen participation shown in figure 2. Her typology
identifies eight levels of participation, with each rung on the ladder





















Source: Arnstein, 1971: 176
Manipulation Non-participation
At the bottom of the ladder are two rungs of non-participation. The objective
here is not to enable people to participate in the planning or conducting of
programmes, but to enable power-holders to 'educate' or 'cure' the
participants. The next three rungs involve dialogue with the public. Citizens
to varying degrees have the right to be heard even if they do not take a
direct part in decision-making. In this zone of the ladder we find one-way
communication from the authority for example, announcements, pamphlets,
posters, annual reports; two-way exchanges for example, attitude surveys,
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village or ward meetings and public hearings; and co-option for example
through citizens sitting on committees but with power holders retaining the
right to decide. Further up the ladder are three rungs which give citizens
increasing degrees of decision-making clout. In this top part of the ladder
citizens share directly in the process of policy-making and service
provision. Though Arnstein (1971 :178) is at pains to point out that the
ladder is a simplification, thirty four years on, it still provides a helpful
starting point for discussion of citizen empowerment by underscoring the
interconnectedness of the latter with participation, since the power of
citizens to effect changes in day to day operational practices and
programmes will depend increasingly on their ability to participate in and
thus control key local development decisions.
2.13.1 Exit and Voice: The market and democratic models of
empowerment
According to Hirschman (1970:14) there are different ways of empowering
local people in relation to the organisations and institutions that are
intended to serve them. As the consequence it is not surprising to observe
that different mechanisms have evolved not only in the private and public
but also in the non-profit sectors. This thesis finds the concepts of exit and
voice developed by Hirschman (1970:15) to be very helpful in
understanding the power relationships between local people and the
organisations and institutions with which they interface. Stated simply, the
market model, in theory at least, gives individuals the power of exit since
dissatisfied customers can take their business else where. The democratic
process, again in theory at least, relies on individuals or groups having the
power of voice since dissatisfied citizens can obtain a response by taking
political action. It is , of course, possible for an organisation to have both
sets of reaction mechanism by having various institutions and voluntary
organisations being responsive both to the views expressed by their
members and to the shifts in membership and participation rates.
Hirschman (1970:15) argues that there is no implication that organisations
which are equipped with both feedback mechanisms are necessarily more
advanced than those which rely primarily on one alone, as everything
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depends on the responsiveness of the organisation whichever mechanism
or combination of mechanisms it is equipped with.
While he is concerned to explore ways of mixing exit and voice
mechanisms he is at pains to point out how different they are. This is
primarily because exit belongs to the realm of economics and voice to the
realm of politics. In his view:
Exit is the sort of mechanism economics thrive on. It is neat - one either
exits or one does not; it is impersonal - any face-to-face confrontation
between customer and firm with its imponderable and unpredictable
elements is avoided and success and failure of the organisation are
communicated to it by statistics; and it is indirect since any recovery on the
part of the declining firm comes by courtesy of the Invisible Hand, as an
unintended by-product of the customer's decision to shift.
In all these respects voice is just the opposite of exit. It is a far more
'messy' concept because it can be graduated, all the way from faint
grumbling to violent protest; it implies articulation of one's critical opinions
rather than a private, 'secret' vote in the anonymity of a supermarket; and
finally, it is direct and straightforward rather than roundabout. Voice is
political action par excellence. (Hirschman, 1970~15-16)
Hirschman's strategy for empowering local people by giving them voice is,
of course, much more familiar to those concerned with local government.
Indeed, a central justification for local authorities is that they can at least
give local people an indirect voice because they are democratically elected
and are accountable to their citizens. In essence therefore it can be
suggested that, in relation to local government, citizens can exercise voice
in two main ways - through the ballot box and through direct participation




The term "participation" appears with increasing frequency, emotion, and
looseness in the development discourse. This imprecision may have
rhetorical value in certain political contexts, but for purposes of analysis it
serves merely to cover up fuzzy or non-existent thinking (Johnson &Clark
1982:170). In this thesis, the conceptualisation by Uphoff & Esman
(1974:81) of participation by its ex-ante sense of before-the-fact
involvement in the choices and efforts producing benefits will be adopted in
preference to the economists' ex-post sense of after-the-fact distribution of
benefits.
The Peasants' Charter, (FAO 1981), which is the epitome of the declaration
of principles and programme of action of the World Conference on Agrarian
Reform and Rural Development held in 1981 at the Food and Agricultural
Organisation Headquarters in Rome, Italy, made the following observation
on participation:
Participation by the people in the institutions and systems, which govern
their lives, is a basic human right and also essential for realignment of
political power in favour of disadvantaged groups and for social and
economic development. Rural development strategies can realise their full
potential only through the motivation, active involvement and organisation
at the grassroots level of rural people, with special emphasis on the least
advantaged, in conceptualising and designing policies and programmes
and in creating administrative, social and economic institutions, including
cooperative and other voluntary forms of organisation for implementing and
evaluating them.
Unfortunately, participation, even when taken beyond mere rhetoric, is
often felt to be sufficient, for example, when villagers turn out on request to
dig irrigation channels or build roads or schools or community health units
merely to participate in the labour element of project implementation
Burkey (1993:57). Participation in project design and decision-making is all
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too often limited to a few village meetings where the project is explained
and the people are asked to give their comments, and where the few
comments made are by the school teacher in a language unintelligible to
the majority. A major study of the many participation initiatives of the 1960s
and 1970s concluded that:
Though there have been great moves towards public involvement in local
service provision in recent years, little has been achieved by way of a
fundamental shift in power, a shift which implicitly underlay the ideas of
radical proponents of participation in the late 1960s. In the end, elite
perspectives have won out, and participation has served the purposes of
building up a consensus for the proposals of those in power, thereby
legitimating them. (Boaden et ai, 1982:179)
Participation, if it is to really release the peoples' own creative energies for
development, must be much more than the mere mobilisation of labour
forces or the coming-together to hear about pre-determined plans.
Participation must be more than a policy statement-there must be a
genuine commitment to encourage participation in all aspects and at all
levels of development work. In the Ugandan context, this commitment
seems to be discernable within the framework of the existing law as
exemplified in the preamble of the Local Governments Act (1997:9):
An Act to amend, consolidate and streamline the existing law on local
governments in line with the Constitution to give effect to the
decentralisation and devolution of functions, powers and services; and to
provide for decentralisation at all levels of local governments to ensure
good governance and democratic participation in, and control of decision-
making by the people; and to provide for revenue and the political and
administrative set-up of local governments; and to provide for the election
of local councils and any other matters connected to the above.
The extent to which the above commitment has practically manifested itself
on the ground is still a subject of discussion in this study.
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Analysis of participation, as a concept is still incomplete without reference
to one ofthe leading researchers in the field. Fals-Borda, (1981:18) refers
to participation as a philosophical approach- to development rather than as
a policy. He points out that even General-Pinochet of Chile believed that
his government was participatory and warns that we should not deceive
ourselves by the official or common definitions of the concept of
participation, lest we end up with a jaundiced view of the term. Freire
(1972:42) from his neo-Marxist perspective of society as a social class
notes that:
Attempting to liberate the oppressed without their reflective participation in
the act of liberation is to treat them as objects which must be saved from a
burning building; it is to lead them into the populist pitfall and transform
them into masses which can be manipulated.
In such a case participation merely serves as a means to an end rather
than as an end in itself. But the biggest caution that participation is quite
often deployed as a mask to cover up quite different objectives is made by
Sarnoff (1979:43). He argues that, in situations where plans are formulated
centrally, and administrators dominate representative institutions,
participation is seen as an instrument to instruct, guide and legitimise rather
than to locate decision-making powers in the hands of local people. He
further argues that participation is incompatible with the bureaucratic and
technocratic values held by the newly-emerging bureaucratic bourgeoisie
which are necessary to their continuing dominance. While other classes
might benefit from representative institutions and high levels of
participation, a bureaucratic bourgeoisie does not. Participation is further
precluded by the ideology of "government as expertise" through which the
bureaucracy claims authority based on knowledge. Accordingly, to the
extent that increased productive capacity in the countryside depends on
local level participation and self-government, it is unlikely to be achieved
when a programme of decentralisation is "undertaken within the setting of a
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ruling bureaucratic class and a dominant ideology of technology" (Sarnoff,
1979:57).
Parnell et. al. (2002:12) on their part argue that participation as a
development practice and political ideal is vulnerable to disillusionment as
reform practitioners increasingly see it.as a brake on rapid service delivery.
In their view it is increasingly cast in terms of the process-versus-product
dichotomy, meaning that participatory processes tend to bog down
planning and implementation due to incessant conflict between different
sections of communities. The net result is stalled service delivery and
growing frustration that the policy approach of inclusive development is
practically unviable and too cost-intensive. This experience fuels
arguments that participation should be reassessed and made less
important in the development process to allow government to implement its
mandate to get infrastructure and services into the ground and households
(Parnell et. al. 2002:12). The problem with this analysis is that it does not
interrogate the quality of mediating institutions and practitioners who are
the brokers in such processes. It also fails to explore whether sufficient
investment is being made to nurture and strengthen democratic and
accountable community-based associations that can legitimately engage
on behalf of their members within a transparent political framework.
In the final analysis, the above conflicting view points would seem to
suggest that participation should not be seen as a blanket solution for all
developmental issues and problems, and as Parnell et. al. (2002:13) will
argue, participation is a political practice that fosters access to relevant
information, influence over allocation of scarce resources, awareness about
the benefits of collective action in terms of strengthening livelihood
strategies and increasing social capital, and citizenship. It is, by definition
therefore, a process of social learning because it serves to empower
uninformed, marginalized citizens about how they can advance their
interests in conjunction with their communities.
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2.14.1 Participation and Involvement
A distinction between participation and involvement is drawn by
Jagnnadham (1979:137) as follows: participation implies "to share in",
while involvement implies that there is a feeling of belonqinq and that
people become involved on the basis of this feeling. In development, such
a feeling of belonging follows when people can identify with development
efforts. They feel therefore that they belong to the various projects or
programmes. Being involved with and belonging to development
programmes means that participation is not enforced. It may therefore be
argued that development can only take place with the preparedness of the
local people and their desire to possess the development programmes and
to be permitted to make their own physical and economic input in
implementing them. Therefore, local people can either be allies, or else
their collective strength can be used to offer resistance. Ultimately, their
involvement may be more of political than of technical value, that is to say,
although participation may not necessarily guarantee the success of a
programme, it will enable participants influence its efficiency (Bryant &
White 1982:212).
A study in South Africa found that community involvement reduced the cost
of creating jobs and improved the cost-effectiveness of transferring
resources to poor people. As can be noted from Figure 37, where there
was no community involvement in the programme, it cost government
about 13 Rand to transfer 1 Rand to a poor person, and where the
community was either a partner or involved in a limited way , it cost
government about 7.5 Rand to transfer 1 Rand to a poor person. But
where the community was a sole implementer of the programme, it cost
.-._---"'~_.;~._~
government only 5 Rand to transfer 1 Rand to a poor person. This made a
strong case for the importance of decentralisation in lowering the cost of
raising the income of poor people in South Africa.
7 Adato, Michelle ,Timothy Besley, Lawrence Haddad and John Hoddinott, .1999, "Participation and poverty
Reduction: Issues, Theory and New Evidence from South Africa ", Background paper for World Development
Report 2000/2001, The International Food Policy Research Institute and World Bank, Washington, D.C.
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2.14.2 The Problem of Local Elites
Johnson & Clark (1982:167) have observed that traditional group
structures and strong patterns of social differentiation often combine to
create a system of organisation dominated by a few powerful local elites.
The elites are linked to the poor through a variety of patronage/dependency
relationships. And although people look to kinsfolk, or at most to individuals
whom they know personally for help, because of the traditional group
attitudes ingrained in most members of the community, locally-
acknowledged stratification ensures that only individuals with wealth or
contacts are seen as able to offer such help (Chambers, 1974:86). Poor
local people" then tender support of various kinds in exchange for, and in
expectation of such patronage. In general the exchange reinforces the
stratification on which it is based. Patronage further secures the privileged
8 The term 'people' as used in this thesis describes the majority of Ugandan-farmers, cattle keepers, primary
school teachers, labourers, petty traders, and the unemployed, living in the country-side. It isaheterogeneous
group who, although they perform different jobs, live together in the rural set up, share the same facilities and
have amore orless similar standard ofliving. This term distinguishes them from the Kampala-based educated
middle class or political elites who possess a high level of education and have fairly remunerative positions
with government. Ideologically, they see themselves as different from the rural populace and identify
themselves with the values ofthe West.
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position of the elite, while reciprocal dependency further undermines the
position of the poor (Hunter, 1969:38). Viewed from the standpoint of
egalitarian ideology, the power of local elites appears-to be just one more
unmitigated evil visited on the local people, and the evidence emerging
from developing countries is-monotonous and depressing.
Most attempts to organise local people, if they survive at all, are captured
by the local elites, who exploit them to enhance their position, power and
wealth more effectively than before (Hunter;- -1969:70). The cumulative
effect of this relationship is the negation of the principle of empowerment
and participation on which sustainable local government democracy is
premised. In Uganda, the other problem lies with the unethical and corrupt
behaviour of public representatives and officials and the way these
influence the obtaining, allocation and utilisation of public resources in
ways that systematically ensure the crowding out of local people in the
decision-making process. Where the delivery of public services gets
curtailed because public officials and local politicians have fraudulently
misappropriated funds or caused wastage through misallocation of public
resources, it is impracticable to nurture conditions palatable for promoting
the empowerment of local people. While such a scenario would call for
active involvement of the Civil Society as part of the larger society and a
stakeholder in maintaining, promoting and consolidating a just
governmental and administrative system, it also brings into perspective the
importance of public integrity and ethical behaviour of all stakeholders in
the monumental task of nurturing developmental local government.
2.15 Local Government and Ethics: The Question of Public Integrity.
The growing recognition of the threat posed by ethical violations accounts
for the attention being given to public integrity programmes in different
parts of the world (Balogun, 2003:127). The focus of the programmes is
mainly on the demarcation of ethics boundaries, the elaboration of codes of
acceptable conduct in public life, and the role of leadership in championing
the cause of ethical compliance and punishing deviation. While ethical
codification and leadership (through legalistic mechanism such as the
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Leadership Code Act of 2002) in Uganda might suffice in upholding the
ideals of public service, this thesis argues that achieving a consistently-
high ethical standard on the negative side of the rectitude scale requires
that the rudiments of public morality be instilled in the entire citizenry. In a
special report entitled "How decentralization took corruption to the districts",
(Sunday Monitor, 1st of February, 2004, Page 14) Onyango, quotes the
words of one district chairperson to his councillors and officials at the close
of 2003.
"Don't shy away from eating government money, you will die poor ifyou
remain holy".
Among other things, the Chairperson assured Councillors that they would
be protected if they diverted only 5 percent of the money budgeted for a
project as long as the project was accomplished. In this special report
Onyango (2004:14) attempts to assess how decentralization, which
government had hoped would erode corruption, has instead taken the old
vice to greater heights. A case in point is one of Mbarara District Local
Government which lost about 400 million Uganda shillings, (US$ 320,000)
and an equivalent to a quarter of total revenue collected by the district in
the financial year 1995/96, through printing of false GPT tickets (Kibuuka-
Musoke, 1997:46). According to the report, Charles Kagombe, the then
District Secretary for Finance formed two companies, namely Chesi Ltd
and Castext Ltd, which were awarded 75 percent of the total council
contracts. He used his position as finance chief to bulldoze the Treasury
into giving priority to payments for his companies. The companies over-
invoiced and partially delivered goods, occasioning substantial financial
loss to the district. The Inspector General of Government (IGG) and
Auditor General (AG), the two most powerful watch-dog institutions fully
mandated to stamp out corruption and other unethical behaviour in the
central and local governments, have not gone far on investigating this
matter. Balogun (2003:127) admits that the biggest bottleneck in the
struggle against unethical and deviant behaviour in government and the
public sector generally relates to contextualization. He argues that
contemporary integrity programs proceed on the assumption that
leadership support for ethical codification and enforcement, together with
the establishment of a network of anti-corruption institutions, is all it takes
to combat the scourge of corruption. A contrary view is that a leader is only
human - a person who, in making ethical choices is liable to confuse the
right with the wrong, and whose judgment tends to be shaped by fleeting
circumstances. As argued in this thesis, resolving integrity issues in some
societies, particularly, where consensus on right and wrong is lacking,
requires going beyond leadership and engaging society at large in an
ethics dialogue.
2.15.1 Meaning of Ethics
Ethics, when applied to governance and public administration, refers to
moral principles, norms, attitudes, values and obligations that guide public
representatives and public officials so that their actions promote the
general welfare of all the population (Sing & Ntshangase 2003:105). Sing
& Ntshangase (2003:105), citing Kreitner (1995:152), add that public
representatives and officials lacking awareness may be labelled amoral.
They are neither moral nor immoral but indifferent to the ethical implications
of their actions. Ethical behaviour, according to Dwivedi (1997:10), is
considered a blend of moral qualities and mental attitudes, essential to
moral governance and public administration. Consequently, ethical
behaviour is the foundation of legitimate and effective governance and
public administration, which is founded on public trust and confidence
(Dwivedi 1999:10).
2.15.2 Nature, Magnitude and Significance of the Ethics challenge
The first challenge in tracking ethical compliance or violations is one of
definition (Balogun, 2003:128). While rules have been developed that
make it possible to assess the rationality of decisions taken by public
officials, there is yet no foolproof method of evaluating the integrity and
fairness of their decisions. A recent case provides an illustration. The
Head of the United Nations tribunal for Rwanda, Carla Del Ponte, refused
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· to renew the contracts of seven African and Indian prosecutors, citing
incompetence as her reason. The dismissed attorneys, for their part
termed the decision a racist act (http://www.CNN.COMlWorld. May 15,
2001). As individuals with rigorous training, the parties to the dispute would
undoubtedly prepare briefs, enter pleas, and marshal evieence in support
oftheirpositions. Knowing what is at stake-reputation, power-and position-
they would be unsparing in the use of factual information, highlighting what
favoured them and downplaying awkward pieces of data. To vindicate their
positions, they would be generous with facts, even if, at times this meant
being economical with the truth. According to Balogun (2003:128), this is
what rational individuals do, they channel means toward preferred ends. in
contrast, their ethically-inspired counterparts are likely to obliterate the
distinction between self and others and agonise over right and wrong.
Ethical dilemmas, (Balogun, 2003:128), are not limited to the personnel-
selection process, but are closely intertwined with decisions taken in
contracts and procurement, tax administration, law enforcement and
adjudication, revenue collection and service delivery agencies. They are
thus fundamentally linked to the process of local government management
and development.
Commissions of inquiry into suspected frauds in Mbarara and Tororo
District Local Governments in Uganda as well as special audit inspection in
Iganga District Local Government by the Auditor General revealed
important data which suggested that, in the wake of decentralization, local
governments were not sufficiently trained to exercise financial and political
power in a responsible and transparent manner (Nsibambi, 1998:66). But
the experience since implementation of decentralization started shows that
if this argument was sustainable, one would now be seeing a high level of
ethical compliance and dwindling levels of corruption, given the intensive
capacity-building and training programme districts have undergone,
including the putting in place of ethical codification measures, such as the
Leadership Code Act of 2002. The persistence of the amoral, ethically-
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deviant behaviour in local governments testifies to a much graver problem
and calls for a much wider analysis of the matter.
2.15.3 Ethical Violations in lsece! Governments: The Society-
Individual Relations.
The argument that identifies society as-a senior partner in society-individual
relations is quite compelling. It is based on the logic that the whole is
gr-eater than the sum of its parts (Balogun, 2003:139). In Uganda, while
tracking the incidence of corruption across local governments, the practice
up to now has been to ask panels of experts or focus groups, both in the
business community and Civil Society, to assess the integrity of specific
components of public policy. The corruption perception indices developed
by Transparency International and the World Bank (and frequently used by
the Inspector General of Government), rely heavily on the responses of
those who, because of their daily interactions with government officials, are
assumed to be sufficiently knowledgeable about the level and magnitude of
corruption. Schwella (2001 :384) observes that useful as the conclusions
from such exercises might be, the methodology has serious limitation
because for a start, it takes a narrow view of corruption, since it excludes
non-business forms of ethical violations.
Second, it starts with the assumptions that public officials are Ipso facto
corrupt and their clients saints. This assumption overlooks the possibility
that private business firms on many occasions, in an effort to expedite
transaction with local governments, are the initiators, rather than helpless
victims, of corrupt acts (Balogun, 2003:140).
Third is the routine and a priori association of the aver~ge government
official with sleaze and the client with rectitude (Balogun, 2003:140)
In the light of the methodological limitations of contemporary orientations,
this thesis explores a new approach to the analysis of ethical violations in
relation to local governance. First, it assumes that corruption goes beyond
the obstacles to private sector growth, for example, the crooked judicial
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and law - enforcement mechanisms, flawed public procurement
procedures, incoherent revenue assessment and collection practices.
Second, it is interested not only in the outcome of ethical violations, but
also in the symptoms and causes of the malaise. The discussion here
contends that, depending on the influence exerted on them at any given
time, societies are likely to fall into one of three broad ethical categories:
the ethically-sound, the totally-decadent, and the ethically-median
(Balogun, 2003:140).
The starting point in the analysis is the society. Balogun (2003:141 )
observes that in times when belief in the retributive power of a Supreme
Being is deep-seated, the inclination of societies will most probably be
towards rectitude. Discounting past deviations from the norm, religion is
likely to be a strong influence on human behaviour in societies under
traditional influences, and institutions (the family, schools, churches,
mosques) propagating values deemed acceptable to God or the Supreme
Being would play crucial roles in the life of the people. Population
distribution in this type of society (the ethically-sound society) would then
correspond to the one plotted on the graph shown in Figure 4 below. With
the exception of a few deviants (located within ABC along the X and Y
coordinates), the majority of the people (within CBDE) would have no
problem in living up to society's high ethical standards.
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Source: Balogun, M.J. 2003:142
As Balogun (2003: 141) further notes, no society is perfect. What is not so
obvious is whether there are societies that can justifiably be pronounced
totally and irredeemably corrupt. Indeed some observers envisage the
possibility of the perpetual struggle between the social right and wrong
ending up in favour of the latter at the expense of the former. In the
circumstances, the vast majority of people would find their standard falling
en masse within the confines of the amoral zone, in the form represented
by Figure 5. In such circumstances, neither the minimalist nor the
developmental nor even the professional strategy would prove adequate in
meeting the public integrity challenge.
It should be noted however that where the campaign for rectitude appears
to achieve the intended results, population distribution on the rectitude
scale would begin to follow the normal
72
Figure 6-
Population Distribution in a Normal Human Society
Source: Balogun, M.J. 2003: 143
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pattern shown in Figure 6. Specifically, a small fraction of the populace
would ignore the reform message and stick to their bad old ways on the
negative end of the scale. Another small proportion would consolidate their
position on the positive side of the scale, while the majority would fall in
between the moral and amoral zones. It is also to this majority that the two
opposing forces on the two ends of scale would appeal for support from
time to time.
In conclusion it is significant to emphasize that Figure 6 accords with the
central proposition put forward in this study - namely, that the individual is
a blend of good and evil, and matters in the formation of public morality.
Local government managers act as individuals most of the time and are
rarely influenced by the rudiments of collective responsibility and public
good, and as Nigro (1970:426), cited by Sing & Ntshangase (2003:107)
observes, a code of ethics will not cure this malady because codes of
ethics are regarded as legislating morality. They cannot reform people who
do not inherently adhere to high ethical standards. In charting the way
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forward, therefore, attention ought to shift toward accentuating the
individual's positive tendencies and neutralising the negative ones.
2.15.4 Promoting Public Integrity to Enhance Local Government
Effectiveness
The upshot of the preceding analysis is that public service ethics is too
important to be left in the hands of a few individuals occupying leadership
positions. When left alone, the average human being - leaders included -
is not incapable of substituting self - interest for the general public good.
Public integrity is, in any case, very much like a seed. Whether or not it will
grow and germinate depends largely on the soil in which it is planted. The
soil, in this case, is the character type that has the upper hand in, and sets
the moral tone for, an organisation or society at large.
Character formation, a product of the dominant socio-historical forces, is
therefore the causative factor in public integrity with leadership and
institutions performing an enabling role (Barogun, 2003:143). This thesis
therefore argues that it takes, at the minimum, a combination of character
education and training societal rules a network of integrity - promoting
institutions, and a dispersal of leadership roles among several competing
centres, to bring individuals to the realization that they must of necessity
fulfil obligations of public good. Going by the preceding analysis, it would
not be entirely correct for Onyango (2004:14) to assert that the effect of
decentralisation in Uganda has been to take corruption to the districts.
Such a view would presuppose that the vice was absent before the onset
of decentralisation.
Yet in a national integrity survey done by the Inspectorate of Government in
1998, corruption is noted to have existed right from Independence and was
exacerbated by deteriorating working conditions in subsequent years.
Efforts by the Inspector General of Government to fight corruption should
involve creating an environment in which the independent Civil Society can
be facilitated further to monitor and hold government accountable. Such a
measure could be centred on increasing the flow of government information
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to Civil Society through cooperation with media, legal stakeholders, private
sector associations and religious and cultural institutions. The irony with the
above argument however is the assumption that a strong Civil Society
already exists in Uganda. Most of the available data tends to point to the
contrary, which implies the need to nurture a strong Civil Society capable of
monitoring governmentand holding it accountable.
In the final analysis, this thesis is unequivocal on the fact that the unethical
and corrupt behaviour of some public representatives and public officials
affects immensely the public resources of local governments, as it does the
resources of the Centre. An understanding of the nature and implication
of ethics and corruption should inform strategies for enhancing ethical
behaviour and countering corruption in local govemments. In order for
devolution to realise its key objectives of empowerment and improved
service delivery, corruption must be countered through all means available,
and as noted earlier, the success of anti-corruption programmes hinges to
a large extent on the role of individuals, whether they are in government or
in the Civil Society. If people see nothing wrong with ethical violations or
deem themselves helpless victims of the system, even the most ambitious
anti corruption programme will either fail to get off to a promising start or
falter midway.
Ruzindana et. al. (1998:166) propose some of the new paradigms that
should drive the governance and anti-corruption programmes in Uganda in
a bid to improve the quality, timeliness, cost and coverage of services to
the public.
2.15.4.1 Accountability through transparency
Lack of accountability both for national and local civil servants is probably
the most important factor why sustainable development has not taken place
in many of Uganda's local governments, despite large transfers of money
over the last ten years. Accountability, integrity and the rule of law are very
much dependent on leadership and political will both from the top and at
the local level, but even with the necessary political will, there is no
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guarantee that there will be transparency and accountable local
government. Given that in Uganda less than 2 percent of the population
work for government, with an even lower percentage working in local
authorities, the approach of this thesis is based OP the assumption that
accountability in local governments can only occur throuqh active education
and involvement of the 98 percent of the people outside the government
rather than through the traditional pressure from central government
agencies.
According to Ruzindana et. al. (1998:166), the challenge is to look for
synergy through sequencing and timing of the two pressure points
highlighted above. In this regard, education and involving the public should
be the centre-piece of the awareness-raising strategy, coupled with other
key elements such as:-
• Giving the public an active voice by involving them in periodic
service delivery and integrity/corruption surveys;
• Deepening the democratisation process through regular democratic
elections (presidential, parliamentary and local);
• Increased transparency by opening up the government and by
delivering services closer to the customers; and
• Raising the public's awareness about its rights and responsibilities
through introducing citizen charters by which the public knows what
services to expect in terms of quality, cost, timeliness and coverage.
2.15.4.2 Raising awareness and expectations of the civil society
Ruzindana et. al. (1998:167) use the experience of Mali, where a service
delivery survey was conducted in 1995 to justify the rationale for this task.
Despite the fact that Mali has some of the worst social indicators in the
world, the survey indicated that a majority of the population did not have a
problem with the situation pertaining in the country. It was realized that
after so many years of misery people had lost hope and did not expect
anything from their government.
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Based on this experience, the adoption of a citizen charter model is
necessary, (Ruzindana et. al. 1998:168) in addition to periodic service
delivery surveys in order to increase the accountability of government
through:
• Informing the Civil Society about their rights; what services they are
supposed to get from their government, at what cost, in what
quantities and when;
• Obtaining more accurate information about the services actually
reaching the people at community or vii/age level through household
service delivery surveys; and
• Giving the people a voice by going back to them with regular
household surveys and initiating a process where by this information
is returned to the national and local policy-makers in an efficient and
effective manner.
2.15.4.3 Strengthening the pillars of integrity
Langseth (1998:159) observes that pervasive corruption reduces the
efficiency of government in general, and in particular reduces the
effectiveness of local and national investment. Corruption also makes
citizens feel alienated from their government. Indeed leaders in the
campaign against corruption will only achieve real gains when a society
collectively changes its expectation of public behaviour, or when people
believe that they are entitled to expect a government that is not corrupt.
The starting point in this respect is the strengthening of the pillars of
integrity and in particular, the Executive, Parliament, the Judiciary,
watchdog agencies, the Media, the Private Sector, Civil Society and
enforcement agencies such as the Police and Public Prosecution.
Ultimately, the bottom line as regards improved governance and public
sector management rests on strengthened institutional capacity, improved
service delivery and enhanced national integrity.
77
2.15.5 Disseminating information
Another important measure is disseminating information to allow people to
monitor public services. Using newspapers and other popular information
sources to disseminate information on budget allocations and spending
could enable people to hold civil servants accountable, thus reducing
lnettlclencyand corruption in the process.
In Uganda, when primary school enrolments did not improve despite
substantial increases in budget allocations, a survey of schools examined
public spending on primary education (Ablo & Reinikka, 1998:35). The
study found that budget allocations may not matter when institutions or
their popular control is weak: in 1991-95 on average less than 30 percent
of the intended non-wage public spending on primary education reached
the schools.
The government has since improved performance by increasing the flow of
information within the system. A major breakthrough was achieved by
making regular announcements in local newspapers and on radio of the
public funds transferred to districts and posting information on transfers at
each school. A follow-up survey in 1999 showed dramatic improvements
since 1995, with schools receiving close to 100 percent of the non-wage
public funding.
Improvement in the flow of information coupled with revision of the existing
legislations some of which inhibit the disclosure of useful information will
help to establish cues for ethical behaviour in local governments. Though
not providing a full scale solution, at local government level, codes of ethics
have been accepted as one of the strategies for improving the moral
behaviour of public officials, and as Lake (1991 :175) observes, in an era of
increasing globalization and demand for localization, local government
needs to re-examine existing approaches to enhancing ethical behaviour
and public integrity. According to Lake, some of the challenges include:-
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• Balancing demands for personal and individual ethical behaviour
against the demand for institutional outcomes and collective
behaviour.
• Focusing more on environmental interdependences and
interconnectedness rather than focusing on inward political and
administrative complexities.
• Balancing tension between self-interest and public interest with
multiple definitions of public interest that cut across regional and
national boundaries and generations.
• Overcoming restrictive measures that force public representatives
and public officials to pay attention to personal conduct only.
• Encouraging thinking that focuses on the interests of contemporary
and future generations of citizens.
• Balancing the education of public representatives and public
officials so that they not only make choices in just, fair, honest, and
accountable ways, but also consider the long-term effects and
consequences of policy and programme outcomes.
2.16 Conclusion
A detailed analysis of the views of a number of authors namely Woods
(1992), Landell-Mills (1992), Reddy (1999), Bebbington et. al. (1993),
Wuyts et. al. (1992) and Jagnnadham (1979) look at empowerment,
participation and partnerships with the Civil Society as dominant themes in
the gamut of developmental theories that underpin local government
democratisation and development. According to them democratic
decentralisation can produce effective local government that is responsive
to the needs of the poor and can provide opportunities for participation
around issues that matter most in peoples' lives. Their views are grounded
in a sound historical appreciation and an astute analysis of the international
policy context within which devolution and the new local government
dispensation has been constructed. Prominent in these international
discourses is the tendency to valorise I the local I and local government
generally as the site of strategic defence against powerful centripetal
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forces, by portraying them as the bulwark for democratic local participation
and empowerment.
On the other hand, the second group of authors namely Sarnoff (1979),
Freire (1972), Fals-Borda (1981), Boaden et. al. (1982) Burkey (1993)
and Rahman (1983a) believe that state inspired influence is so pervasive
at the local level that participation and empowerment are merely seen as
instruments to instruct, guide and legitimise rather than locate decision-
making powers in the hands of local people through democratisation. They
are so unequivocal on the omnipresent influence of the state in all spheres
of life that they believe it is impracticable to nurture a strong Civil Society to
buttress local democratic participation.
The third school of thought is of Hirschman (1970) and Le Grand (1990)
which advocates for the power of the market as a key instrument for
empowerment within the broad framework of peoples' ability to choose and
or exempt themselves from certain services as and when they deem it so.
According to this group, the state should stop being both the funder and
provider of services. Instead it shouJd become primarily a funder, with
services being provided by a variety of private, voluntary and public
suppliers all operating in competition with one another.
In essence therefore the empowerment and participation discourse divides
between these three broad groups. The first who see civil society
empowerment and local democratisation as the primary functions of
participation. The second who look at empowerment and participation as a
useful process to legitimise state actions and foster local compliance, and
the third group composed of mainstream liberals and the public choice
school who believe that the main role of government is to maintain liberty
and to provide a framework within which the competitive markets can
operate un hindered.
A significant characteristic of the first and second group's views on
empowerment and participation is that they all focus on the relationship
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between citizens and specific governmental agencies and programmes and
tend to over look the existence of a number of other spheres of influence
regarding citizen power that lie outside the state-local government arena.
Figure 7 highlights these spheres and sets the framework within which the
paradigms of empowerment and participation should be contextualized.
The first sphere is that of the individual person or household. To what
extent do they have power to determine the nature of services they receive
and, if they are ill, old, disabled or otherwise deemed 'dependent', the care
or treatment plans that are designed for them? The second sphere, which
is very much the focus for community participation and involvement, is the
sphere within which local people or individuals use public services,
programmes and goods in common and maintain these services based on
the principle of community ownership.
Maintenance of bore holes by water source committees in Uganda and
village schools by Harambee committees in- Kenya are some of the
examples of such community ownership. The third sphere which is of local
government and administration provides the mechanism through which the
citizens are able to access national resources through the process of
devolution, while the fourth is of the state or national governance mandated
with the task of providing the legal and policy framework through which the
broad process of devolution and empowerment should manifest itself.
Figure 7
Spheres of citizen power
(1) (2) (3) (4)
The The sphere The sphere of The sphere
Individual of the village local of the state
sphere Community, government or national
Parish or and governance
Neighbourhood administration
Source: Burns et.a/: 158
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This thesis argues that it is quite possible for citizens to enjoy a high
degree of power within the second sphere yet comparatively little within the
third and none at all-within the first. Citizens may for example be denied
power within the third sphere because the local strategic powers which
should reside there have been absorbed by the fourth sphere, and this will
ordinarily occur in conditions where political pluralism is absent. Conditional
grants in Uganda that are accessed by local governments upon signing
memoranda of understanding between the latter and the central
government constitute another manifestation of the absorption alluded to
above, since by signing these memoranda, local governments undertake to
implement central government plans to the letter.
Regarding the third group's view which in this thesis is identified as
Hirschman's model of empowerment, it is important to stress that this
model has serious drawbacks in the public service delivery context. In
particular, power and choice become illusions when there is nowhere to
exit to. Even where there is an element of choice, such as in the education
sector, the evidence suggests that, as with conventional markets, quasi-
markets create inequalities and foster social injustice. Thus critics of the
Uganda government's education policy argue for example that some
private and public elite schools will cream off the most able pupils and
leave the rest to struggle in 'sink' UPE schools. It is argued in this thesis
therefore that, despite the enthusiasm of some of its advocates, the fact
remains that there are few, if any, success stories demonstrating how the
competitive model has created high-quality, cost-effective services which
meet the needs of all citizens.
Finally, it is postulated that while absolute empowerment of local people is
utopian, and that no institutional or political structure can guarantee
participative democratic governance, meaningful participation at local level
is possible and should manifest itself through maximization of the power of
citizens as opposed to non-elected elites within the communities. In doing
so efforts should be made to integrate women into all stages of local
decision-making by ensuring that mechanisms to facilitate community
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participation are targeted and inclusive. Secondly, focus should also be
directed at the degree and quality of ethical behaviour and level of integrity
.. among local leaders and managers since this would help to conserve the
available resources and utilise them to eradicate poverty and address other
aspects of local government development. Political pluralism, though still
strongly discouraged by the NRM government, still remains a fundamental
element of the democratisation process, and would go a long way to
enhance people's participation by providing multiple platforms for the
initiation, aggregation and advocacy of alternative political values and
interests necessary for development. Although they are cross-cutting
aspects, gender, ethics and public integrity are part of the broader
approaches which are essential in the strengthening and development of
local government.
While these measures could go along way to enhance participation at the
local level, most of the intractable issues which render participatory
development difficult will remain. Some of these are enumerated below:-
• Participation will develop in different ways in specific situations
dependent upon the problems faced by specific groups of local
people and the specific factors inhibiting their development. The
promotion of peoples' participation according to neatly defined
standard 'development objectives' may actually inhibit peoples'
initiatives rather than promote them.
• Generally local people need to be approached as a specific group
and their economic situation ought to be improved if participation is
to be successful. This will in most situations automatically imply
conflict with more well-to-do elements (local elites) in differentiated
rural communities.
• There is a complex relationship between local self-reliance as one of
the basic tenets of empowerment of local people and the need for
external assistance. Participation requires self-reliance and is
surrendered by dependency. However the promotion of participation
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in initially non-participatory, dependent situations often requires
some initial external assistance. This dilemma is real and must be
approached with extreme sensitivity if the process is not to result in
new dependencies.
• Participation requires organisation and yet organisations easily
become centres of formal power controlled by a few. Maintaining
peoples' power requires that local people retain genuine control over
their own organisations.
• Participatory processes seldom begin spontaneously. Such
processes are generally initiated by a leadership whose vision is
external to the perceptions and aspirations of the people concerned.
Resolving this contradiction implies going beyond mere mobilisation
for the support of an externally defined cause.
2.17 Summary
The decentralisation process has initiated a comprehensive and thorough
transformation of the entire Ugandan public sector and of the political
landscape with wide-ranging consequences for the Ugandan society. It has
been an essential part of the government's national-building strategy for a
period spanning fifteen years. Given that decentralisation in Uganda has
been a radical departure from the centralised governance of earlier
governments, and has manifested itself through extensive devolution of
power and reasonable grassroots participation, it will be the preoccupation
of this thesis to assess and analyse the magnitude to which local
government democracy has been strengthened, and more particularly,
whether this strengthening has any relevance to the level of community
participation as a mode of empowering the people.
This chapter focused in detail on the most critical aspects of devolution and
local government democracy and the theoretical framework within which
they are conceptualised. Efforts are made to review and analyse the
concepts of decentralisaton and local government democratisation and to
define the key circumstances pertinent to their realisation. The importance
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of community participation- as a process whereby people learn to take
charge of their own lives and solve their own problems is emphasised, and
its significance as an essential ingredient of societal development
highlighted.
The chapter underscores the negative role of corruption, both political and
bureaucratic, to local government development and asserts that this is
symptomatic of bad governance and a weak, unstable and immature
system of public institutions and public order, low popular participation in
politics, and a weak protection of civil liberties.
In sum, empowerment through local governance will emerge as a
consequence of interplay of various factors of which devolution is one.
Others are good governance, democratisation, community participation, a
strong civil society, and a high level of public integrity, commitment and
transparency in the dispensation of public services.
2.18 Projections for the next chapter
Chapter three will examine the trends, constraints and prospects of local
government in Uganda. It will highlight the historical and contemporary
nature of local government, the current local government system in
Uganda, its legal and institutional basis, and some of the critical issues in
local government management and development. The chapter will also
analyse the country's nature and scope of loca! government financing,
decentralised taxation and expenditure and through comparisons with other
cases such as that of Papua New Guinea suggest ways of improvement.
The role of gender in the local democratisation and empowerment process
will be examined and so too will be women's participation in the political,





LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN UGANDA: TRENDS, CONSTRAINTS
AND PROSPECTS
3.1 Introduction:
Local Government is the level of governance created to ensure that
government is brought to the grassroots population to give its members a
sense of involvement in the political processes that control their daily lives
(Reddy, 1999:1). This chapter provides a general overview of local
government development in Uganda since Independence, focusing
particularly on the post-Independence period up to the present day.
The initiatives towards strengthening of local government started by the
Colonial Government in the mid 1950s are analysed and the centralising
influence of the one-party Obote Government and the military regime of
Amin highlighted. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, there have been
practical and consistent efforts to re-establish and consolidate the local
government system in Uganda with the main purpose of improving service
delivery and empowering the local people to become agents of their own
development. The chapter outlines this trend and analyses some of the
key constraints encountered on the way. There are also other key
elements critical to the process of devolution that are discussed, ranging
from issues such as political will, financial and management capacity to the
human resources management factors and control of staffing.
The chapter also looks at the broad spectrum of local and central
government financing and undertakes a deeper analysis of the taxation
policy in Uganda, especially in as far as it relates to local government
revenue mobilisation. It underscores the importance of reform through
best practices in ways that not only target the traditional local revenue
sources such Graduated Personal Tax (GPT) but also focus on new
potential sources of revenue, such as the farming sector. The role of
gender as a cross-cutting concept is highlighted and its synergetic effect in
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galvanising the efforts and involvement of women in local development
initiatives emphasised.
3.2 Historical Evolution of Local Government in Uganda
The modern state of Uganda was a colonial creation. Before the
establishment and consolidation of effective colonial administration, each
ethnic nationality had its own system of local government, ranging from the
centralised monarchical system of the kingdom of Buganda which was
based on a hierarchy chiefs, to the highly-decentralised republican
organisations in the non-kingdom areas of the North, East and South-west
(Lubanga, 1996:47). The first attempts by the colonial authorities to set up
local administrations were in 1919 when the African (Native) Authority
Ordinance was passed, providing for the powers and duties of African
chiefs and for the enforcement of African authority (Apter, 1967:74-77).
The chiefs collected taxes, presided over native courts, maintained law and
order, enforced laws and constituted native councils at district and lower
levels. The native councils were neither representative nor democratic.
They simply provided a forum for chiefs to exercise their powers (Apter,
1967:79).
The chiefs in Buganda derived their power from the Kabaka (the King),
owed allegiance to him and held office at his pleasure. In non-kingdom
areas, the chiefs owed their creation, appointment and allegiance to the
District Commissioners, who in turn were responsible to the Centre. After
1919, the evolution of local government in Uganda went through two
notable watersheds. First were the reforms under the African Local
Government Ordinance of 1949 that provided for the setting up of body
corporate councils in all districts and a system of standing (functional)
committees (Lubanga, 1996:47). This followed a dramatic breakthrough
that had taken place in 1947 when the Colonial Office decided to introduce
what it described as an "efficient and democratic system of local
government" in each of its imperial possessions. The explanation given by
Arthur Creech Jones, the then Colonial Secretary for the dual emphasis on
efficiency and democracy was quite succinct:
87
I use these words because they seem to me to contain the kernel ofthe whole
matter: local because the system of government must be capable of
managing the local services in a way which will help raise the standard of
living; and democratic because it must not only find a place for the growing
class of educated men, but at the same time command the respect and
support ofthe mass ofthe people (Wallis, 1989:127).
Second were reforms under the 1955 District Councils Ordinance, which
provided for elected majorities in the councils and also endowed councils
with the legal basis to assume wider functions, the most salient ones being:
primary education, granting bursaries and scholarships, maintenance of
local dams and boreholes, local forests, local police, provision of
dispensaries, provision of ambulances, local courts and rural leprosy work.
All in all, four basic tenets that characterised the local government system
under the Colonial Government can be highlighted.
The first is in respect of revenue collection. Local governments collected
limited "own" revenue, employed some staff and carried out a small range
of functions. They were under considerable powers of tutelage of the
Central Government through the District Commissioners. The powers of
tutelage were more robustly applied to non-kingdom areas which had a
unitary relationship with the centre as compared to the kingdom areas and
Busoga Region, which enjoyed a semi-federal status.
The second is in respect of public administration. A parallel central
government field administration was headed by a District Commissioner.
The District Commissioner supervised and coordinated district officers
responsible for delivery of services such as works, agriculture, community
development etc.., who were answerable to their Permanent Secretaries at
the Centre in Entebbe and Kampala. This generated functional
departmentalism, as each department had very strong vertical
communication and budget links with its national or regional headquarters,
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with a marked absence of effective horizontal communication and
harmonisation at district level (Lubanga, 1996:48).
Thirdly is the "hub and wheel" style of administration where an individual
colonial officer provided all the complex and abstract functions of
administration himself (Morris, 1977:91). Any complex task would be
reduced to a set of rudimentary and.specific instructions which the centre-
post official could then pass individually to a ring of poorly trained
subordinates, each of whom bore only limited responsibility not requiring
much lateral communication (Leys 1967:12t,-Karugire 1980:190-197).
The fourth and last is in respect of role differentiation. Local government
councils were assigned functions mainly in the area of service provision
and public order but not in development. The period between
Independence in 1962 and 1966 witnessed a blossoming of local
governments. A majority of members of kingdom assemblies and district
councils were directly elected. Kingdom governments and district councils
exercised considerable authority in their areas and had noteworthy
opportunities to set their priorities and execute their decisions. But it is also
during this period that the seeds for the emasculation of local governments
were sown. The Central Government became worried about autonomous
local governance and started curtailing the powers of councils on the
pretext that they were breeding grounds for the opposition (Lubanga,
1996:49). In 1963 for example, district councils lost powers to appoint and
remove from office their political heads, the Secretary-Generals. In the
same vein local district appointment boards also lost their independence.
The Centre-local relations continued to- deteriorate leading to the
abrogation of the 1962 Constitution and its replacement with the 1967
Republican Constitution that centralised all powers and gave all districts,
including those in former kingdom areas, equal status in the eyes of the
Central Government. The final nail in the local governments' coffin came
with the enactment of the 1967 Local Administrations Act which relegated
local governments to a status of local administrations, with severely
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reduced powers so much so that even their budgets and development
plans had to be approved by the Central Government (Leys, 1967:123).
3.3 Overview of the Local Government System in Uganda
Uganda's decentralisation policy, based on the devolution of power,
functions and responsibilities to popularly elected local governments has
made a big difference in the way the country is governed (Commonwealth
Local Government Forum, 2002:100). All local governments in Uganda
now have the-power to make and implement development plans based on
locally determined priorities. They have the power to set, approve and
execute their own budgets, raise and utilise resources according to their
own priorities after making legally mandated disbursements and to appoint
statutory committees, boards and commissions. They can- also make
ordinances and by-laws, hire, manage and fire personnel, manage their
own payroll and separate personnel systems and implement a broad range
of decentralised services previously handled by the Centre
(Commonwealth Local Government Forum, 2002:100). All this is in
sharp contrast to the centralising tendencies of earlier post-Independence
governments. As regards finances, major reforms have followed the Local
Government (Resistance Councils) Statute, 1993. In the initial phase of
decentralisation of services, funding continued under the central budget
vote system through the respective service ministries. These payments
were later replaced with a single block grant consolidating payments into
an intergovernmental transfer (Reddy, 1999:46). The formula for the block
grant is based on an assessment of needs taking account of local revenue
raising capacity. Annexure C is an extract of parts 1 and 2, among others,
of the second schedule of the Local Governments Act (1997), which details
functions and services of the Central Government as differentiated from
those of district local governments, while Table 1 shows the numerical




jDistricVCity (Local Council V)
Rural Urban Total
55 1 (Kampala) 56
! County/Municipality 170 13 183
(Local Council IV)
Sub-county/Municipal 903 113 1016
DivisionlTown council (Local
Council III)
Total 1128 127 1255
Source: Ministry of Local Government, Decentralisation Secretariat, Status report
on the implementation of the decentralisation programme for the period t" July-31st
December 2000~Kampala,March 2001.
3.4 Local Government Organisational Set-up
Table 2 shows the distribution of district local governments and populations
based on the current status.
Table 2:
Distribution of District Local Governments and population
Districts Counties Sub-counties Population % Rural
(LC V) (LC IV) (LC III)
Adjumani 1 7 201,493 90
Apac 5 21 676,244 98
Arua 7 36 855,055 91
Bugiri 1 19 426,522 96
Bundibugyo 2 10 212,884 93
Bushenyi 5 30 723,427 95
Busia 1 10 228,181 83
Gulu 5 23 468,407 76
Hoima 2 13 349,204 90
Iganga 4 25 716,311 95
Jinja 4 11 413,937 76
Kabale 4 19 471,783 90
Kabarole 3 14 359,180 89
Kalangala 2 7 36,661 92
Kampala - 5 1,208,544 0
Kamuli 4 23 712,079 98
Kamwenge 2 8 295,313 95
Kanungu 1 8 205,095 94
Kapchorwa 3 11 193,510 95
Kasese 2 21 532,993 89
Katakwi 3 15 307,032 98
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Districts Counties Sub-counties Population % Rural
(LC V) (LC IV) (LC III)
Kayunga 2 9 297,081 93
Kibaale 3 19 413,353 99
Kiboga 1 14 231,718 95
Kisoro 1 14 219,427 95
Kitgum 2 13 286,122 85
Kotido 3 20 596,130 98
Kurni 3 16 388,015 98
1
Kyenjojo 2 13 380,362 96
Lira 6 28 757,763 88
Luwero
-
4 21 474,627 88
Masaka 6 23 767,759 90
Masindi 4 14 469,865 95
Mayuge 1 6 326,567 97
Mbale 4 31 720,925 90
Mbarara 8 47 1,089,051 92
Moroto 3 11 170,506 96
Moyo 3 14 199,912 94
Mpigi 3 17 414,757 98
Mubende 4 20 706,256 93
Mukono 4 28 807,923 82
Nakapiripirit 3 10 153,862 99
Nakasongola 1 7 125,297 95
Nebbi 3 19 433,466 85
Ntungamo 3 14 386,816 97
Pader 2 13 293,679 97
Pallisa 4 22 522,254 95
Rakai 4 26 471,806 95
Rukunqiri 2 11 308,696 95
Sembabule 2 5 184,178 98
Sironko 2 17 291,906 96
Soroti 4 17 371,986 89
Tororo 4 20 559,528 92
Yumbe 1 7 253,325 94
Wakiso 3 16 957,280 92
Total 170 918 24,748,977 88
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics: National Census Office, Entebbe, Uganda
2002
There are five organisational tiers in rural and urban areas respectively
(Local Governments Act, 1997:14-29). Rural areas consist of village
councils also referred to as Local Council I, parish councils also referred to
as Local Council II, sub-county councils also referred to as Local Council
III, county councils or Local Council IV, and district councils or Local
Council V.
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Urban areas consist of village councils known as Local Council I, ward
councils known as Local Council II, town, municipal division and city
Figure 8
The Legal Structure of the Local Government System
Central Government









u 0 CAL G 0 V ER N MEN TS
tIIunicipal Municipal City Municipal
~ Council/Mayor" Divisions ~ Divisionsl ~ Divisions
.. Chairperson 1+ Chairperson
ADM I N ISTRATIVE U NI T S












Source: The Simplified Version of the LGA 1997: IV
division councils known as Local Council III, municipal councils known as
Local Council IV, and city council known as Local Council V. The village
council is composed of all persons of eighteen years of age or above
93
residing in that village. The parish council is composed of all members of
the village executive committees in that parish. The sub-county, town,
municipal, municipal division, and city division council is composed of a
chairperson directly elected through universal adult suffrage; one councillor
directly elected to represent each parish/ward or part thereof in that council;
two youth councillors representing the youth in that council, one of whom
has to be a female youth; two councillors with disabilities representing
persons with disabilities in that council, one of whom has to be a female;
and women councillorsformlnq one third of that council. The district/city
council is composed of a chairperson directly elected through universal
adult suffrage; one councillor directly elected to represent an electoral area
in the district or city; two councillors one of whom is a female youth
representing the youth in the district/ctty; two councillors with disabilities
one of whom is a female representing persons with disabilities; and women
councillors forming one third of the council. The districts and city council, of
which there are 56 including Kampala, are the principal units of local
government with lower level councils being delegated authority to from
them. Only those classified as LC III and LC V plus thirteen municipal
councils are considered local governments with legislative powers. Being
administrative units, the village fLC I), parish/ward (LC II), and county (LC
IV) are without legislative powers. However, they do have assemblies
which deliberate budget priorities and have a consultative role in relation to
the District Chairperson, Senior Administrative Officers at higher levels of
local government and Members of Parliament. Figure. 8 provides a
diagrammatic representation of the legal structure of the local government
system in Uganda.
3.5 Legal and Institutional Basis for Local Government
The springboard in respect of the legal framework for Uganda's
decentralisation is the Resistance Councils and Committees Statute, 1987,
drafted on the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into the local
government system that was set up that year. The Statute was aimed at
raising the political profile of local councils in a bid to circumvent the
centralising tendencies of the 1967 Constitution and the Local
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Administrations Act that had transformed local governments into mere
appendages of the Central Government. However, the Statute did not
provide IOGal councils with any significant authority or autonomy,
particularly in the management of financial and human resources.
Following government's decision in late 1992 to devolve power to local
governments, the Local Governments (Resistance Councils) Statute, 1993
was enacted. Among other things, the Statute provided for the principle of
non-subordination to prevent higher local governments dominating lower
ones. Its provisions were entrenched in the 1995 Constitution and
subsequently expanded in the Local Governments Act, 1997 (LGA, 1997),
the two authoritative legislative documents on Uganda's decentralisation
policy and process. Local governance as a system of governance is
entrenched within the National Constitution and what only remains to be
seen is how the-social forces at the local level can use the new structures
to foster democratic practices and development. It also remains to be seen
whether or not the agents and agencies of the Central Government will in
the long-run respect the constitutional provisions that require minimal
interference in matters of local concern. As Hyden (1996:95) observes, "a
constitution by itself, no matter how ingeniously designed, no matter what
formal arrangements of checks and balances, will not limit authoritarian
rule".
Schedule Two of the LGA (Annexture C) sharply distinguishes between the
roles played by the Central Government on the one hand, and local
governments on the other. The main role of the Central Government is to
set national policy and standards, and to inspect, supervise, monitor and
coordinate activities of local governments in order to keep them in
compliance with national policies and standards. Local governments on the
other hand are responsible for implementing a broad range of devolved
services listed in parts 2-5 of the same Schedule, in addition to any lawful
others they may wish to undertake for the development of their respective
areas. The division of responsibilities is sufficiently detailed to minimise
confusion of roles, although in practice confusion sometimes still occurs.
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Local government councils approve their own development plans and
budgets without reference to those above them (the non-subordtnation
principle) and oversee the implementation of their development plans,
including those of the Central Government through several bodies they
appoint themselves. These are the executive and sectoral committees
appointed by all local governments, and the District Service Commissions,
District Tender Boards and Local Government Public Accounts
Committees, appointed only at district level (Commonwealth Local
Government Forum, 2002:101). While local councils have approval and
supervisory functions, implementation of their decisions and those of the
Central Government is assigned to civil servants headed by the Chief
Administrative Officer in each district or by the Town Clerk in each
municipality, town councilor city council. Most of the civil servants in local
governments are former employees of the Central Government who were
automatically transferred to local governments at the start of
decentralisation, a development that generated morale and allegiance
problems which have not been entirely eliminated to date.
3.5.1 The 1995 Constitution
The local government system in Uganda is established by Article 176 of the
1995 Constitution, which stipulates that the system of local government
shall be based on the district as a unit under which there shall be such
lower local governments and administrative units as Parliament may by law
. provide. Among the key principles stipulated by the Constitution to apply to
the local government system are the following:
- The system shall be such as to ensure that functions, powers and
responsibilities are devolved and transferred from the government to
local government units in a coordinated manner;
Decentralisation shall be a principle applying to all levels of local
government and in particular, from higher to lower local government
units to ensure peoples' participation and democratic control in decision
making;
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Persons in the service of local government shall be employed by the
local government; and -~--~~~~ -
- The system of local government shall be based on democratically-
elected councils on the basis of universal adult suffrage.
With such a constitutional framework, government expects the current
decentralisation process to lead to massive improvements in public service
production and allocation of resources, while at the same time
strengthening local democracy.
3.5.2 The Local Governments Act of 1997
The Local Governments Act (1997) provides for harmonisation and
constitutionalisation of all laws relating to local governments,
decentralisation of functions, powers and services from the Central
Government to local governments. The Local Governments Act gives
powers to the district and lower local governments to enable them perform
decentralised functions and ensure that services are taken to the people,
within the framework of good governance, democratic participation, and
control of decision-making by the people themselves. Within the
framework of the need to comprehensively empower communities across
the board, the Act establishes affirmative action in favour of groups
marginalised on the basis of gender, age, disability or any other reason
created by history, tradition or custom for purposes of addressing
imbalances which exist against them.
The Act also establishes sources of revenue and procedures for financial
accountability and provides for the election of local councils. Having
outlined the legal framework on which local government is premised, what
remains is to analyse the extent to which this enabling environment has
helped to nurture and strengthen democratic local governance and
empowerment of local people through the process of community
participation, enhanced local decision-making and improvement in the
quality of services delivered. This is a subject which forms a major focus of
this study.
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3.6 Local Government Elections and the Quest for Good
Governance
The system of elections is "first-past-the-post" and candidates are barred
from standing- on political party tick-ets (Commonwealth Local-
Government--Forum, 2002:44), (LGA, 1997:86). All voters must be over 18
years old. Sub-county councillors are elected by universal adult suffrage,
while representatives of special interest groups, mainly the youth and
people with disabilities, where one of each must be a woman, are elected
by electoral colleges. Elections to the lower levels of the local government
structure, village and parish, are conducted by open voting where
individuals line up to show support for a particular candidate. All Ugandan
citizens resident in a local government area for more than four months are
eligible to vote (LGA, 1997:87). Political representation is primarily through
single member wards. For district local councils, sub-county local council
(LC III) boundaries serve as electoral constituencies and one third of the
whole council represent women. Participatory democracy is considered
the bedrock of the local government system in Uganda and is a stated
requirement in the 1995 Constitution (Bidandi-Ssali, 2001 :8). The multi-
tiered local government system is designed to promote participation.
Councils are not permitted to function without the full complement of
women, while the youth and people with disabilities are assured of
democratic input through special constituencies. Each year districts hold
district budget conferences involving all stakeholders, to identify priorities
for the forthcoming year (LGA, 1997:58). It is also the forum in which
foreign NGOs, whose activities are also largely decentralised, indicate the
money they intend to spend in the district. One question remains
unanswered, however, and that is, to what extent can local government
under a monolithic, all-embracing system characteristic of the NRM
espouse even the most basic qualities of good governance? With the
bureaucracy, both central and local, becoming increasingly fearful of the
powerful political elite and the latter's efforts to politicise the former (as was
seen in the 2001/2002 presidential, parliamentary and local council
elections), the gap between policy formulation - a depiction of the
politician's role and policy implementation - an application to the
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administrative function - is becoming increasingly blurred (Wallis,
1989:25). A national administration, no less than a commercial enterprise,
is only as good as its managers. Countries therefore flourish or flounder on
the ability- or incompetence of their bureaucracies (Asiaweek, 1993:19).
While it may be the function of politicians to supply inspiration; direction
and vision-falling short, more often than not, of those lofty responsibilities -
it is the Civil Service that determines in the end whether or not a country
gains a reputation for good government, and for all the importance of
legislative programmes, good government inevitably comes down to an
efficient bureaucracy as political good intentions will not amount to much
without the means to see policies through. Yet efficiency is certainly not the
exercise of unquestioned authority, as indeed excessive power for civil
servants can lead to the very situation that gives the bureaucracy a bad
name: stifling rules and regulations, infuriatingly-delayed decisions, red
tape and non-accountable men and women sitting behind the heartless
desks of officialdom. The illumination by Reddy (1999:48) of the radical
approach adopted in Uganda is understandable and even acceptable,
given the country's political development which is largely characterised by
autocracy and dictatorship. The removal of control by the Centre and its
replacement with control by the local people; liquidation of the power of the
Minister of Local Government to dissolve councils; the end of central
control over local budgets, staff appointments and the level of taxes, rates,
fees and charges; independent district service commissions, tender boards
and district public accounts committees all exercising control over various
aspects of staffing and financial affairs, are all fundamental manifestations
of the existing political will by the Centre to empower the periphery through
the buttressing of local initiative and control at the local level. However, in a
society where, to a extent, the majority of the people appear to be suffering
from what Monga (1995:33) calls the civic deficit, i.e. the failure of society
to secure or promote virtues pertinent to the collective pursuits of the
citizenry, the above attributes need to be underpinned by strong proactive
dispensation that favours and encourages full participation of local
communities in the decision-making process in a manner that safeguards
the virtues of individual freedom.
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3.7 Critical Issues in Local Government Management and
Development in Uganda
Decentralisation in Uganda is currently a highly relevant public
management issue, as it is in a number of developing countries within the
region. It is both consonant with the stress on improved managerial
capacity, as well as with political forces promising- increased
democratisation of the State through entrenchment of local governance
and community participation as the basic mode of managing society.
While the process of decentraUsation has proceeded quite well and local
government can now be described as constituting a key and fundamental
tier of governance in the country, the Nordic Consulting Group (1999:10)
in a report to the Ministry of Local Government on decentralisation of the
development budget, observed that there were still a few sticking factors
that militated against the management and further development of local
government.
3.7.1 Political Will
In his paper on the political dimension of decentralisation, Oscar Jose
Monteiro (1993:12) observes that political will or specifically, obtaining
amongst the political authorities a positive consensus that decentralisation
constitutes an effective means of increasing local participation and making
government more representative is extremely essential for decentralisation
to have far-reaching results. He however adds that, this consensus should
not be a response to frustration caused by the complexity of problems, nor
should it be based on a romantic view of the "Local" and the resources
available to it, since this ignores the difficulties that local institutions will
have to face for which they will require guidance, support and
encouragement from the Centre. While President Musevenf has been
consistent and steadfast in this support for decentralisation, most line
Ministries, with the exception of the Ministry of Local Government, have
9 In his speech atthe Third Decentralisation Implementation Review Workshop in February 1996, he stressed
that decentralisation was not only government policy but was a constitutional requirement that must be
undertaken by central government officials. He added that the functions devolved tolocal government should
not be centralized but that the local people should be helped and encouraged to plan and execute their own
development projects.
100
tended to be aloof and disdainful in their approach towards the process.
The negative attitude displayed by some bureaucrats, notably those in the
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development stem from their
lack of confidence in the capacity of local governments to handle
responsibly large amounts of public money and other key assignments.
And this is not confined to Uganda alone; the experience of Morocco cited
by Rondinelli et al10 (1981 :73) is self-explanatory:
Certain obstacles linked to the implementation of new decentralised
institutions continue to hinder the application of options taken by the
government. These difficulties concern the reticence of a certain number of
central services to cede prerogatives-implementation, launching of actions,
recruitment and management ofpersonnel-to their field units judged still too
inexperienced and insufficiently endowed in human and physical terms.
The functions of these services must be redefined in order to permit them
to play fully the role which is assigned to them in the processes of
decentralisation and deconcentration.
In Latin America, Harris (1998:198), noting the lack of trust central
administrators have in officials from the regions, concluded that:
It is difficult to determine whether this is a product of what has been
referred to as the centrist mentality of national officials or is a well-founded
concern over the shortage of highly skilled and trained officials in the
regions. But the result is a widespread reluctance on the part of central
government officials to delegate power to regional and sub-regional
levels. This has resulted in a "yo - yo" process of delegation and
withdrawal of delegation, depending upon whether the central officials are
satisfied or not with the decisions and actions taken by officials in the
region.
10Rondinelli.D.A, Nellis.JR, and Cheema.G.S, (Undated) Decentralisation inDeveloping Countries: A review
ofRecent Experience, World Bank Staff Papers, No.581, Management and Development Series No.8, The
World Bank, Washington D.C, pp 27-76.
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In Sri Lanka, even civil service unions are known to have intervened to
protect the prerogatives of central administrators during attempts to
decentralize development planning and management. They are also said to
have intervened actively in the political process to prevent a diffusion of
administrative responsibility. Wanasinghe (1982:49-50) observes that:
The general thrust of these interventions has been toward maintaining
individuality and autonomy of respective departmental cadres,
strengthening the role of the bureaucracy in decision-making, enhancing
career prospects through island-wide services. These thrusts have
continuously run counter to attempts at implementation of local area-
focused coordination, delegated decision-making by people's
representatives, and creation of self-management organizations with their
own personnel.
The Nordic Consulting Group (1999:9) also observe in their report that
other Central Government servants, as well as some politicians at the
Centre, loathe the thought of losing their former power and influence.
Thus, many Parliamentarians pressed so hard to be made ex-officio
members of the district councils in order to retain their powers of patronage
and their ability to channel local development projects into areas that will
benefit their constituents. Their persistence paid off with the amendment of
the Local Governments Act (1997). In section 6 of the Local Governments
(Amendment) Act 2001, section 11 of the principal Act was amended by
adding a new clause (2), which says that; "A Member of Parliament may
attend meetings of a local council in his or her constituency". It is an
argument of this thesis that the amendment of the Local Governments' Act
1997 to make Members of Parliament ex-officio members of District
Councils only serves to reinforce the already existing view in which most
MPs see their role as the "boss" of their electorate, and not merely as the
spokespersons, which has led to some tense confrontations with local
government officials and politicians. The other impact of the amendment is
the tendency to crowd-out local views and opinions from these councils and
supplant them with a selfish and sometimes centrist agenda propagated by
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the MPs. Ironically, through this amendment, the Local Government Act
which is basically premised on the need to empower local people by
ensuring democratic participation in, and control of decision-making,
negates this principle by disempowering local people and impairing the
effectiveness of local councils through the introduction of new actors whose
constituencies are not basically local."
The situation in Uganda has similarities with the experience of Papua New
Guinea a unitary state with quasi-federal features, which achieved
independence from Australia in 1975 (Standish, 1983:224-226). Centrist
attitudes in the wake of decentralisation were exhibited by national
ministries and several designated departments, including finance. Worse
still many MPs in Papua New Guinea felt that their role had been eroded
with the achievement of provincial government and resented the political
credit gained by provincial politicians through their control and allocation of
local resources; they believed, perhaps correctly that their prospects of re-
election were thereby jeopardised. In 1981 the national government
yielded to the strong feelings of the MPs and allowed them to become ex-
officio non-voting members of provincial assemblies and authorised two of
their number in each province to serve on the Provincial Executive
Committee (Standish, 1983:224-226). These retrogressive steps
(retrogressive because the constituency of an MP is national, not local)
were so strongly resented in the provinces that most MPs did not exercise
their new rights. Instead, they settled for special funds made available to
them by the national government to promote minor development projects
and activities. These various concessions in the case of Papua New
Guinea (as has been the case in Uganda, endorsed by the Local
Government, (Amendment) Act 2001) reflected a weakening of political will
in a State whose government is traditionally made up of a coalition of
political parties with conflicting interests and varying degrees of
commitment to decentralisation. This is against a backdrop of a strong
recommendation by Papua New Guinea's Constitutional Planning
11 Articles 78 and 79 ofthe Uganda Constitution, 1995 designate the operative platform ofMPs as national
and not local
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Committee (CPC) which in 1974, on diagnosing widespread discontent with
the then distribution of power in the country, and a deep yearning among
the people for a greater say in the conduct of their affairs, urged that:
Power must be returned to the people. Government services should be
accessible to them. Decisions should be made by people to whom the
issues at stake are meaningful, easily understood and relevant. The
existing system of government should therefore be restructured and power
should be decentralised, so that the energies and aspirations of our people
can play their full part in promoting our country's development. (PNG,
1974a, 1/10/8). 12
The advice given by Conyers (1981:116) to political commentators and
analysts to be careful while evaluating devolution in Papua New Guinea,
arguing that it is still too early to make any realistic assessment of the
impact of decentralisation or development, is pertinent to the case for
Uganda. While the current leadership has given a clear unequivocal lead,
and indeed stressed at the Third Decentralisation Review Workshop in
February 1996 that decentralisation was not only government policy, but
also a constitutional requirement that must be undertaken by central
government officials, centrist attitudes still remain and their impact is
discernable in the form of various degrees of intransigence and
procrastination on the part of the latter to implement decisions viewed by
them as leading to more empowerment of local governments.
3.7.2 Financial and Management Capacity
In their report to the Ministry of Local Government, the Nordic Consulting
Group (1999:10) observe that decentralised governments must have the
financial and management capacity to formulate integrated budgets with
recurrent and development components. Since the capacity of these
decentralised governments will vary widely, as they do in Uganda, the
approach to decentralisation, they argue, should be phased and sufficiently
12Excerpted from PNG (Papua New Guinea) (1974a) Constitutional Planning Committee, Final Report, PNG
Government printer, Port Moresby
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flexible to respond to changing needs. In Uganda the problem of providing
training to improve the financial and management capacity of local
authorities was compounded by the far-reaching structural changes made
as part of the decentralisation exercise (Nsibambi, 1998:47). The
Decentralisation Secretariat CBS) within the Ministry of Local Government
(MOLG) was divided into sections covering- training, publications and
capacity-building, institutional and staff issues, and local finance and
development planning. Despite its small staff and limited resources, the
Secretariat made a significant contribution to training and capacity building,
particularly of district staff and politicians, and to the introduction in districts
of new budgeting procedures. But both the distribution and scope of the
exercise was uneven and lacked penetration as far as the 860 sub-
counties are concerned. While the Decentralisation Secretariat made good
use of mobile training teams, it might have achieved a wider coverage by
concentrating on training of trainers within each district where, that is,
personnel capable of undertaking this role could be found. As a result,
many districts local governments still lack their own training teams, and
without them they have little hope of developing financial and management
capacity both at district and sub-county level (Nsibambi, 1998:49). All in
all, and in spite of a greater impact made at the grassroots level by external
agencies such as UNDP and UNICEF, financial and management capacity
in most districts generally remains rather weak, and bad roads make the
links between their headquarters and the sub-counties rather tenuous.
In emphasising the relevance of training in improving manpower skills both
at central and local government levels, the experience of Zambia is worth
mentioning. In order to boost the financial and management capacity of
Zambia's local government system, the government in the early 1990s
instituted the Local Government Support Project (LOGOSP), a three year
British-funded technical advice and training project based within Zambia's
Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH) (Nordic Consulting
Group, 1999:10). Staff inputs in this project were at two levels, with one
level consisting of seven advisers based at the Ministry itself, who included
a Project Manager, three coordinators, one each in finance, planning and
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human resource management and three senior advisors in finance. The
second level was of 18 regional advisers with two based in each of
Zambia's nine provinces, one as a Provincial Management Training Adviser
(PMTA) and the other as a Provincia1 Finance Training Adviser (PFTA).
These --regional advisers who were all handpicked Zambians provided
capacity-building for Provincial Local Government Officers (PLGOs) and
their staff, conducted workshops, and provided on-the-job training for local
authority staff (each province contains an average of six districts, each with
its own district council; there are also city, municipal and township
councils). The expectation was that by the close of the project, that is after
1997, local authorities would have developed enough capacity to manage
their affairs competently, provide adequate services, and put in place
sound financial management practices. While this expectation was not fully
realised, according to the Nordic Consulting Group (1999:10), by the
close of LOGOSP, its effect in improving substantially the financial and
management capacity of Zambia's 61 local authorities was largely visible.
The only snag, which in a way negates this success, is the fact that to-date
83 percent of government expenditure in Zambia is still controlled by
Permanent Secretaries in Lusaka, the national Capital and yet much of this
is spent in the country's nine provinces headed by Provincial Permanent
Secretaries (Reddy, 1999:264). Chikulo (1996), cited by Reddy
(1999:264), notes that the situation at district level is much worse because
recurrent expenditure under general grants and all specific-purpose
transfers are controlled at the provincial level. In the final analysis, the
relevance of Zambia's experience to the Uganda situation is not in the area
of devolved decision-making as a way of enhancing local government, but
rather, it is based on the view that relevant and comprehensive training is
quite critical to the improvement of existing manpower skills, which is itself
fundamental to improved service delivery levels and these are vital if
people's welfare is to be enhanced.
3.7.3 Financial Resources
Under decentralisation local governments in Uganda have assumed a wide
range of functions, including most of the services and responsibilities
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previously undertaken by health, education and other line ministries
(Nsibambi, 1998:59). Yet as noted in the Decentralisation Secretariat
status report on the implementation of the decentralisation programme for
the period 1st july_31st December 2000, appendix 109, only a relatively
small proportion of government expenditure (some 20 percent of recurrent
expenditure or 2 percent of GDP) has so far been placed under the control
of local governments. The latter are handicapped in that, while the wage
bill of decentralised staff is covered, non-wage bill costs are not adequately
met. Reddy (1999:44) observes that right from the time of Independence
there are few cases in Africa where local authorities have had adequate
sources of finance, whether from local revenues or central grants and
loans, and were able to maintain financial viability. The recurrent funds
available to most decentralised governments in Africa, from whatever
source, are barely enough to meet the wage bills, pay councillors and other
allowances and maintain vital equipment (Nordic Consulting group,
1999:43). Consequently, many authorities have to seek donor funding for
their capital development projects; the effect is to increase the recipient
country's burden of debt and to saddle the local authority with often-
unknown recurrent costs. There is therefore no doubt that the
decentralisation process will be seriously handicapped, unless local
governments have sufficient financial resources at their disposal to
supplement their development budgets and meet the attendant recurrent
costs. Local governments in Uganda have at times suffered as a result of
the Centre withholding and/or delaying the release of funds, or remitting
lesser amounts than anticipated. Lack of an assured revenue base has
made development planning and especially long-term planning extremely
difficult.
In a study carried out in Uganda by the Crown Agents Institutional
Development Group (ODA, 1996:45) on behalf of the Overseas
Development Agency, Graduated Personal Tax (a personal tax, varying
with assessed income, levied on males over 18 and on women either
salaried or in business) despite being the main district revenue raising
instrument, was found to conflict with two central principles of good
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taxation, those of equity and administrative simplicity. In relation to other
tax instruments, GPT is regressive, while also exhibiting its own internal
regressivity. The complex administrative requirements of GPT in-relation to
both assessment and collection result in unacceptably high administrative
costs, particularly in the districts and collection data indicate significant
arbitrary elements in the income assessment process.
Consequently, one can argue that in order to boost the current levels of
financial resources available to local governments, further synergy between
Uganda's national and local taxation systems is required and this can -be
achieved through a closer integration of institutions responsible for the
administration of national and local taxes, the Uganda Revenue Authority
(URA) and district local governments respectively. Specific informational
links are required between the URA, staff at district level and district local
governments, if relationships of trust are to be developed and co-operative
arrangements are to evolve based on sharing of intelligence/knowledge of
local economies and the diffusion of standards of good administrative
practice. Since there are few obvious meaningful sources of additional
local revenue that district local governments can tap, besides Graduated
Personal Tax, except the introduction of increased or new user charges,
their dependence on the Centre and external donors will continue and
could worsen, unless administrative and structural bottlenecks, that at the
moment appear to impede the expansion of local revenue bases, are
identified and addressed.
3.7.4 Control of Staffing
According to Lubanga (1998:69) personnel decentralisation may be
manifested in two classic typologies, the separate personnel system, and
the unified personnel system. In the separate personnel system, local
governments become the ultimate employer, they have powers to hire and
fire their employees. The process and initiatives with regard to recruitment,
promotion and discipline becomes the exclusive domain of each local
government. They therefore bear the responsibility to establish or abolish
offices in their local public services. In a unified personnel system the local
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government service runs parallel to that of central government (Lubanga,
1998:69). Local government officers are appointed, promoted and
disciplined by a national or local government-service commission. Local
governments remain the employers; but staff are organised on a national
basis under one local government service commission or board. Reddy
(1999:43) adds another typology and raises to three the systems of staffing
for local government that are operational worldwide. In the integrated
system, local government draws its staff from a national -service that covers
both central and local government and staff is transferable between the
two.
Lubanga (1998:70), however, observes that many developing countries do
not operate pure systems. They tend to blend them, hence the emergence
of a new typology; the hybrid system. Uganda took the bold step of moving
from a mixed integrated and unified system of the 1980s to the separate
personnel system in 1993 (Reddy, 1999:43), (Nordic Consulting Group,
1999:130). Clause 56 (1) of the Local Governments Act, 1997 vests the
power to appoint, discipline and remove district and urban council officers
in the District Service Commission (DSC). Clause 59 (2) of the same Act
requires the DSC to submit a report to the District Council and the Public
Service Commission (PSC) on the performance of its functions after every
four months and at such other times as is required. It is noteworthy that,
while the PSC is required under Article 166 (d) of the 1995 Uganda
Constitution to guide and coordinate District Service Commissions, it has
no power to direct or control them, indeed clause 59 (1) of the LGA, 1997
stresses the independence of the DSC and says specifically that it "shall
not be subject to the direction or control of any-person or authority". Local
government staff is however cushioned from any possible arbitrary actions
of District Service Commissions by clause 60 (2 and 3) of the LGA, which
empowers the Public Service Commission to hear and uphold the appeal of
an aggrieved officer against the decision of the District Service
Commission.
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In Botswana, in the pre-1974 period, all staff responsibilities were
delegated to the local authorities. (Nordic Consulting Group, 1999:13).
This arrangement was abandoned in 1974 on the ground that it was open
to nepotism and other abuses and worked to the detriment of the smaller
councils. The recruitment, posting, transfer, promotion and discipline of
local authority staff, other than the industrial-class employees then became
the responsibility of the centrally-directed Unified Local Government
Service (ULGS), headed bya civil service establishment secretary of
undersecretary rank. There is also a Local Government Service
Commission (LGSC) responsible for overall policy, as distinct from
personnel management. District councils in Botswana have criticized the
ULGS headquarters staff for not being sufficiently responsive to their
problems or sufficiently aware of their needs. They argue that there are
instances where officers are transferred from one council to another without
adequate consultation with the councils concerned. But the Botswana
Government has refused to accede to district councillors' requests that they
should themselves resume full responsibility for appointing, promoting and
disciplining council staff. In essence, the unified local government system
in Botswana has been retained and is intact.
In Zambia, under the Local- Government Act of 1991, a unified and
transferable local government service was re-introduced, having been
abolished by the 1980 Local Administration Act. It was centrally-controlled
by a Local Government Service Commission, albeit with powers that were
reduced both then and subsequently (Nordic Consulting Group,
1999:14). The election of new councils in November 1992 brought to the
fore the issue of the relative powers of the local authorities - notably the
extent of their autonomy over both personnel and other resources, and
functions - and the Local Government Service Commission. The latter
body was somewhat distant and was not particularly effective; its
confirmatory powers fell into abeyance, leaving it only with the power to
review cases on appeal. In the post-1993 period the locus of responsibility
for the appointment, promotion and discipline of staff was unclear and
ambiguities in the law remained. Despite this, councils exercised an
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unrestricted power to "hire and fire", while the Minister of Local Government
and Housing transferred staff arbitrarily from one council to another, often
without the agreement of the councils affected. By mid-1995 a unified local
government service had virtually disappeared; the projected Provincial
Service Boards had not been·created and little had been done in the-way of
performance appraisal.
In Ghana the 1967 Mills-Odoi Report recommended that the local
government and civil service should be merged (Nordic Consulting
Group, 1999:13). However, renewed military intervention in 1972 held this
up and delayed other structural reforms. In the late 1980s Rawlihgs,13
quasi-military government introduced a non-partisan system of local
government based on district assemblies; the latter were small units, 110 in
number, raising the question of whether they would have an adequate
resource base in staffing and finance to be viable and effective. The
democratic 1992 Constitution re-affirmed the non-partisan nature of these
elected assemblies, thereby taking no account of the difficulties likely to
arise from the creation of a partisan central government formed by
Rawlings, following the holding of competitive multi-party elections. In the
meantime under the revised arrangements, Ghana has completed the
process-of recreating a unified local government service, separate from the
civil service but, as Reddy (1999:43) observes, some staff members of
central departments have been reluctant to transfer to the local government
service and surrender their prospects in central government.
Zimbabwe's separate personnel system in urban authorities, while not
without shortages of key technical staff, seems to have been successful
and to have contributed to the relative strength and autonomy of the
system (Reddy, 1999:44).
13 Flight LtJerry Rawlings became Ghana's Head of State 1979 following a military coup that ousted the
military Junta led byGeneral Akuffo. He latter handed over power toacivilian government but re-took it inyet
an military coup in 1981 and ruled up 1992 when democraticmulti-party elections( which his party won} were
held.
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In view of the above analysis, this thesis concurs with Reddy (1999:44) in
respect of the suggestions he makes regarding the management of staff
under decentralisation; that the management of the unified systems
requires considerable sensitivity to the needs, priorities and preferences of
local authorities and that the success of the separate personnel system can
be promoted by building up the image of local government and increasing
confidence in its future. It also supports the view advanced by Lubanga
(1998:70) that since decentralisation is conceived as a continuum, with de-
concentration being minimal and devolution being maximal, and assuming
that it is most desirable for purposes of empowerment and good
governance to let local governments have control over and responsibility
for their decisions, then the separate personnel system would be the most
appropriate form to promote good governance and provide an organic
interface with civil society. It also offers more opportunities to councils and
civil society to monitor, evaluate, reward, censure and sanction local
government officials. Developing countries which have adopted a separate
personnel system often take systematic precautions against irregular
practices by local recruiting agencies and victimisation of appointed staff by
introducing statutory or constitutional provisions for appeal to a national
body that is also often granted a regulatory and quasi-Judicial role
(Lubanga, 1998:70). The experience of Uganda shows that the separate
personnel system is capable of offering positive results and to paraphrase
Reddy (1999:44), if the future lies in devolution, perhaps the days of the
unified and integrated systems are over. The separate system could
flourish in a context of adequately-resourced councils that are supported
strongly by the Centre and gain in confidence with success.
3.8 Local Government Financing in Uganda
For local government to perform a developmental role in addressing socio-
economic and infrastructural backlogs and inequalities in a viable and
sustainable manner, innovative and transformative financing and financial
management strategies, processes and procedures have to be instituted
(Sing, 2003:54). There are three types of fiscal transfers made from the
Central to local governments in Uganda, and these are: unconditional,
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conditional and equilisation grants. Revenue from these sources is
supplemented by locally raised revenue. Unconditional grants, determined
on the basis of population (85 percent) and area (15 percent) are the
minimum grants that are paid by government to local-governments to run
decentralised services (LGA, 1997:84). They are intended to permit
considerable discretion to local governments in resource allocation in
pursuit of their developmental objectives. But local governments are
however required to give priority in allocation to the five national Priority
Programme Areas (PPAs) of primary education, primary health care,
agricultural extension, rural feeder roads and water and sanitation (PEAP,
2001:147)14. Conditional grants on the other hand are directed at pre-
determined programmes within the Priority Programme Areas and are
supposed to be based on agreement between the Central Government and
the relevant local governments regarding their access and utilisation (LGA,
1997:84). Equilisation grants are a subsidy or special provision disbursed
from the Central Government to the least developed local governments to
enable them meet the minimum standards of social services delivery.
These sources of revenue are supplemented by local revenue generated
from a host of taxes of which the most significant are graduated personal
and property taxes, market dues, fees and fines, rates, cess, rents and any
other legal revenue sources (LGA, 1997:145-156). Local governments are
also permitted to borrow by way of bonds, debentures or directly from
commercial banks up to 25 percent of locally-raised revenue, but the
Minister of Local Government must approve any borrowing exceeding 10
percent of what a local government may legally borrow LGA, (1997:155).
14 The purpose of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) is to set the overall framework and principles for
government planning and budgeting. The priorities articulated in the PEAP are implemented through sectoral
plans and financed through the annual budget. The level ofdetail of these plans varies among sectors, but in
all cases sectors have moved towards fUlly costed programmes with well-defined targets. The implementation
ofthe PEAP istherefore not aseparate exercise but primarily operates through the actions ofeach sector and
the annual budgeting exercise.
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TABLE 3: FISCAL TRANSFERS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN UGANDA (Fys 1993/94·2000/2001) (MILLIONS OF UGANDA ~HILLINGS)
Local 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01
Type ofGrant Govts Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount %
18.90
District 7,990 25% 20,896 29.70% 38,544 33% 45,317 26% 48,111 24% 60,427 21% 62,659 % 74,978 14.90%
Unconditional 1.20
Grants Urban 322 0.50% 2,076 2% 3,400 2% 3,672 2% 3,960 1% 3,960 % 4,160 0.80%
79.40
District 23,580 75% 49,042 69.80% 75,988 65% 127,797 72% 144,634 74% 217,942 77% 263,002 % 308,211 61.40%
Conditional
Grants Urban 1,048 0.20%
District 101,167 20.20%
Development
Grants Urban 8,373 1.70%
0.50
District 1,500 % 3,537 0.70%
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Equalisation
Grants Urban 462 0.10%
TOTAL
TRANSFERS 31,570 100% 70,260 100% 116,608 100% 176,514 100% 196,417 100% 282,329 100% 331,122 100% 501,926 100%
GOP Current Factor Cost (bn) 4,922 5,565 6,023 7,104 7,963 8,656 9,695
Total Fiscal Transfer as %ofGOP 1.4 2.1 2.90% 2.80% 3.50% 3.80% 5.20%
National Recurrent Budget (a*) 403,335 473,617 597,169 655,291 826,190 908,760 1,012,821
1,175,8
National Development BUdget (b*) 524,270 537,363 684,804 749,523 811,869 97 1,300,283
1,011,00 1,404,8 1,638,0 2,084,6
Total National Budget (c*) 927,603 0 1,282,000 15 60 58 2,313,104
Total Fiscal Transfer as %of (a*) 17% 25% 30% 30% 34% 36% 50%
Total Fiscal Transfer as %of(c*) 8% 12% 14% 14% 17% 17% 22%
Source: Ministry of Finance, Planning &Economic Development, Kampala, Uganda: Approved Estimates of Revenue andExpenditure, 1993/94-2000/2001.
Figures rounded up tonearest thousands
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TABLE 4: PROPORTION OF DIFFERENT GRANTS TRANSFERRED TO DISTRICTS SINCE Fys 1993/94-2000/2001 (%)
Grant 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/2001
District Unconditional Grants 25% 29.70% 33% 26% 24% 21% 18.90% 14.90%
Urban Unconditional Grants 0.50% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1.20% 0.80%
District conditional Grants 75% 69.80% 65% 72% 74% 77% 79.40% 61.40%
Urban conditional Grants 0.20%
District Equilisation Grants 20.20%
Urban Equilisation Grants 1.70%
District Development Grants 0.70%
Urban Development Grants 0.10%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Ministry ofFinance, Planning & Economic Development, Kampala, Uganda: Approve.d Estimates ofRevenue
and Expenditure for Fiscal Years 1993/94-2000/2001.
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Table 3 shows total fiscal transfers from the Centre to local governments in
Uganda for the period 1993/94-2000/2001, both as a percentage of the
gross domestic product-and the national budget, while Table 4 shows the
proportion of different grants transferred to Districts over the same period.
As regards local revenue, the Local Governments Act provides for the
sharing of locally-raised revenue among local governments. Sub-counties,
not districts, collect revenue, retain 65 percent of their collections and are
required to remit the balance to districts. Sub-counties in turn are required
to remit 25 percent of what they have retained to village councils, 5 percent
to parish councils and 5 percent to their respective county councils (LGA,
1997:151-153). Municipal divisions are required to remit 50 percent of their
collections to their respective Municipalities, while Kampala City divisions
must also remit 50 percent of their collections to the City Council.
In 1987, the Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System that
had been appointed by the Central Government in 1986, reported that
revenues of local authorities, under a highly-centralised national system,
were inadequate to perform the mandatory and non-mandatory functions
assigned to those authorities (Nsibambi, 1998:48). Given the fact that the
Central Government itself did not have adequate funds to meet its financial
obligations, it is hardly surprising that local authorities were financially
deprived because even the meagre resources available were spent at the
Centre rather than the districts. Grants from the Centre were neither
predictable, nor pre-determined, while local revenue generation was not
assured. The icing on the cake however remained the widespread tax
evasion coupled with lack of proper involvement of the district councils in
the budgeting process. In a nutshell, local authorities neither received the
requisite financing for their functions nor were they authorised to raise the
necessary revenue through taxation (Report of the Commission of
Inquiry into the Local Government System in Uganda, 1987:88). While
the socio-political landscape may have drastically metamorphosed in view
of decentralisation, the problems hitherto envisaged with local government
financing remain largely unchanged.
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The first persistent problem is that, in revenue-sharing between the Centre
and local governments, no systematic attempt has been made to match the
assigned functions to local governments with the requisite financing,
despite a clear division of functions and powers between the Centre and
lower levels of government. In order to consolidate this argument of unfair
distribution of revenue further, Shah (1994:4) highlights two categories of
service delivery as are divisible between the Centre and local governments.
One category is of services delivered by local governments which include
the following: services for which economies of scale are not a major
consideration; services for which political proximity is essential; services for
which no significant cost-benefit spillovers are anticipated, and those for
which distributional considerations are not important (Shah, 1994:4). Such
functions would ordinarily include primary education, public health, rural
feeder roads, street lighting, markets, recreational facilities, etc. The
second category, which is of services taken care of by the Centre,
encompasses heavier functions which have serious international
implications for the country such as defence and internal security,
international trade, immigration, regional cooperation, etc. Regarding the
basis on which finances should be shared between the Central
Government and local governments, Nkurumah (1995: 11) argues that:
AI/local authorities combined handle up to fifty per centum (50%) of total
governmental responsibilities and therefore are correspondingly entitled to
fifty per centum (50%) of aI/ public revenues.
While this formulation has the advantage of matching functions with
requisite financing, it is too general to apply universally to the situation in
Uganda especially given that implementation of some peculiar national
priorities may militate against the principle of matching functions with
revenue.
The second persistent financial problem is that the Central Government
has tended to monopolise the sources of revenue, like value-added tax,
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while leaving the non-elastic sources like market fees to local governments.
It suffices to go on record that, whether "own" resources or
intergovernmental grants are considered, the basic conclusion that
emerges from reviewing the structure of intergovernmental finance in
Uganda, as in almost any developing country, seems invariably to be the
-same: local governments need to be given access to adequate resources
to do the job with which they are entrusted. At the same time, however,
they must also be held responsible to those who provide these resources
for what they do with them, through independent scrutiny institutions such
.as the Local Government Public Accounts Committees, the Auditor General
and the Inspector General of Government.
3.8.1 Graduated Personal Tax
Graduated Personal Tax (GPT) is levied on all males aged 18 and above
excluding those specifically exempt on grounds of ill-health, those
registered as full-time students and those in the Army or Police (LGA,
1997:145). Females aged 18 and above who are in full-time employment
or engaged in business are also included. The tax originated in the colonial
period as a straight-forward poll tax, when it was thought, though
erroneously, that it would be a good means of inducing peasant farmers to
move into the cash economy". Its unpopularity and regressive nature led
to its abandonment after Independence in Kenya and Tanzania. In Uganda
it was modified to become a graduated personal tax in 1963 (ODA,
1996:46)16. Following its review an attempt was made to introduce a
stronger element of progressivity and equity into the tax by incorporating a
large number of tax bands, 37 in number, combined with a comprehensive,
15 This argument continues to be put forward in favour of the GPT. In fact rural and urban households in
Uganda already have plenty of incentives toseek cash, for example to pay school fees for their children, and
togenerally fit in the Market Economy. 15 Graduated personal tax was a source ofheated debate and tension
during the 2001 Uganda presidential elections.
16 GPT was a source ofheated debate and tension during the 2001 Uganda Presidential Elections. Dr Kiiza-
Besigye, a key opponent of President Yoweri Museveni in the race took advantage of the tax's unpopularity
and promised to srap it altogether. Museveni had tomake compromises that included reduction of the tax to
Shs 3000/= (US$ 1.5), an act which has rendered its collection by district local governments economically
unviable.
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detailed and intrusive assessment of taxpayers' income, both monetary
and non-monetary (Muwanga-Zake, 1983:33).
Despite the above reforms, the tax still conflicts with two fundamental
canons of taxation: that of equity and-that of administrative simplicity. As
already mentioned in 3.7.3, GPT as a constituent part.of central and local
taxes constitutes an element which is regressive and this has deprived it of
the flexibility that would be essential for the-tax to be easily managed in the
country side. Table 5 compares the frequency distribution for rural tax
payers in the districts with that for monthly per capita incomes among rural
households. It can be noted that 72 percent of GPT payers fall within the
lowest six tax grades, implying (except to the extent that they have been
under-assessed for tax) that they fall within the bottom Income class of the
monthly income distribution. Thus Graduated Personal Tax (GPT) is
essentially paid by low-income households (ODA, 1996:46).
Table 5
Distribution Of Rural Graduated Taxpayers in Uganda Compared
With Distribution of Rural Households by Per Capita Household
Income, 1992-3
Monthly per Distribution of Graduated tax grade Distribution of tax
capita income households, (U.Sh.OOO) payers
class (%) 1992-3 1992-3 (%)
(U. Sh. 000) 1992-3
1992-3
0- 63.6 2 15 1.2 1.2
10- 26.6 3 16 4.5 0.9
20- 6.3 4 17 9.3 0.9
30- 1.9 5 18 22.8 1.0
40- 1.0 6 19 21.6 1.0
60- 0.3 7 20 12.6 1.1
80- 0.2 8 21 9.2 0.1
100- 0.1 9 23 4.4 0.1
200 or over 0.1 10 25 3.5 0.2
11 27 1.2 0.1
12 30 1.7 0.2
13 35 1.2 0.1
14 40 1.0 0.2
Source: National Integrated Household Survey 1992-93
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A similar comparison is made in Table 6 for Kampala City Council. Here
70% of taxpayers fail in the bottom two grades only. The two frequency
distributions contrast even more markedly and this confirms that GPT
impinges right at the very bottom of the income distribution. The implication
in this case is that when incorporated into the tax system as a whole, the
tax is directed towards the mass of income earners, rural and urban
pegged at the lowest end of the income distribution. Indeed as Davey
(1974:30-32)17 notes, were it to be incorporated into the income tax scale,
the majority of graduated personal tax payers would be exempt, falling
below the minimum threshold.
Table 6
Distribution of graduated taxpayers in Kampala City Council compared
with distribution of households by per capita household income, 1992-3
Monthly per Distribution Graduated tax grade Distribution of
capita income households(%) (Ush.OOO) payers (%)
class (Ush.OOO) 1992-3 1992-3 1992-3
1992-3
0- 6.9 6 17 44.5 0.6
10- 24.9 7 18 25.2 0.5
20- 24.2 8 19 7.0 0.3
30- 14.1 9 20 3.1 0.8
40- 11.5 10 21 3.2 0.4
60- 6.8 11 23 1.6 0.3
80- 5.2 12 25 1.1 0.4
100- 3.2 13 27 1.2 0.5
120- 1.8 14 30 0.9 0.5
200- 2.2 15 35 1.0 0.5
300 or over 0.1 16 40 0.5 4.6
Source: National Integrated Household Survey
The equity aspect of a tax directed towards the bottom of the income
distribution is even more evident if we consider it against a welfare
measure comprising the ratio of household expenditure per adult equivalent
to an estimated poverty line, as shown in Table 7. Judging from the table,
the bottom 61 percent of the Uganda population are classified as poor.
Indeed the expenditure of the bottom quarter, who comprise the bulk of
17 Davey Kenneth, 1974. Taxing a Peasant Society: The example ofGraduated Taxes inEast Africa, London,
Charles Knight.
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GPT taxpayers, amounts to just over half the poverty level. On the
administrative side, it is noted that the use of 37 narrow bands or divisions
within what is a relatively narrow range of income, means that very detailed
data on household incomes are required (ODA, 1996:48). This includes
data on all farm output, marketed and non-marketed, as well as on non-
farm activities in the ruraHnformal sector. Proper assessment, given major
year to year variations in income, requires that this be collected annually in
every sub-county in Uganda for all households. The amount of information
called for if this is to be carried out accurately is as detailed as would be
involved in a comprehensive national farm survey of the type contemplated
only at periodic intervals, if at all (ODA, 1996:48).
Table 7 ..
The Distribution of Economic Welfare in Uganda












Source: World Bank (1996), calculated from the 1992/93 Integrated Household
Survey
In view of the above-mentioned discrepancies, the reality of assessment is
very different. There is arbitrary assessment, up or down, which is
unrelated to actual incomes. There are also cases of widespread forgery of
tax certificates in both rural and urban authorities, leading to the need for
expensive counter-measures, including, like the case of Kampala City
Council, the most extreme of remedies: the printing of GPT certificates in
the United Kingdom. The features described above mean that GPT also
scores poorly for elasticity, since the bulk of revenue is secured from a
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limited number of bands at the lower end. Consequently, it is an argument
of this thesis that Graduated Personal Tax does not provide a good basis
for a district development budget and currently constitutes a key bottleneck
in the efforts to develop and enhance the local government financial
resource base under devolution.
3.8.2 Business Licences and Fees
Given Uganda's open and, relatively unregulated economy, and its rather
small industrial sector, incomes derived from trade, transport and
construction activities are comparatively important, but for a variety of
reasons, generally under-taxed (Zake, 1994:90). As shown in Table 8 the
top quarter of Uganda's households obtain more than a quarter of their
income from business and within this substantial group business income is
70 percent of the value obtained from agriculture.
Table 8
Business Income earned in Uganda 1992-3 by Quartile of the
population
Business income obtained Bottom Distribution of households by income level
25% Lower middle Upper middle Top 25%
Uganda - total
As % of agriculture 15.2 18.4 26.6 70.5
As % of earned income 11.7 13.2 17.7 31.2
As % of all income 8.1 10.3 14.2 27.0
Uganda - urban
As % of earned income 27.6 36.1 39.0 49.7
As % of all income 19.3 27.9 29.4 42.8
Uganda - rural
As % of agriculture 12.0 12.0 17.8 29.4
As % of earned income 9.9 9.6 13.7 19.8
As % of all income 6.9 7.5 11.1 17.2
Source: 1992-3 Integrated Household Survey, derived from figures in World Bank
(1996)
Among urban households all income groups obtain a substantial part of
earned income from business, 50 percent in the case of the top quartile of
households. There is thus a significant business class in Uganda based
especially in the urban areas but operating also throughout the rural areas.
Table 9 shows that, as in the case of other sources of revenue, revenue
secured by urban and district authorities from licensing was lightly variable
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across authorities, suggesting under-exploitation in certain cases and
hence some scope for improvement in collections.
Table 9
Distribution of Actual Council Revenue by Source 1993-4 (%)
SOURCE COUNCIL GRADUATED MARKETS TAXI BUS TRADE,OTHER PROPERTY HOUSING OTHER'
TAX PARKS L1CENCES& FEES
Municipalities I
Kampala 40.2 11.3 6.9 11.9 I 16.4 7.2 6.1
Jinja 14.0 13.1 7.8 4.7 28.0 11.4 21.0
Mbale2 21.5 52.3 5.5 20.0 0.7
Fort Portal2 27.1 34.8 18.4 15.5 4.3
Gulu 19.0 36.5 6.4 3.6 2.1 18.8 13.6
Bushenyi 40.7 13.3 20.4 5.3 2.7 17.7
Mukono 36.0 18.0 14.9 11.2 8.1 11.8
Tororo 22.1 40.7 14.7 8.8 13.2 0.5
Njeru 32.1 8.8 5.0 5.0 15.7 33.3
Kitgum 18.3 29.0 4.3 14.0 34.4
Districts
Mbale 61.7 13.4 14.6 0.1 10.33
Kabarole 57.6 13.6 8.4 0.2 20.23.4
Gulu 73.6 22.4 3.0 0.3 0.7
Bushenyi 73.5 13.0 0.3 13.3
Luweero 71.0 26.2 2.6 0.5
Mukono 73.1 22.7 4.5
Mubende 66.2 8.5 0.3 25.0
Tororo 88.9 4.9 6.3
Igana 74.4 6.4 10.2
Masaka 84.9 11.3 0.1 3.7
1. Exclude transfers from central government
2. Percentages based onestimates, notactual values
3. Includes education tax
4. Includes kibanja fees
Source: Ministry of Local Government, Kampala, Uganda, 1995
When one looks at the municipalities, one observes that proportions raised
from different sources of revenue vary widely from Council to Council. Part
of the explanation may be in varying economic circumstances and,
Therefore, in variability in the tax bases and taxable opportunities between
districts. It would also appear that the differences also reflect to some
extent the pursuit of different revenue-raising priorities and strategies. But
for Zake (1994:90), the major cause of variation appears to reflect
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differences in the effectiveness of implementation, management and
administration of the chosen-revenue-raising instruments.
This study also notes that in many cases traditional patterns of revenue
assessment and collection tend to focus on the same old sources of local
revenue at the expense of vibrant, progressive-new ones. For instance in
Mbale, Kasese and Bundibugyo Districts (these are border districts),
trading in coffee has been a-major source of income since the deregulation
of coffee marketing, yet no form of tax on coffee trade exists in these
districts. Zake (1994:93) proposes adoption of the principle of
discriminatory licence-fee setting on businesses such as coffee trade which
are confined to just a number of districts, in a way that enables the fee to
take account of three major aspects namely:
• the earnings in the activity, whether high or low, as determined by
the nature of the activity;
• the size of the establishment; and
• its regional location within Uganda, whether urban or rural, or in
richer or poorer districts.
It is noteworthy that in districts across Uganda, the number of rural
business establishments and the level of earnings secured varies primarily
with the level of incomes and purchasing power generated in agriculture,
and will differ significantly, for instance, between the central and northern
regions. This thesis argues that caution must be exercised when levying
licence fees because, since most district local governments operate in a
rural setting, the low levels of licensing will normally reflect low levels of
real activity and earnings. Efforts to extract licence fees from poor groups
in marginal rural business occupations need to be relaxed as they are likely
to be unsuccessful. It is also likely to be costly in relation to the revenues
obtained, to have a negative impact on the pursuit of survival activities, and
to increase the unpopularity of local administrators at a time when it is
important to put forward a positive image. An example of a particularly
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futile tax is in form of licence fees for "Boda Boda" Bicycles (Bicycles for
hire) in Hoima District and a number of other districts and municipalities.
The registration plates for these bicycles cost more than the licences
themselves.
3.8.3 Property Tax~--~_~ ---~~~
Up to 1971 a relatively effective system of property rating was in place in
Uganda before it broke down (ODA, 1996:58). Following the Local
Government Rating Decree, number 3 of 1979, a uniform annual value
rating system was put in place based on the annual rental value of
properties. Uganda now boasts of a substantial indigenous business class,
and since it is unlikely that income tax not set at high levels is able to
capture what might have been considered an appropriate level of revenue
from the incomes derived from business, and these revenues are also not
captured by indirect taxes, inheritance or other capital taxes, then there is a
strong case for focusing on and improving property tax. The major problem
however appears to be the absence of sufficient institutional mechanisms
to collect the tax despite the existence of an enabling legal framework. For
example, property valuations particularly in urban authorities, take
extremely long to update, and in some cases are never updated at all,
despite a statutory legal requirement for five-year revaluations (ODA,
1996:59). At the same time the capacity of the property tax department of
the Ministry of Water, Lands and Environmental Protection has effectively
collapsed, such valuers as it had, in many cases having left for the private
sector. Table 10 portraying the situation in Kampala City Council,
demonstrates the intensity of the deterioration between the periods 1990/1
and 1994/5. The table shows a marked decline in the share of revenue
from property taxes by KCC in the short period of four years, a decline in
the share from 39 to 16 percent, matched by an almost exactly opposite
movement in the share of graduated tax from 17 to 42 percent.
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Table 10
Kampala City Council change in revenue sources 1990-1 & 1994-5
Share of incoming revenue (%)
Source 1990/1- 1994/5
Property taxes 39.2 16.6
Graduated tax 17.6 42.1
Markets 10.9 9.1
Taxi/bus parks 9.6 8.7
Licences and fees 14.3 10.9
Housinq and rent 2.8 7.0
Other 5.6 5.5
Source: Local Government Finance Commission, Kampala, Uganda 1996
The overall effect was a shift in the burden of tax 'from higher to lower
income earners, whose effect in the long run has been the creation of
fatigue and despondency on the part of the local population leading to
general apathy and withdrawal from community development initiatives.
3.8.4 Market Dues Under Privatisation: The Case of Kampala City
Council
In their study on enhancing district revenue generation and administration,
the ODA (1996:54) undertook a detailed analysis of the privatisation
experience of Kampala City Council. They found out that KCC at that
time owned 31 markets situated on both public and private land. The
Council commenced a programme of privatisation of market management
in June 1994. Nine markets, including the largest and accounting for three-
quarters of the total stall capacity, were privatised. The procedure was to
offer management contracts through open bidding, selecting the successful
bidder on the basis of both the level of bid offered and the assessed
reliability of the individual concerned. KCC retained an advisory and
controlling role: fee levels continued to be determined by the Council,
physical structures could not be altered without council consent, while stall
holders could not be evicted, except in the case of failure to pay. Contracts
were for six months only, renewable on satisfactory performance. The
success of the scheme is put down to management motivation (ODA,
1996:54), following the profit motive; better-paid and thus better-motivated
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employees; elimination of incentives to divert revenues; and reduction of
evasion of dues through arrivals ahead of opening times and through
monitoring of previously-unmanned entrances, and exits. As a result of the
reform, it is noted that revenue accruing to Kampala City Council increased
in the year following privatisation by about 23 percent from shillings 50.8
million to shillings 61.75 million a month. At the same time costs incurred
by the same Council fell by half from shillings 173.8 million in FY1993/4 to
shillings 88.2 million in FY1994/5. Of the savings made, 26 percent were in
wages and allowances, 34 percent in water and electricity charges, 26
percent in rents paid by private landlords, and 14 percent in stationery.
The number of market masters employed in collecting revenue reduced
from 215 in 1992 to just 35 in 1995/6. Since it can be assumed that these
savings are associated with the privatisation arrangements made, the net
annual gain to KCC from privatisation can be calculated to equal the
income received from the contractors, less revenue previously obtained
from the markets plus savings in the costs of running the markets, totalling
to shillings 217 million per annum, about US$220,000, according to foreign
currency 1995/6 exchange rates (aDA: 1995:55). It is also noted that a
further inducement towards efficient operation by private management
arises out of competition from the large number of unplanned or illegal
markets in the Kampala area. These may have developed spontaneously
due to market forces, such as an advantage in proximity to consumers, or
alternatively as means of avoiding market dues. In the latter case there will
still be a preference among vendors for a planned market so long as the
location, physical facilities and selling opportunities there are significantly
better, and there is therefore an incentive to the private operator to provide
improved facilities. On the basis of Kampala City Council's experience, it is
argued in this thesis that privatisation of urban (city, municipal, town) and
district markets does indeed offer prospects for some enhancement of
revenues from market dues and should be pursued with that objective and
along the lines followed by Kampala City Council. Judging from the trend
at KCC, this policy does not preclude an important role for local authorities
in the planning and development of markets. On the contrary the evidence
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is of serious deficiencies in this regard which need to be corrected as a
matter of priority.
3.8.5 lnter-tnstrlct Variation in Taxable-Capacity
Zake (1994~98) observes that changes in national policy, particularly in
relation to taxation of the agricultural sector, could alter considerably the
revenue situation of the districts. He argues that more immediately,
changes in organisational effectiveness within the existing system of taxes
could enhance revenues, even without fundamental changes. At the same
time, he emphasises that not all districts are blessed with the same
potential tax base and could expect on their own to secure a similar level
of revenue per capita and thus to offer their citizens the same standards of
service provision, except with some compensatory funding. Apart from the
system of unconditional and conditional grants that form part of
decentralised government financing, existing disparities in districts' taxable
capacity underscore the need for substantial compensating finance in both
recurrent and development budgets of endemic districts, if unacceptable
divergences are not to occur. It is in this relation that the Government of
Uganda introduced equalisation grants as per section 84 clause 4 of the
Local Governments Act 1997. Table 11 illustrates the magnitude of the
problem. As shown in the Table, the ratio of rural adult male population to
the number of GPT payers varies from just over one to more than two. In
other words, some districts are able to secure payment from no more than
half or less the proportion secured by others and perhaps no more than half
of those technically liable to pay the tax. Hence more relevant to the
potential tax revenue in general terms is the overall taxable capacity of the
district economy. Table 12 highlights some of the major regional
differences that were revealed by the 1992/93 Integrated Household
Survey. The table shows that within the rural areas, the average annual
per capita income in the Northern region of Uganda is only 59 percent of
that of the Central Region.
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Table 11
Ratio of Rural Adult Male Population to the Number of Graduated Tax
P b O· t . t 1993~ayers .y IS nc ,
District Region No. of Rural male Ratio of GT Per head.
payers population population revenue of male
age 20-592 to payers per payer pop.
(U.sh) (U.sh)
Mpigi C 132,255.00 138,275 1.05 10;300 9,842
Nebbi N 43,704.00 49,880 1.14 7,610 6,670
Mukono C 111,940.00 129,969 1.16 9,010 7,764
Iganga E 126,806.00 156,947 1.24 7,160 5,782
Kiboga C 18,812.00 24,931 1.33 15,370 11,592
Kapchorwa E 15,000 20,087 1.34 5,330 3,983
Kasese W 39,100 52,909 1.35 11,060 8,174
Luwero C 53,818 73,603 1.37 12,770 9,340
M asaka C 96,247 134,698 1.40 11,600 8,270
Movo N 20,256 49,880 1.42 9,390 6,606
Mbarara W 107,696 155,404 1.44 13,100 9,105
Bundlbuqvo W 12,966 19,009 1.47 6,990 4,764
Hoima W 23,296 34,709 1.49 13,060 8,767
Kisoro W 19,721 29,610 1.50 7,320 4,874
Kabarole W 80,000 125,492 1.57 7,500 4,781
Lira N 42,195 83,531 1.98 13,510 6,824
Apac N 39,266 78,547 2.00 11,700 5,854
Pallisa E 30,390 61,552 2.03 7,280 3,598
Mbale E 56,464 116,249 2.03 6,810 3,311
Tororo E 40,791 86,364 2.12 11,130 5,256
Arua N 38,490 105,242 2.73 8,420 3,081
Rakai C 18,812 64,885 3.45 15,370 4,454
Soroti E 6,056 66,760 11.02 8,280 750
Kitgum N 2,140 58,988 27 .56 7,720 280
C= Central N=Northern E=Eastern W= Western
Calculated from 1991 census figures, applying national age ratios to District totals.
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Table 12
A Average nnua per apia ncome Iy eglon, ura an ran, .
Region Rural U. Sh (% Urban U. Sh %
Central 139,971(1 00 356,150(100
Eastern 103,266(74 220,685 62
Western 108,007(77 235,766 66
Northern 82,226(59 169,466 48
Source: Integrated Household Surgery, 1992-93
In its report, aDA (1996:63) also notes that, in terms of taxable land, an
indicator of the taxable capacity of a district rural population can be taken
as the ratio of taxable acres (where all acreage over and above one acre
per holding constitutes taxable land) to the numbers of the population,
measured in turn by the number of holdings in existence. As shown in
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Table 13, this ratio ranges quite radically from 2.47 in Kabarole, 2.01 in
Hoima to 0.16 and 0.19 in Kapchorwa and Mbale. 18
Table 13
Potentially Taxable Land per District, 1991: Rankings by Taxable
Land- to- Holdings Ratio
District No. of taxable No. of holdings Taxable land to
acres" in district holdings ratio
Kabarole 169066 68519 2.47
Apac 130436 54245 2.40
Mbarara 249498 108572 2.30
Kamuli 160267 70628 2.27
Mubende 191457 85807 2.23
Bushenyi 172956 78091 2.21
Hoima 121639 60530 2.01
lqanqa 200139 110395 1.81
Rakai 66633 45174 1.48
Masindi 33746 23169 1.46
Lira 111347 79835 1.39
RukunQiri 53735 39622 1.36
Masaka 90753 73776 1.23
Tororo 167988 137468 1.22
MpiQi 99894 82609 1.21
Mukono 147612 127642 1.16
Luwero 505779 44593 1.13
Kabale 72183 81944 0.88
Jinja 190000 22828 0.83
Moyo 13603 20166 0.67
Bundibugyo 8247 13012 0.63
Kasese 8777 20749 0.42
Nebbi 16727 43448 0.38
Arua 33630 92103 0.37
Mba/e 20036 103897 0.19
Kapchorwa 2493 15899 0.16
Source: Integrated Households Survey, 1992/93
The position of the last two districts reflects the situation of acute scarcity of
land, which could be expected in turn to mean a low proportion of taxable
households, given the general dependence of the population on agriculture.
18 The productivity of land in different agro-ecological zones will ofcourse differ so that acres
cannot be considered uniform across all districts. The differences which exist however, are
much greater than could be explained by differences in land quality and in any case are not
related in any systematic way to regional location.
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The table indicates very wide disparities in land holdings between districts
and thus the existence of a major taxation problem if, balanced
development across districts is to be achieved-within the framework of
devolution.
3.8.6 The Role of the Farm Sector in Local Government revenue
Generation
Uganda is primarily an agricultural country and has a relatively rich
agricultural sector. However, agricultural incomes are exempt from income
tax, and there are no taxes on land. Ironically though, it should be noted
that local rural economies are taxed through different indirect taxes on
expenditure, levied by Central Government, but not accruing to district
authorities .
The importance of indirect taxes in Uganda can be seen from Table 14
which shows that in FY 1993/94 taxes on goods and services accounted for
almost 80 percent of all recurrent revenue and 85 percent of tax revenue.
Table 14
The Composition of Central Government Revenue1993-4
Ush.Bn %
Total recurrent revenue 388.451 100
Tax revenue 363.101 93.5
Income tax 52.953 13.6
Goods and services 101.796 26.2
Excise duty 40.505 10.4
Sales tax (local) 46.000 11.8
CTL 15.291 3.9
International trade 206.165 53.1
Export taxes 0.000 0.0
Customs duty 152.575 39.3
Sales tax on imports 53.590 13.8
Other tax revenue 2.187 0.6 ...
Non -tax revenue 25.351 6.5
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Background to the budget,
1994-1995,June 1994
1 Includes unallocated tax receipts and excise duty on imports
2 Fees and licenses, and any other tax revenue
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Table 15 shows the distribution of farm areas by size of landholding in
Uganda. It can be seen from the table that land ownership is unequal with
the mean-size of holding in the largest stratum nearly 40 times that in the
smallest size category. Notable as well are the following facts: larger farms
are not a small minority from which little tax yield could be expected: some
60,000 farms are 10 or more-acres in size and altogether nearly 160,000
are of 5 acres or more. The former account for as much as 30 percent of
arable land areas while the two upper categories together account for 48
percent. As shown in Table 15, a large proportion of holdings (half) are
less than one acre in size. Suppose for example a proportional land tax
was levied as so much per acre, with the first acre exempt, half of the farm
population currently paying graduated tax would be exempt.
Table 15
Distribution of farm areas by size of farm holding in Uganda, 1991 (%)
(Size distribution of number of farm holdings % in Brackets)
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Source: National Integrated Household Survey, 1992·93
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The number of taxable acres would be distributed as in Table 16 and these
would equal some 2.4 million or 67 percent among holdings of 5 acres and
above and 43 percent among holding of 10 acres and above. The above
trend suggests the need for bringing incomes from commercial farms,
defined as holdings exceeding 5 acres, within the ambit of income tax, thus
generating revenue- for local governments in the same way as other
sectors. In the absence of, or alternative to the above, it is recommended
that a contribution be made to local authority revenues in the from of a rural
devefopment charge. Quite a small unit charge could yield very useful
revenue and relieve pressure on districts to raise graduated tax.
Table 16




1 and under 2
2 and under 5
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10 an over
Total













Source: Derived from Table 17
Comparing districts' revenue receipts for 1992-3 shown in Table 17, it
can be seen that a rural development charge on land equal to just Uganda
Shs 1200/= (about half a USD) an acre would be sufficient to fully replace
Graduated Personal Tax as a source of local revenue, while a charge of
Shs 2500/= (about USD1.2) would more than double it.
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Table 17
Receipts From Graduated Personal Tax Under Alternative Illustrative
Band System, All Districts Authorities, 1992·3
Actual No of 1992- 13band Receipts 9 band receipts( 5band Receipts
rates payers 3receipts rates U sh 000 rates U.shs'OOO rates (u shsOOO
U shsOOO Ush 000 (lf.shs- U.shs'
'DOD 000
2 25688 51376 - - - - - -
-3-. 99951 299853 - - - - - -
4 207423 829692 3 622269 - - - -
5 507038 2535190 4 2028152 5 2535190 5 2535190
6 480655 2883B30 5 2403275 5 2403275 5 243295
7 280614 1964298 6 1683684 5 1403070 5 1403070
a- 203619 1628952 8 1628952 10 2036190 5 1018095
9 97278 875502 10 97280 10 97280 5 486390
10 76999 769990 10 769990 10 769990 15 1154985
11 26537 291907 10 265370 10 265370 15 398055
12 37113 445356 15 445356 15 556695 15 556695
13 27014 351182 15 405210 15 405210 15 405210
14 22394 313516 15 335910 15 335910 25 559850
15 27520 412800 20 550400 15 412800 25 688000
16 20745 331920 20 414900 15 311175 25 518625
17 20811 353787 20 416220 30 624330 25 520275
18 21747 391446 30 652410 30 652410 25 543675
19 21308 404852 30 639240 30 639240 40 852320
20 24580 491600 30 737400 30 737400 40 983200
21 1592 33432 40 63680 45 71640 40 63680
23 1007 23161 40 40280 45 45315 40 40280
25 5380 134500 40 215200 45 242100 55 295900
27 1535 41445 50 76750 45 69075 55 84425
30 3881 116430 50 194050 60 232860 55 213455
35 1504 52640 60 90240 60 90240 55 82720
40* 3886 155440 60 155460 80 207280 80 207280
- 80 103600 80 103600 80 103600
Tota/(% 122478 16183927 15,910,778 16,123,145 161,1182
of
accrual
1992-3 (100.0) (98.3) (99.6) (99.6)
receipts
Source: Ministry of local Government, Kampala Uganda
* it is assumed that payers in this group would divide 2:1 (ie2595:1295) into this and
higher tax group
3.8.7 Taxation and Decentralised Expenditure: Theoretical Issues
Having endeavoured to establish and analyse the key role played by
locally-generated taxes, such as GPT, Property Tax, Licence Fees and
market dues, in the implementation and sustainability of local government
services, it is equally important to highlight some of the theoretical
perspectives and issues that underpin the linkage between taxation in
general and local government expenditure, since, according to Davey
(1993:216), money is the heart of intergovernmental matters in all
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countries. Moreover, the general nature of intergovernmental fiscal
relations is also surprisingly -sirnilar across a wide range of countries. As
Bird (1990:278) observes, almost invariably, countries assign more
expenditure functions- to sub-national governments than- can be financed
from the revenue sourcesa llocated to those governments. The result of
this mismatching of functions and finances, sometimes referred to as
"vertical imbalance", is that sub-national governments are generally
dependent upon transfers from higher levels of government, and the more
so, the more significant the expenditures with which they are charqed'", In
his article, "Decentralisation of Expenditures or Taxes: The Case of
France", Remy Prud'homme (1990:116) wonders why those discussing
the optimal level of decentralisation , l.e. the ideal allocation of
responsibilities and resources amongst levels of government, do so in
terms of cost-effectiveness, accountability, responsiveness (to demand or
need), democratisation, and equity. He cautions that such alignment
usually takes for granted that taxes are or should be decentralised together
with responsibilities and expenditures. In this scenario, it is further assumed
that, first, the taxes raised by a given sub-national level of government are
borne by the people living within the boundaries of this government, and
second, that these taxes together with user fees and loans raised by this
government are its main source of income. In Prud'homme's view, while
both these assumptions might make sense to a certain extent, like in the
case of USA, they are not realistic for many other countries. For example,
depending upon the type of taxes raised locally, and the economic
characteristics of the local economy, part of the taxes raised in a given sub-
national government will be transferred or 'exported' to the people living in
other sub-national governments . For Prud'homme therefore, the normal
assumptions must be dropped, and the issue of decentralisation re-
19 The observed complexity of intergovernmental structure isnot likely toparallel what theory suggests. State
and local governments exist in the form they do and with the finances and functions they have, neither to
maximise democratic access togovernment nor toprovide public services as efficiently as possible, but rather
as a result of many complex historical and institutional factors. While generalisations are particularly
treacherous in this field, in many countries the role played in public finances by local governments is less a
matter of local autonomy than of the extent to which central governments have chosen, for reasons of
administrative efficiency orpolitical choice (Macmanus 1990:162).
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examined in the light of the spatial incidence of regional and local taxes,
and of the impact of grants and subsidies from central to regional and local
governments. At this point, it suffices to make a simple extension of
Prud'home's centralisation/decentraiisation paradigm by treating taxes and
expenditures separately, thus producing four distinct models. By comparing
and contrasting the four models, their characteristics and impact on their
environment is weighed, and the findings of this general analysis are then
utilised to- assess the trend in Uganda.
If the assumption that taxes and expenditures are jointly centralised or
decentralised is dropped, the four models of centralisation and
decentralisation can be identified as:
• Model A defined by complete centralisation of taxes and expenditures;
in this model, there are hardly any local governments, and there are,
of course no intergovernmental transfers.
• Model B defined by complete decentralisation of taxes and
expenditures; in this case, there are also no intergovernmental
transfers and practically no Central Government.
• Model C defined by centralisation of taxes and decentralisation of
expenditures; in this model, all taxes are raised by the Central
Government, given to the local governments in form of grants, and
spent by local governments.
• Model D defined by decentralisation of taxes and centralisation of
expenditures; in this case, taxes are raised by local governments,
given to the Central Government in form of grants and spent by it.
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Figure 9












These four models are represented in figure 9. It goes without saying that
these polar cases are nowhere to be found. All existing countries or
systems lie somewhere in between. The interesting point is that they do not
lie only on the AS line, as is conventionally assumed, but in the entire
ABCD area. The Ugandan system, for instance, which is indicated by point
x is characterised by a much larger degree of decentralisation of
expenditures than of decentralisation of taxes, and consequently by the
importance of grants in the fulfilment of devolved services. Table 18 on
page 141 shows that in FY 1999/2000 total local revenue collections
constituted only 12 per cent of total funds spent by the 45 district local
governments in Uganda then. The situation is practically similar to that of
Papua New Guinea where, as shown by Table 18a, the provinces are
almost totally dependent on the Central Government for their revenues.
Table 18a for example shows that between 1978 and 1981, revenues from
the provinces accounted for between 6 and 8.5 percent of all provincial
expenditures (Kina 36,415,000)20, while Unconditional grants to the
provinces increased by 65 percent over the same period and totalled to
Kina 516,699,000. This thesis concurs with the view advanced by Bird
20 The Kina is the national currency for Papua New Guinea.
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(1990:284) that unless local governments are given some degree of
freedom, including the freedom to make mistakes for which they are
accountable to their paymasters- local taxpayers or the Central
Government, as the case may be-empowerment of the people through the
development of responsible and res-ponsive local government will remain
an unattainable mirage.
There are of course dangers in permitting local authorities even limited
freedom to levy taxes unchecked. One such danger is that they will attempt
to extract revenue from sources for which they are not accountable, thus
obviating the basic efficiency argument for their existence. To counter this
inevitable tendency, Bird (1990:284) argues that Central Government
should deny or limit access to taxes that fall mainly on non-residents:
examples are most natural resource revenues, corporate income taxes,
value-added tax, and to some extent, non-residential real property taxes.
The possible over-exploitation of such politically less painful revenue
sources may, somewhat paradoxically, at times be offset by economically-
motivated under-exploitation, as localities competing for mobile tax bases
enter into rate-reducing competition (McLure, 1983:130). On this point Bird
(1990:285) concludes that the panacea to both problems in the context of
most countries is probably the establishment of a uniform set of tax bases
for local governments (perhaps with different sets for different categories
such as big cities, small towns, and rural areas), with a limited amount of
rate flexibility being permitted in order to provide room for local effort while
restraining unproductive competition and unwarranted exploitation. On the
basis of this argument, it is quite important to provide adequate flexibility to
exploit good tax bases to avoid the pattern seen in so many countries,
where the only degree of flexibility available to cope with budgetary
pressure is to exploit such economically-undesirable, but available and
largely unregulated taxes like the graduated personal tax. Moreover over
dependence on GPT itself entails a trade-off in that other key sources of
revenue tend to be neglected as a result.
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Table 18
Total Expenditure In 45 District Local Governments In Uganda
For Financial Year 1999/2000 Disaggregated Into Total Local
R A d Ttl FIT f F A IUd Sholl"evenue n oa isca rans ers, iqures re n Igan a I mqs,
District Total Local Revenue Total Central Transfers
Adiumani 58179 526 1 932 392 000
Aoac 467 315,816 9,665,137 000
Arua 1229101 511 15150 212 000
Buairi 312825228 4,395 626 aDO
Bundibuavo 122 463 260 2955800 000
Bushenyi 1240063 873 11 746694,000
Busia 141167 972 3288 242 000
Gulu 262 649 430 8,236 842 000
Hoima 694 816 675 5004582000
Iganga 528,365,849 12,163 457 000
Jin ia 447379 820 8649827 000
Kabale 424579406 887291 2 000
Kabarole 2 689 665845 11 730 262 000
Kalanqala 189 061 562 1,080,835,000
Kampala 15 809 558 889 91 15518 000
Kamul i 352581,286 7 826 916,000
Kaochorwa 203 626 975 3 312 197 000
Kasese 288345 369 6,888 429 000
Katakwi 300 070471 3 725 061 000
Kibaale 490825015 4690,327000
Kiboga 167 715639 3 110 481 000
Kisoro 174907 310 3 404912 000
Kitourn 202 879 040 8173191000
Kotido 139,039,000 3,447012000
Kumi 209907652 5533527 000
Lira 669 735 110 10,992534 000
Luwero 1 356998199 7581 166 000
Masaka 695430 582 11 793,344 000
Masindi 1 553489224 5837419 000
Mbale 880 349 088 16,510 185 000
Mbarara 2075 542743 15817 041 000
Moroto 124,267450 3,044,010,000
Movo 60 498 919 2452239 000
Mpigi 1 051,800 000 16396,836 000
Mubende 6562871 17 8787721000
Mukono 1 749,236892 14 298 508 000
Nakasonqola 549972,751 2,002 ,558,000
Nebbi 312413843 6153679 000
Ntunaamo 1 028678,599 4986486 000
Pallisa 429 977 358 6489110 000
Rakai 622 759691 7352 197 000
Soroti 349,013,627 8,239,080,000
Ssembabule 418 ,747 ,289 2,123,630,000
Tororo 774,489,016 8,631 ,980,000
TOTAL 43,044 046,953 331,122,417 000
Source: Local Government Finance Commission, Kampala , Uganda 2001
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The answer to such a situation is not to replace the undesirable graduated
personal tax with a grant which then fails to expand over time but rather to
redesign the tax base to provide the needed flexibility in a more tolerable
fashion (Schroeder,1987:30).
3.8.8 Redistribute Effects of Centralised Taxes and Expenditures
In a centralised system of taxes and expenditures, each locality, area or
region (i) pays a certain amount of taxes (T, ) to the Central Government
and gets a benefit (B i ) for all (i) (Prud'homme, 1990:119). For some
areas, Tj < Br; for other areas Tj>Bj. Some areas therefore gain in the
budget game, others lose. The national budget therefore redistributes
income over space. According to Prud'homme (1990:119), there is every
reason to believe that this redistribution is normally from the richer to the
poorer areas. He argues that on a per capita basis, the amount of taxes
paid by each area is a linear or a slightly exponential function of the
average income of the area, as shown in Figure 10. Going by his argument
one would say that in a centralised system of expenditures, the benefits of
public expenditures are similar in every area and benefits accruing from




-Provincial Government Revenues in Papua New Guinea, 1978-1981 (K'OeO)
T e of Revenue 1978 1979 1980 1981a
Unconditional Grants
Provincial minimum grants 20,216 49,446 38,579 45,94
Office of Implementation bl 51,359 64,446 67,448 75,331
Provincial salaries cl 3,007 8,031 14,215
SUb-total 75,582 111,056 127,609 124,777
Provincially Based Revenue
Provincial derivation grants 421 3,377 2,191 2,84
Betting tax/licence grant 96 101 277 23
Liquor licenses 553
Tobacco and cigarette sales tax 1,109 1,25
Mining royalties 1,904 3,827 4,026 3,87
Timber royalties 1,046 1,423 1,415 1,68
Motor registration and licences 701 1,128 136 2,80
--- .._----
Sub-total 4,721 9,856 9,154 12,684
Establishment grants dl 422
Operational grants 97
Provincial development corporations 490 1,973
Provincial capital works 685 877 943
Provincial maintenance (roads) 1,589 1,600
Staffing grants 98 1,454 340
National fiscal commission 1,365 5,000 7,000 5,000
National public expenditure plan projects el 5,394 1,963 1,372 334
State works and maintenance 2,763
Kerema Kwatiba road 400
Sub-total 7,866 11,075 10,838 11,380
Total 88,169 132,088 147,601 148,841
al Budget estimate
bl Branch of Department of Decentralisation responsible for provinces which donot have
full financial autonomy. Includes 15 provinces in 1980, 16 in 1979 and 18 in 1978.
cl Includes 1 province in 1978; 3 in 1979; 4 in 1980 and 1981
dl A one-time grant for each province
el Excludes sectoral programs. They are included in the central government budget.
Source: The World Bank, 1982: 87
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Figure 10




Source: Prud'homme : 119
While even in a country like France where these services are provided by
the Centre, with national norms and unified wages, it is difficult to sustain
the argument that the quality of social services (education, health, roads
etc) does not vary much over space, in the case of a developing economy
like that of Uganda, it is impossible to contemplate such a situation. For
the latter, structural and systemic defects within the economy will always
inhibit government's efforts to evenly and equitably spread our key social
services over space. For example well-qualified teachers prefer working in
Kampala City Council or other municipalities, to up country rural schools
because in the former they easily make ends meet by teaching in many
schools, an opportunity which is generally non-existent in the rural areas.
Similarly in the health sector, there are few doctors and health workers
willing to forego the opportunity of operating lucrative health clinics in towns
in preference to the countryside. At times the problem can be so acute that
a special measure like the Karamoja allowance" has to be put in place to
21 In Uganda, Karamoja is the most backward, under-developed region with the most hostile climate in the
country. The colonial government introduced aspecial Karamoja allowance which was payable tocivil
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ameliorate the situation. In effect therefore, while centralised taxation and
expenditure could in a developed economy like that of France go a long
way in redistributing income over space, the-Ugandan situation shows that
in many under-developed economies such a pnlicy will only serve to
deepen the disparities in spatial distribution of social services for which a
possible remedy could be decentralisation.
In sum therefore, Prud'homme's centrist approach to local government
ought to be examined with a lot of caution. As Smith (1985:198) has
observed, in developing countries, the funding of both Central and local
government can not be separated from the general system of public
funding and that system's usual dependence on raw export commodities in
the absence of alternative revenue capacity. He argues further that this is
not just a question of whether there is a political will on the part of the
centre to create alternatives, it is a question of whether the structure of the
economy, inhibiting diversification and the development of indigenous
enterprises, can allow the development of alternative sources of wealth,
which can be taxed by the State at any level other than the national. When
rural incomes in a predominantly agricultural society are under pressure
from falling export crop prices, as has been the case with coffee and cotton
in Uganda, it becomes politically difficult to increase taxes on incomes and
still maintain law and order.
In the final analysis, while it does not preclude Prud'homme's discussion on .
the importance of national government in the redistribution process of
income and thus development, this thesis finds the argument of Smith
(1985:199) more palatable, that an explanation of centralisation in
underdeveloped countries in terms of the administrative competence of
local authorities compared with central agencies will almost inevitably over-
look important features of underdevelopment which impinge upon
intergovernmental relations in Third World States. In his view,
underdevelopment may mean, among other things, that it is structurally
servants posted to work in the area, as an extra incentive toencourage them towork in such ahostile
environment.
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dHficult to organise sources of revenue, which would strengthen financial
independence at the local level. But in the same vein an- underdeveloped
economy will find it increasingly difficult to generate adequate resources to
execute its entire development process from the Centre. Itwill therefore be
argued in this thesis that the best way forward would be to opt for a middle
ground one where, given the fact that intergovernmental relations are
dominated by persistent and overwhelming dependence on resources
allocated by higher levels of government, centralised taxation is undertaken
within the general policy framework of decentralised expenditure (Nellis,
1983:136). In the Ugandan situation characterised by huge regional
disparities in natural resource endowment a completely decentralised
system of taxes and expenditures would be a setback to overall improved
service delivery and negate the whole essence of the empowerment
process. Since taxes collected in a given area would be spent in that area,
richer areas like Kampala and Central Region would remain rich, while
poorer areas like Karamoja and the Northern Region would remain poor.
Rich areas would even get richer because higher expenditures would
attract more people and activities, enlarge the tax base, and make it
possible to raise even more taxes to provide even more services. In
essence, total decentralisation of taxes and expenditures would inevitably
create and increase regional disparities, while centralised taxation and
decentralised expenditure would minimise those disparities by taxing richer
areas and transferring those resources to poor ones through fiscal
transfers, such as the equalisation grants.
3.8.9 Redistributive Impact of Decentralised Taxes
The argument in support of a redistributive impact of decentralised taxes is
advanced by Prud'homme (1990:120) who, while despising income taxes
as a relatively unimportant form of local taxation, identifies property taxes
as some of the most viable taxes capable of redistributing income across
local governments. The traditional view of property taxes is that they are
borne by the users of the property; the owner of the house in case of
owner-occupied houses and the tenant in case of rented houses
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(Prud'homme, 1990:121). In such a view, property taxes are not
transferred geographically. However, in a more modern, qeneral
equilibrium view, property taxes on any given property are borne by the
owners of the property, irrespective of where they are located for both
housing and industrial property. According to this view part of the taxes
paid on rented housing is borne by the owner of the house, who might be
located in a distant city (Prud'homme, 1990:121). Part of the taxes paid on
business or industrial properties will be borne by the owners of the capital,
who are not necessarily located in the same area. There is every reason
then to believe that property taxes levied in any community are in part
exported out of that community, resulting in some form of redistribution
over space. Interestingly, this conceptual discourse is not borne out of the
Ugandan experience because here, since a propertied/industrial class is
literally absent from the countryside, there are virtually no property taxes
levied in the rural areas, despite the existence of an enabling law. Even in
Kampala City Council and other urban centres where the tax exists in
theory, it has largely remained uncollected because of institutional
weaknesses on the part of local authorities and a general degree of
indifference towards the tax by the small propertied urban population. This
has left only graduated personal tax and market fees or dues (a crude form
of local income tax) as the mainstay of decentralised taxation and because
these are regressive taxes, they are mainly borne where they are levied
and so far there has not been any evidence of their shifting spatially.
In conclusion therefore, one can argue that while the potential exists, so far
the redistributive impact of decentralised taxation beyond the geographical
limits of district local governments remains minimal. The situation is likely to
remain so in the foreseeable future until local enterprises develop and
become taxable to magnitudes that are sufficient enough to create spill-
overs beyond the geographical limits of the taxing authorities.
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3;9 Local Government Service Delivery: The Principal Agent Problem
Rondinelli and Nellis (1986:4) have observed that in some countries,
many functions performed by central ministries and agencies are poorly
implemented because of the-difficulty of extending central services to local-
communities. Maintenance of roads (especially feeder ones), water and
sanitation, irrigation canals and equipment and other basic physical
infrastructure tasks are sometimes done better by local governments or
administrative units when they are given adequate funds and technical
assistance than by central agencies, which cannot easily monitor
deterioration or breakdowns. Looked at from this perspective, devolution is
seen as fundamental in increasing the efficiency of the Centre by relieving
its managers of routine, repetitive tasks and allowing it more time to plan
and monitor programmes that absolutely require central direction and
control. Local government, it is argued, can be a more effective level at
which to coordinate action requiring participation by many agencies. In
short Rondinelli and Nellis see devolution as a key sine qua non for better
service delivery. Burki et. al. (1999:76) however extend this argument
further, and argue that no government is required to become directly
involved in the delivery of service; and that even in the realm of public
goods, it may choose to contract for such services as disease surveillance
or feeder road maintenance, and its choice will probably depend on the
relative quality and efficiency of contracting for services or providing them
directly. The reasoning being that, as benefits of various services become
increasingly confined to individual consumers, the case for government
participation in their production diminishes. In such circumstances, while
the public sector's role in regulating remains strong, its comparative
advantage in provision is less so. A number of decentralised departments
in Uganda provide practical examples and in a way help to reinforce this
view. While the trade development services, commercial inspectorate and
cooperative development are decentralised departments as per LGA,
1997:117 with staff and operational budgets, their roles have long since
been diminished by market forces as a result of deregulation and
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liberalisation policies of the 19905. Such departments should have by now
been abolished and their staff either re-designated or retired, but this has
not been the case. The failure of both the Centre and local governments to
observe the distinction between public and private goods on the one hand,
and impersonal versus personal services on the other, has resulted in their
financing and delivering all kinds of services even- though many could be
delivered as well or better in a competitive market. Burki et. al. (1999:6)
attribute this to a dichotomous role played by local governments in service
delivery in which they act as 8§ents of the Centre (itself the principal) on
one hand, and as principals of their constituents, on the other. In the case
of Uganda, the principal agent problem has in turn created two main
problems for local governments.
First has been the assumption on the part of the central government that
decentralising of key functions will automatically result in effective service
delivery, when in fact lower levels of government lack any advantage in
skills, incentives, motives or negotiating power to improve the management
of such services.
Secondly, local governments have not been availed with sufficient financial
resources commensurate with their dual role manifested through the
principal-agent relationship. As a result, and contrary to what Rondinelli &
Nellis (1986:4) have claimed, devolution may, in as far as the principal-
agent problem remains unresolved, not lead to any improved service
delivery among the local communities or even enhance any efficiency on
the part of the Centre. The problem could even be exacerbated if there
continues to be failure on part of the local government service delivery
approach to recognise that women are currently the majority in Uganda, not
only population wise, but also in terms of the poor, marginalized sections of
society, and that any empowerment strategies which focus on women are
likely to be the most effective and inclusive as long as they do not restrict
themselves only on aspects of poverty and deprivation. This is because an
anti-poverty approach of empowerment does not necessarily improve
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women's position in society, and if women's marginalisation is only seen as
a result of poverty, then issues of power and inequality are ignored. A
gender-sensitive approach to an effective local service delivery and
empowerment process should therefore not feed into a welfarist orientation
where women and other marginalized sections of society are portrayed as
beneficiaries of state support, and not as social agents of their own
development,
3.1U Local Government and Gender: The Case for Affirmative Action
The definition of gender in this thesis draws heavily on what has been
proposed by Kerenge (1992:5) to the effect that gender should be
considered as a social role in terms of what women and men in a given
society do. Gender relates to social structures and relations in terms of
hierarchical power relations, encompassing dominance and subordination
in economic and political organisations as well as in every day life. There is
also the aspect of practices in terms of what is actually done to maintain or
change gender roles. According to Kerenge (1992:5) therefore, for
devolution to be complete there is need to strengthen the position of
women in society by:
• Integrating gender issues into national, local and sectoral
development plans;
• Defining structures and processes which will ensure that gender
concerns are addressed in all future developmental activities;
• Ensuring that sectoral development programmes address the
multiple roles of women (productive, reproductive and community
service) and putting in place measures to reduce women's work
burden; and
• Fostering gender awareness among local politicians and staff in
order to enable them address gender issues.
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The South African White Paper on Local Government summarizes the
importance of gender equity as one of the core principles of local
government transformation in the following words:
'Communities' and 'Households' are not homogeneous categories in which
everyone is the same. Different people have different starting points in life -
determined by such factors as gender, class and race - and different
opportunities to access resources and influence decision-making. Within
communities and households, power dynamics can develop which see
some people gain access to resources and power, and others marginalized
or excluded. Local government is uniquely placed to analyse and
understand power dynamics within a community, and ensure that those
who tend to be excluded and marginalized can become active and equal
participants in community processes and the transformation of the
settlements where they live ( Republic of South Africa, 1998a:14, White
Paper on Local Government).
The World Bank Poverty Assessment Survey in Uganda (World Bank,
1993a:50) identified a number of major constraints on the participation of
women in the political, economic and social life of the country. These
included issues relating to integration into the decision-making process,
access to productive resources necessary to fully participate in agricultural
production, un-equal burdens of house-hold management, excessive work
loads (women on average worked 12.9 hours per day, compared to men's
8.2), unequal access to health and education, and isolation.
The World Bank survey proposed the following polices of gender-
responsive growth:
• Promotion, through literacy and education and in conjunction with
the vigorous pursuit of gender-responsive institutional reform
efforts underway, the economic and political profile of women
through control of economically productive resources, includinq
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capital and land, and equal participation in community-level, district
and national decision-making; and
• Realignment of the political structures, including the Resistance
Committee system to ensure appropriate- representation and
articulation of women needs. 22
Despite existence of acute restrictions emanating both from the cultural
systems and the natural law, there is evidence that many disempowering
forms and values are gradually being overcome, not only through
legislation but also other modes of affirmative action. The requirement by
the Local Governments Act 1997 for example, that women councillors shall
form 1/3 of every local government council and that at least one of the
secretaries shall be a female, demonstrates the extent to which women are
considered part and parcel of the devolution process. This empowerment
approach, strongly propagated by the World Bank (1993:33) and
apparently fully embraced by Uganda, questions the fundamental
assumptions concerning the relationship between power and development.
It argues in terms of the capacity of women to increase their internal
strength and right to determine choices in life and to influence the direction
of change by gaining control over crucial material and non- material
resources, and asserts that for local governance to take root and blossom,
long-term strategies are needed to break down the structures of inequality
between genders, classes, and other divisions that characterise the socio -
economic landscape.
UNICEF (1994:6)) agrees that the way forward lies with mainstreaming
gender issues both at national and local government levels as this not only
removes gender discrimination but also enables a cost-effective
development process in the long run.
22 This was the system of local administration in operation before the coming into force of
the local council system in 1993
151
Figures 11 and-12 encapsulate UNICEF's vision in ensuring women's
participation at community level using the Triple AAA and Women
Empowerment Frameworks. Both models emphasise the need to identify
existing gender gaps followed by efforts to identify and analyse the
discriminatory systems that produce and nurture these disparities and
finally taking action to reduce OT remove such gender discrimination. It is
the argument of this thesis that for a strong system of local governance to
be built, all stakeholders, men and women, must play their respective roles
to their full ability and in a way that does not diminish the potential of either
to contribute to national development. Kerenge (1992:8) estimates for
example, that over 33 percent of house-holds in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
are headed by women. In Malawi the proportion has been estimated at
around 29 percent. In Kenya, around 40 percent of rural house-olds have a
female head. While it is widely accepted that female-headed house-olds
are on average poorer, ironically, one statistical survey-the Ghana living
standards survey of 1987/88-estimated the income of female-headed
households at about 7 percent higher than that of male-headed house
holds (Boateng et. al. 1990:47). It is therefore quite obvious that a
progressive local taxation policy would ensure that such income
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Das Gupta et. al. (1999:629) underscores the aspect of custom in
reinforcing gender gaps through accentuation of existing discriminatory
practices. 23 They argue that customary gender norms and values can lead
to political, legal, economic, and educational inequalities that perpetuate
women's lack to access to resources, control over decision-making, and
participation in public life. If the rights of men and women are flagrantly
unequal, it is very difficult to establish a democratic and participatory socio-
political order and an environment of equal opportunity. Inevitably local
government suffers more from such a skewed relationship since it is
deprived of the synergy essential for collective community action and
development.
This thesis agrees with Wade (1985:480) that social inequality in the
. villages undermines efforts to manage collective goods such as water, and
while in the hands of village elites, control of these resources tend to be
23 Some countries use the legal system toformalize customary rules that explicitly limit women's rights. In the
Republic ofKorea forexample, customary laws restricting women's rights were formalized in the Civil Code of
1962, and women's rights have been slow to improve. After decades ofstruggle bywomen's organisations,
key amendments in 1990 gave women the right to inherit their parents' and husband's property. Divorce
laws were changed toallow women equal rights to property acquired during marriage, and child custody is no
longer granted automatically to the father
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used to further discriminate against marginalized groups, such as the
women. This probably explains why in Uganda, very few women are
allowed to sit on water source -committees, and it is extremely rare to find a
water source committee-chaired bya-woman.
Finally, it has to be stressed that, when social distinctions between groups .
are used to perpetuate inequalities in access to material resources, they
generate rigid socio-political hierarchies, which constitute powerful social
barriers explicitly aimed at preserving the status of the better-off (Rhyme &
Holt 1994:25). Rigid stratification also creates obstacles to collective
action; if the distribution of power in a community is too skewed, then
prospects for trust and cooperation are low. Under these circumstances, it
will be difficult for local government to blossom and grow because the
above-mentioned paternalism places crippling constraints on individuals
and deters them from exhaustively exploiting their potential in areas of local
and community development. These observations do not imply that local
government does not have a role to play in the process of gender
transformation, nor that the provision of local services is insignificant in
promoting social equity. Rather, the mere provision of basic services will
not be sufficient to achieve gender equality, as other conditions will have to
be met before communities become more equal places.
A critical requirement is that women are formally and equally represented in
all sectors and at all levels of local government. This applies to both the
political level, as councillors, members of the executive committee,
chairpersons of council sectoral committees, and to the administration as
managers, planners, technicians, engineers and financial administrators.
The current reality shows that both in Hoima District Local Government and
Uganda, women are under-represented at both levels and in all these
positions. Informing and involving women in all stages of local decision-
making is another requirement for making communities more equal places.
This means that women have to be formally and equitably represented on
community structures like, like Village and ward committees and other
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development forums. It also means that local government has to ensure
that mechanisms to facilitate community participation are targeted and
inclusive. Currently, preferred mechanisms of communicating with
communities tend to have implicit biases which make it more difficult, if not
impossible, for women to make meaning contributions to decision-making
processes. Van Dank (1997:25) observe, for example, that using the
written form as a means of informing the community is biased against
people with lower levels of literacy or those who cannot prioritise their time
to read relevant information. Since the majority of both groups are women,
they will possibly be targeted by use of additional methods such as
community radio or using a loud-hailer to disseminate information and
facilitate the outreach to a larger group of people in the community.
Similarly, local government tends to use public meetings as the preferred
mechanism to consult with the community. Women may find that they lack
the time or resources, transport especially, to attend these meetings. Even
if they do attend, women may be constrained by social values to speak in
public when men are part of the audience, or they may simply not be taken
seriously. Alternative or additional activities, such as meetings with women
organisations or individual meetings with councillors, are likely to be more
appropriate ways to include women's voices in the decision-making
process.
An additional prerequisite for gender transformation in communities is that
local government representatives are sufficiently sensitised and skilled to
ensure that local government, in all aspects of its work, is gender-sensitive
(Van Dank,1997:25). In addition to gender awareness and a commitment
to gender equality at a political level, expertise in gender analysis and
gender planning as an area of technical competency is needed amongst
local government officials.
The above requirements highlight the need for a mind-shift within local
government. In other words, it is not sufficient merely to change the faces
of councillors or officials, or to organise an additional meeting with a group
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of women in the community. This thesis argues that simply 'adding women'
is not going to transform the inherent patriarchal bias in local government,
for two reasons. Women are not necessarily more gender-sensitive than
men because they have been brought up to accept the- same norms and
values as men and may not experience the multiple constraints imposed on
them as oppressive. Secondly, those women and men who do consider
themselves as advocates for social change are likely to experience a whole
range of institutional and attitudinal barriers, not the least of which is
resistance to change, which may leave them more disempowered and
disillusioned. Given that these gender advocates often find themselves in
the minority, they are easily out numbered by those who, overtly or tacitly,
support the status-quo. Thus, for local government to realise its potential to
promote gender equity requires a fundamental change of local government
institutions in terms of their structures, their organisational culture, what
they do and how they do it, and how they prioritise available resources.
3.10.1 Reforming Institutions
Herbst (1995:45-48) observes that in societies that are not deeply
stratified, reform of state institutions can increase social equity and levels of
community participation. He argues that a fairly simple reform is to ensure
that delivery of public services does not neglect disadvantaged groups,
while broader reforms should entail making legal systems equitable and
ensuring that administrative and political institutions are accessible and
responsive to all. Rather than create barriers, these systems should
facilitate the full participation of the entire population (Herbst, 1999:61).
Citizenship and family laws may also need reform to reduce social tensions
and enable disadvantaged groups to participate in socio-economic and
political life, which is important to their ability to organize on their behalf. In
this argument for reform the bottom line remains simple and succinct: for
local government to succeed as a spring board for development, all actors
and stakeholders must play equal roles, fully engage their energies into
the development process, and in the end be able to access available
opportunities based on equity and egalitarianism.
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3.10.2 Taking Affirmative Action
Coate & Loury (1993:1228) argue that in deeply-stratified societies, efforts
in gender mainstreaming need to be supplemented by affirmative action
programs to counter the disabilities from long-standing discrimination. To
compete in the economic and political arenas, those discriminated against
need special assistance in acquiring_ education, information and self-
confidence. Affirmative action begins with legislation against discrimination
in access to public and private goods and services as well as to public
office.
In Uganda, legislation in the Local Governments Act (1997) which reserves
a third of the seats in a local government council for women, and at least
one position for a woman on a local government executive committee, is a
manifestation of this policy.
Prominent in affirmative action are efforts to reduce the cumulative
disadvantages of low access to education, employment and politics
(Herbst, 1999:48). This typically involves helping members of groups
discriminated against to acquire skills and access opportunities through
financial support for education, preferential admission to higher education,
and, where appropriate, job quotas. Loury (2000:19) identifies two types
of policies in respect of affirmative action whose outcomes have made a
big difference in terms of empowering disadvantaged groups, especially
women.
• Development Policies seek to enhance the performance of members
of disadvantaged groups. Examples are financial and other inputs to
improve educational qualifications of women, or management
assistance to women establishing their own businesses, or indeed
seed money to enable local women start income-generation
projects.
• Preferential Policies seek to reduce cumulative disadvantages
more rapidly by giving members of disadvantaged groups
opportunities even when they may be less qualified than others.
IS7
Although the quickest way to social, economic, and political mobility,
these policies can backfire by reinforcing negative stereotypes about
lower abilities of the disadvantaged (Coate & Loury 1993:1233,
Steele, 1999: 48).
In conclusion, this thesis postulates that constructing high quality public
institutions is essential for ensuring that diverse identities become a
developmental asset, not a source of political division and confrontation.
Civil society organizations and the State can and should do much to lay the
institutional foundation for local groups to cooperate for the common good.
In order for local government to playa meaningful role, institutions need to
be participatory, credible and accountable so that people can see the
benefits of cooperation. Underpinning these institutions need to be
constitutional and legal systems and representative political systems, which
allow groups to work out their interests through mechanisms other than
confrontation.
3.11 Problems Faced by Local Government in Uganda.
In May 1972, the Simmance Committee in Zambia stated that,
.. .an essential feature of decentralised administration must be the
preparation by the province of its own capital and recurrent estimates for all
the activities of sectoral ministries and departments which will now come
under provincial rather than Lusaka - based control. This is one of the
most important- perhaps the most important - measure by which true
decentralisation can be achieved. It is not enough for the province to
become a self-contained accounting authority alone. It must be functionally
responsible and this will mean nothing without financial responsibility for
estimating its developmental and recurrent needs.24
Zambia is still a long way from realising this objective, and while Uganda
can display some bold and exciting initiatives of decentralisation, it too
24Excerpted from the Simmance Committee Report, areport ofthe working party appointed to review the
system ofdecentralised administration ( Lusaka: Cabinet office: May 1972) pp. 65-66, para. 5.15
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does not fully satisfy the conditions, laid down in the Simmance
Committee Report since its district local governments are yet to prepare
and approve their own development budgets. It is this condition which
gives rise to the first major problem encountered by local government in
Uganda. In a report to the Ministry of Local Government by the- Nordic
consulting group (1996:11), it is noted that local governments have
assumed a wide range of functions, including most of the service
responsibilities previously undertaken by health, education, water and other
line ministries. Yet only a relatively small portion of government expenditure
(some 20 percent of recurrent expenditure or 2 percent GDP) had by 1997
been placed under the control of local governments. As a result, the latter
are generally handicapped in that while the wage bills of decentralised staff
are covered, non-wage bill costs are not adequately met.
Nsibambi (1998:49) observes that accountability at all the three levels of
financial, administrative and political, is another area where local
government is still experiencing problems.
Financial accountability has to do with holding individuals and organisations
responsible for their actions and performance in the financial sphere
(Nsibambi 1998:49). In the interest of the people whom they represent it is
essential that the money which local authorities spend is used for a good
purpose and is fully accounted for.
Administrative accountability refers to accountability by public managers to
the political leadership and the population (Nsibambi 1998:50), while
political accountability is a measure of the extent to which governors are
responsible to the governed.
It is a fundamental aspect of democracy that those who rule should pursue
the public interest rather than their own selfish interest. This is an obligation
placed on local government councillors no less than on central politicians.
Yet this is an area which is still deficient to such an extent that local
councillors are most of the time preoccupied with private interests
(business ventures, tenders) at the expense of the public good.
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Nsibambi (1998:53) also identifies auditing of local authority accounts as
another area of tremendous weakness. It is normal local government
practice to make legal provision for the auditing of accounts. This is a duty
which falls upon a local authority's internal auditors and usually, though not
universally, on the Auditor General's Department, but for a variety of
reasons, often including poor internal accounting and a very heavy
workload placed on an under-staffed Auditing department or AG's office,
audit reports tend to fall behind schedule; and when reports are more than
two years overdue, they have little corrective value.
3.12 Summary
As already stated in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the extent to
which Uganda has developed its local government is impressive, but
despite this fundamental achievement, it would be foolhardy to deny that
the process is still beset with problems. The experience of other countries
in Common wealth Africa, notably Ghana, South Africa and Botswana, may
shed some light on alternative strategies that might be pursued and/or the
dangers and pitfalls to be avoided. Viability and sustainability are
fundamental factors in district and sub-county service delivery if local
government is to address its developmental role effectively.
This chapter outlined the historical evolution of local government in
Uganda, the system as it is currently, including the organisational, legal and
institutional set-up and identified some of the critical aspects that
characterise local government management and development.
The chapter reveals that although Uganda is deeply committed to
strengthening of local governments, an underdeveloped and therefore
inadequate local government financing continues to be a stumbling block to
this initiative. Efficient collection of graduated personal tax- the major
source of local revenue-is constrained by lack of a coherent taxation policy,
poor assessment and other arbitrary decisions, some of which make the
tax too costly to collect.
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Finally the chapter identifies gender as a significant cross- cutting aspect of
the empowerment process that needs to treat women the same way as it
treats men, and in so doing be able to tap their vast potential and enhance
the levels of community participation, development and consequently good
governance.
3.13 Projections for the next chapter
The next chapter will outline the research methodology that was used to
conduct the study. The details wi/! include the research design, sampling
mechanism, the sources of data and research instruments used. Other
aspects to be covered will include the mode of data analysis, the ethical





This chapter dwells on the research methodology used in the study.
It entails a broad explanation of the procedure followed in the collection,
synthesis, and analysis of data, including details of where, when and how it
was collected. It gives an outline of the objectives of the study, and
provides a detailed overview of the study area, the population and sampling
methods applied together with the data gathering methods used. The mode
of pre-testing the interview guides and schedule is explained while
problems encountered in the course of data collection, including ethical
issues and limitations of the study are highlighted. The chapter concludes
with a description of the non-quantifying procedures of qualitative data
analysis used and shows how these have been helpful in synthesising the
different themes and concepts from the research and forming them into
new integrated patterns.
4.2 Objectives of the study
The main objectives of the study are:
• To critically examine the historical development of the
decentralisation process in Uganda in the context of empowerment
and strong local governance characterised by a visible and
buoyant community leadership.
• To evaluate the impact of the decentralisation policy and process
within the broad frame-work of the need for improved service
delivery, good governance and strong civil society, and using
Hoima District Local Government as a reference point, assess the
extent the policy has been able to strengthen the institutional
capacities of local councils, and thereby enable them to meet
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internal challenges and avert the failures of decentralisation. Also
built within this broad objective included an attempt to establish the
extent to which the policy had gone in promoting popular
participation as a way of empowering the local people to make their
own decisions and enhance accountability and responsibility.
• To identify the shortcomings of the decentralisation process using
Hoima District Local Government as a case study and propose a
viable political and managerial discourse for sustainable local
governance.
• To generally draw on the lessons of decentralisation in order to
address the challenges facing local governments in Uganda and
more particularly, Hoima District Local Government.
4.3 Research Design
Selltiz et. al. (1976:90) have defined a research design as the arrangement
of conditions for the collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to
combine relevance to the research purpose with economy in procedure. It
follows therefore that research designs will differ depending on the purpose
of the research. In this study, emphasis was put partly on the discovery of
new ideas and insights and partly on increasing the researcher's familiarity
with the phenomena of devolution and empowerment that were being
investigated. The research design was therefore advertently made flexible
enough to permit the consideration of various aspects of these phenomena.
It was based on a case study approach and broadly employed a
phenomenological paradigm in its scope and breadth of analysis, including
the theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis of data. It was
also role-focused whereby key stakeholders cutting across gender, both in
the local government system and the general decentralisation set up, were
interviewed on the individual and institutional roles of the organs they
represented.
The qualitative methods of data collection were generally used. In particular
qualitative methods were used to investigate local councils' knowledge of
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planning and budgeting, service delivery, community participation and
involvement efforts, and levels of resource mobilisation.
Other themes investigated using qualitative methods included the principle
of non-subordination and control over civil servants among the various
levels of local government, knowledge on the operationalisationof the local
government system and the visibility strength of the civil society.
As is common with most studies, not all data could be colJected in a non-
numerical form. Some quantitative data was collected, albeit at a small
level, using the interview schedule that was administered to the civic and
opinion leaders. Not all the thematic areas covered by the interview guide
were covered by the schedule. The interview schedule covered only three
areas namely; the levels of service delivery, community participation and
involvement efforts, and knowledge of operationalisation of the local
government system.
4.4 Study Area .- --."---
The study was carried out in Hoima District which lies in mid-Western
Uganda, bordering Kibaale District in the south, Kiboga District in the east,
Masindi District in the north and Lake Albert and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo in the west. Annexture A provides more details regarding the
study area.
Hoima District Local Government consists of 2 Counties, 11 Sub-counties,
2 Town Councils, 44 Parishes and 478 Villages. The District has a total
population of 349,204 people25 with a density of 97 people per square Km,
well below the national average of 126 (2002 Uganda population and
housing census). The annual population growth rate is 6.33 per cent which
is above the national average of 4.03 per cent.
25The district population figure quoted isper November 2002 Uganda population and housing census. Though
the results are still provisional, they indicate a 76% increase in the population over a 12 year period from a
total of197,851 people in 1991 to349,204 people in 2002.
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Female-headed households represent 26 per cent of the total in the
district. While life expectancy at birth is 52.7 years, the infant mortality rate
is 92 per 1000, which is in line with the national average (2002 national
population and housing census). While almost 90 percent of the population
is rural, the adult literacy rate is 56 per cent. Homesteads are widely
scattered and houses are mostly constructed using mud and wattle, with
grass thatched roofing. As practically the whole population lives in rural
areas, socio-economic welfare depends almost entirely on the effective and
efficient use of its substantial .aqricultural resource base. However,
agricultural productivity in the district is low, and has been declining over
time (IFAD, 1998:2). Subsistence farming with minimal inputs is the main
system practised, while market-oriented cultivation, other than of coffee, is
negligible. An indication of poor food production level and food security is
that only some 20 per cent of rural households in Hoima District are able to
store adequate amounts of grain to last-till the next harvesting season, and
the district each year imports food from other parts of the country (IFAD,
1998:2).
The above pattern of agricultural practices is reflected in the very low
average incomes in Hoima District. In 1995, the annual average income per
capita was estimated to be USD 169, representing 75 per cent of the
national average which is the lowest in the world (IFAD, 1998:3). In this
situation, while the incidence of hunger is not common, 90 per cent of the
rural population in Hoima District live below the poverty line (IFAD, 1998:3).
The foregoing portrayal gives the background of the area where the study
was conducted. It was carried out in all the 11 Sub-counties and 2 Town
Councils as shown in Table 19 below:
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Table 19
Study Area: Hoima District Local Council
LOCAL COUNCIL IV LOCAL COUNCIL III LOCAL COUNCIL II LOCAL COUNCIL I






















KIGOROBYA KISUKUMA HAIBALE II
KIKWANANA
KIGOROBYA T.C NORTHERN WARD KIJONGO
LUSAKA LOWER
HOIMAT.C NORTHERN WARD LUSAKA UPPER
4.5 Population and Sample
In any research, it is extremely important that the study findings based on a
sample which is only part of the group about which statements are to be
made and conclusions derived, be a reasonably accurate representation of
the state of affairs in the total group, known as the population in research
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terminology. This means that the sample should be selected in such a way
that findings based on it are likely to correspond closely to those that would
be obtained if the population itself were studied Selltiz et. al. (1976:107).
These two considerations were kept in the researcher's mine right from the
onset of the research design up to the conclusion of the investigation for
the simple reason that while the population being studied enjoyed more or
less similar socio-political status in society and while 90 per cent held
leadership positions at various levels, the tribal background of its members
was as diverse and heterogeneous as their cultural beliefs, both of which
had effects on the nature and quality of responses obtained.
4.5.1 Defining the Population
The population under this study was constituted by the entire political,
technical and civic leadership of Hoima District who were residing within
the bounds of the said district at the time the study was carried out. The
unit of analysis was Hoima District Local Government, as this was the case
study to which the phenomena of devolution and empowerment that were
being investigated referred to.
4.5.2 Sampling Frame
Determination of the sampling frame was guided by the need to obtain a
sample that was, as far as possible, representative of the population as a
whole. The research was dependent on the goodwill and availability of the
subjects-and there were plenty of both-to be properly undertaken. The
scattered settlement pattern of the population imposed significant
constraints on the available resources.
The following sampling units were core and formed the fundamental
elements of the sampling frame:
a) All members of the Village Executive Committees;
b) All civic and opinion leaders in the sub-counties and urban areas;
c) All Sub-County Chiefs and Town Clerks;
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d) All Sub-County Chairpersons also referred to in this study as Local
Council III Chairmen;
e) All members of top management of Hoima .District Local
Government; and
f)- All members of Hoima District Local Council Five.
Given that the study was conducted using a phenomenological approach,
emphasis was put on quality and depth of data. In-depth interviewing was
essential to capture the richness of detail and nuance of the circumstances
being studied, and to realise the said detail necessitated the incorporation
of a broad spectrum of political, technical, civic and key socio-economic
players in the sampling frame as a way of limiting on the incidence of
results currency and the limitations often posed by the generalisation of
results. Other factors that determined the choice and breadth of the
sampling frame were in respect of the unit of analysis itself and the status
of the existent knowledge on the same. Devolution is still a relatively recent
phenomenon on the Ugandan political landscape, and is even more recent
in Hoima District, the latter having come on board two years after the
inception of full-blown decentralisation in Uganda. In research terms this
meant a generally deficient body of knowledge on which analytical and
conceptual issues could be premised. It was thus thought that a relatively
broad sampling frame, though still unable to fully cure the deficiency would
help minimise the effects of the problem.
4.5.3 Sampling Size
As is common in most studies particularly those involving case studies, two
questions will always arise when it comes to determining the sampling size.
The first is a question of deciding how accurate you want your results to be,
while the second, though less important, relates to the traditions in that
particular research area regarding an appropriate sample size. Given the
fact that there were no known studies in the area of devolution and
empowerment in Uganda, the study could not make use of any established
benchmarks in terms of an appropriate sample size. In any case it was felt
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that a relatively large sample would be a critical factor in determining both
the reliability and validity of the research findings. This is not to say
however, that by picking as large a sample as possible the degree of
uncertainty in the conclusions to be drawn would be completely eliminated,
rather it was feltihe act would go a long way in enhancing the level of data
integrity of the research findings.
The research was conducted based on a sample of 666 respondents drawn
from the sampling frame already described in sub-section 4.5.2.
4.5.4 Sampling Procedure
The cluster random sampling method was used to select the eleven rural
sub-counties and two town councils as constituent units of Hoima District
Local Government, as illustrated by Table 19. A multi-stage random
sampling method was used to select one parish and one ward from each
sub-county and town council respectively, care being undertaken to ensure
a fair balance, in terms of inclusion into the sample of both peripheral and
non-peripheral parishes. Proximity to the sub-county headquarters was the
key parameter used in determining how peripheral a parish was.
A multi-stage random sampling method was further used to identify two
villages or local council ones per selected parish whose executives would
be covered by the survey.
Other sampling units selected using the same method included the Sub-
county chiefs, Sub-county chairpersons, and top management of Hoima
District Local Government. The researcher had no influence on the
composition of these particular groups as they already operated in a
delineated institutional setting, and automatically applied the natural
sampling technique in determining these samples. Selection of the sample
from the civic and opinion leaders was problematic. The group is itself
diverse and in spite of the researcher's knowledge of the study area, it was
difficult to pin-point with precision credible members of the community
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meeting the set criteria for that particular gmup. Against the background of
the foregoing challenge, a combination of purposive and snowball sampling
methods, coupled with the guidance of Sub-county Chiefs, Parish Chiefs
and Village Chairpersons were collectively used to come up with the 325
respondents that were surveyed under this category.
4.5.5- Description of Sample
Tables 20 and 21, and Figure 13 summarise the nature of samples and
the methods that were used to obtain the data. The tabular categorisation
is based on the type of research instrument used. There was a trade-off in
deciding to use the interview schedule rather than the in-depth interview
guide to survey the civic and opinion leaders in that whereas it was
possible through this method to handle as many respondents as possible,
depth and richness of data, normally characteristic of the interview guide,
were forfeited. A total of six hundred sixty six (666) respondents drawn
from eleven sub-counties and two town councils were interviewed using.
both research instruments.
Table 20
Description of Sample: Structured Interviews
Research Sampling Unit Number of
Instrument Respondents
Civic and Opinion
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Description of Sample: Unstructured Interviews
Research Sampling Number of
Instrument Units Respondents
LC I Chairperson 26
LC I Vice Chairperson 26
LC I Gen/Secretary 26
LC I Secretary for Information 26
LC I Secretary for Security 26
Interview Guide LC I Secretary for Finance 26
LC I Secretary for Production 26
LC I Secretary for Youth 26
LC I Secretary for Women 26
LC I Secretary for people with disabilities 26
Sub-County Chiefs Sub-County 11
Chairpersons 11
Town Clerks 2
District Top Management 30
District Councillors 27
TOTAL 341
4.5.6 Composition of Sample
The study was conducted using two categories of research instruments,
namely the interview schedule for structured interviews that were
administered to civic and opinion leaders, and the interview guide for
personal interviews conducted with Local Council I Executives, Sub-County
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Chiefs and Chairpersons, Town clerks, top manaqement of Hoima District
and the District Local Council political leadership.
Tables 22 and 23 summarise the sample composition based on the two
research instruments used in the study, and disaggregated by gender and
domicile of respondents.
Table 22 .
Composition Of Sample: Civic And Opinion Leaders
Research Gender of Domicile of No. of Respondents
Instrument Respondents Respondents Interviewed
Rural Urban
Interview Schedule Male 257 40 297
Female 18 10 28
TOTAL 275 50 325
Table 23
Sample Composition: Unstructured Interviews
Gender of Domicile of Number of Resp.
Respondents Respondents Interviewed
Sampling Units Male Female :Rural Urban
Village Executive
Committees 182 78 220 40 260
Sub-county Chiefs 10 1 11 0 11
Sub-county
Chairpersons 11 0 11 0 11
Town Clerks 2 0 0 2 2
Hoima District Top
Management 24 6 5 25 30
Hoima District Local
Council Members 18 9 25 2 27
TOTAL 247 94 272 69 341
4.6 Data Collection Methods
Despite the largely phenomenological paradigm that was applied in
terms of conceptualisation, design and general framework of the
study, the research also applied the methodological triangulation approach,
by bringing on board both the qualitative and quantitative approaches to
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data collection. In choosing the methodology to use, consideration was
made as to its appropriateness in eliciting reliable, valid, qualitative and in-
depth data. The- critical incident technique, given its fame and wide
application in generating qualitative data, was used. Developed by
Flanagan (1954: 327-330), the critical incident technique is a procedure for
gathering certain important facts concerning behaviour and events in
defined situations (Flanagan, 1954: 335). Although called a technique, it is
not a set of rigid rules, but a flexible set of principles which can be modified
and adapted according to circumstances. The technique proved to be of
considerable value in generating data especially during personal in-depth
interviews where, in some instances, interviewees had difficulty in
expressing their opinions. The technique was particularly useful while
interviewing the 260 Local Council One Executives and the 13 Sub-County
Chairpersons. It was however not used to interview Sub-County Chiefs and
the top District Management because their relatively-high literacy levels
required less probing.
A positivistic approach using structured (closed) questions was used to
interview the 325 Civic and Opinion Leaders. In this case
respondents' answers were selected from a number of
predetermined alternatives. The reductionist tendency'" commonly
associated with the positivist paradigm was greatly minimised by
applying factual questions as much as possible.
4.6.1 Primary Data Sources
There were two main sources of primary data. The first and basic source
was the research itself conducted in Hoima District, while the second
source was derived from the result of the national service delivery survey
conducted by the Ministry of Public Service.
26 This tendency is common with quantitative methods of data collection that give a spurious objectivity to
information inamanner that diminishes the richness ofdata and its contextual implications thus contributing to
anarrower and less 'real' interpretation ofphenomena.
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4.6.1.1 Data from the Hoima Research
Data from the Hoima research was obtained from carefully conducted
interviews (personal in-depth interviews) covering 341 respondents, and
closed (structured) interviews covering 325 respondents.
4.6.1.2 Data from the National Service Delivery Survey
The National Service Delivery Survey was carried out by the Ministry of
Public Service in August 2000 with the aim of collecting information on
perceptions, as well as satisfaction of the people of Uganda with regard to
the quantity and quality of services delivered by government. The Survey
covered a wide range of services ranging from crime prevention, delivery of
justice, water and sanitation, good governance, education, and health
services to agricultural extension. It was based on a two-stage stratified
district-wide independent and representative sample of households. For
each of the 45 districts existing at the time of the survey a list of village LCs
constituted the sampling frame for the first stage. At this stage a minimum
of 30 villages were randomly selected using a simple random sampling
method and from each of these selected villages, a random sample of 10
households was chosen. The realised sample size countrywide was 13,604
households.
The NSD survey used a structured household questionnaire as its survey
instrument covering service sectors that included:
• Crime and Justice
• Good governance




Data was mainly processed through manual editing and coding and the
main purpose here was to counter check the field-completed
questionnaires for their completeness and to edit them for accuracy against
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established value ranges, as well as carrying out consistency checks
between one or more questions.
4.6.2 Secondary Data Sources
The study was characterised by a deep and detailed search to explore
existing literature, ascertain what has been written or published on the
research topic, and how this impacted on the research problem. Principally,
secondary literature data was obtained from four basic sources, and these
were; the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development; the
Local Government Finance Commission; The Uganda Bureau of Statistics;
and bi-annual status reports from the Ministry of Local Government's
Decentralisation Secretariat, on the implementation of the decentralisation
programme for the period 15t January 1995 to 31 st December 2001. Details
of data obtained from the literature are provided in Tables 1 to 18a
respectively of chapter three.
4.6.3 The Research Instruments
The research instruments were of two categories, namely the interview
guide that was administered to key informants, namely the Local Council
One Executives, the Sub-County Chiefs, the Sub-County Chairpersons, the
Town Clerks, the top District Management and the District Political
Leadership. The other category was of the interview schedule for structured
interviews that were administered to Civic and Opinion Leaders. All
interview guide questions were un-structured or open-ended and were
administered individually to respondents in a face-to-face dialogue. That
way, it was possible to secure each respondent's personal response or
opinion in his or her own words.
All interview guides began with classification questions that set out to find
more about the respondent, particularly his or her age, level of education,
marital status, occupation etc., leading up to the sensitive questions
progressively. This strategy was built into the research methodology right
from the time of designing the Interview guide questions, which process
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also saw the establishment of a checklist for eliminating inappropriate
questions based on the principles -espoused by Czaja & Blair (1996:61) as
per Figure 14 below.
Figure 14
Checklist for eliminating questions
1. Does the question measure some aspect of one of the research
questions?
2. Does the question provide information needed in conjunction with
some other variable?
(if NO to both 1and 2, drop the question;
if YES to one or both, retain)
3. Will most respondents understand the question and in the same way?
(if NO, revise or drop; if YES, retain)
4. Will most respondents have the information to answer it?
(if NO, drop; if YES, retain)
5. Will most respondents be willing to answer it?
if NO, drop; if YES, retain)
6. Is other information needed to analyse this question?
(if NO, retain;
(if YES, retain only if the other information is available or
can be obtained)
7. Should this question be asked of all respondents or only a subset?
(if ALL, retain; if ONLY A SUBSET, retain only if the subset is
identifiable beforehand or through questions in the interview)
All interview schedule questions were structured (closed) and respondents
had to select their answers from a number of predetermined alternatives.
Each closed question had multiple choice answers from which respondents
were required to pick their preferences. In determining the nomenclature
both for the interview guide and the schedule, it was ensured as a general
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principle that the terms used were understood by respondents to ensure
they had confidence in their replies.
Maximum assurance on confidentiality was also given to all respondents
through inciusion of a provision in both the Interview Schedule and Guide
that informed the respondents that whatever information was shared with
the researcher would be handled in confidence. This assurance coupled
with the researcher's familiarity with some of the respondents enabled a
quick establishment of rapport between both parties.
4.6.4 Pretesting the Interview Guide
The pretest was a try-out of the interview guide to see how it worked and
whether changes were necessary before the start of the full scale study.
The pretest provided a means of identifying and solving unforeseen
problems in the administration of the interview guide, such as the phrasing
and sequence of the questions, or their length. It also helped in identifying
the need for additional questions or elimination of others.
Pre-testing the Interview Guides took two weeks. 7 Local Council One
Executives were purposively selected from a village in a non-sample parish
or ward from each sub-county and urban centre throughout the district. In
all a total of 91 respondents were interviewed in respect of pre-testing the
interview guide for Local Council One executives. It was felt necessary to
conduct many interviews to make sure that people differing in education,
temperament, opinion, and for Local Council One executives even, cultural
background, understood the questions and gave complete and pertinent
answers. Each village pre-test interview was followed by a discussion of
the questions with respondents after answering them. Respondents were in
each case asked what the questions meant to them, what difficulties they
experienced in replying, what further ideas they had that were not brought
out by the question, how they would ask the questions themselves, and
what feelings they had about the questions they had answered.
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Following this dialogue some imbalances and loopholes were observed in
this particular interview guide and adjustments made accordingly.
On noticing, for example, a high proportion of reluctance or at times
refusals to answer, a question on respondents' level of -education was
eliminated at this stage on the realisation that, given the high illiteracy rate
in the villages, this could be a taboo subject that was embarrassing most
respondents.
Secondly, it was noticed that there was lack of order in the answers
attributed, not to the wording of the questions, but weak conceptualisation.
This meant changing the patterning of the questions to deal with this
discrepancy. A case in point was question nO.3 of the pre-test interview
which read, "Do you have any occupation? ", where many respondents
appeared to wonder why this question was being asked since they
considered their Local Council executive positions as occupations and yet
in the real sense since these were not salaried portfolios, they could not be
regarded as occupations. This question was therefore re-cast to read,
"Besides being the Chairperson/Member of your village executive
committee, do you have any other occupation?".
The pre-test also revealed that respondents preferred qualitative questions
that inquired into the extent or degree of comparative improvement for
example in service delivery as opposed to quantitative questions
necessitating factual numerical data.
Consequently, questions were reorganised to provide for an acceptable
balance between the two.
The Interview Guide for Sub-County Chiefs and Town Clerks was pre-
tested for a much shorter period. The guide was administered to a member
of the sub-county technical and planning committee in each Sub-County
and urban technical and planning committee in each Town Council. These
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committees are chaired by the Sub-County Chiefs and Town Clerks
respectively.
Assistant Community Development Officers were preferred in sub-counties
in view of the cross-cutting nature of their mandate, while Clerks to Council
were preferred in Town Councils. A total of 13 respondents were covered
by the pre-test. Regarding the Interview Guide for Sub-County
Chairpersons, the pre-testing exercise involved Sub-County Vice
Chairpersons, 13 in number and drawn from each of the Sub-Counties and
Town Councils.
Pretesting the interview guide for District Political Leaders and Managers
involved five people. Two were technocrats at the level of Assistant Chief
Administrative Officer in charge of a County and three were Councillors at
the County. In all the three foregoing cases, alternative respondents were
sought for the pre-test, as all the sampling units would be involved in the
main survey. Nevertheless every effort was made to ensure that in all
cases the people interviewed under the pretesting exercise were similar in
characteristics to those who would be interviewed in the final study.
4.6.5 Pretesting the Interview Schedule
The interview schedule pre-test was conducted in all the 11 Sub-Counties
and 2 Town Councils. Participants were handpicked through purposive
sampling technique, taking care to ensure that those involved in the pre-
test were typical of the population under study. A total of 39 respondents
were interviewed during the pre-test. The Interview Schedule had multiple-
choice answers to closed questions where a participant selected his or her
answer from a set of predetermined responses.
During the pre-test it was noted that some questions did not have sufficient,
unambiguous responses to allow respondents give unequivocal answers.
The discrepancy was addressed by increasing the number of
predetermined responses to some questions from 4 to a number ranging
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between 5 and 8, including a provrsron for "Do not know/not sure" in
respect of circumstances where there was uncertainty that all possibilities
had been covered. Another strategy employed was to include the "other"
category in responses for some questions. The rationale here was to
enable respondents-specify answers in their own words where necessary.
After the pre-test, alternative responses to questions no. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7,
were increased from four to five, those to question 14were increased from
five to six, while those to question t8 were increased from six to eight.
Increasing the responses to the highest number possible was done in an
attempt to present respondents with a range of opinions from which they
would select those which closely resembled their own. The trade-off
however was that such type of interviewing would not capture respondents'
opinions in their own words, and as a result one could not ascertain how
closely their choices matched their opinions.
Table 24 shows the gender, location and number of respondents selected
for the Interview Schedule pre-test.
Table 24
Pretesting the Interview Schedule
Gender of Domicile of Number of Respondents
Respondents Respondents Interviewed
Rural Urban
Male 24 4 28
Female 9 2 11
Sub-Total 33 6 39
TOTAL 39
4.6.6 Measures to Avoid Bias
Some discomfort arose from the fact that the researcher was known to a
large number of respondents involved in the final study, having interacted
with them in his day-to-day duties as an administrator. It was feared that
180
the "response effect" syndrome could emerge at some stage. Borg
(1981 :87) has defined "response effect" as the eagerness of a respondent
to please the interviewer, or a vague antagonism that sometimes arises
between interviewer and respondent, or a tendency for the interviewer to
seek out answers that support his preconceived notions. In order to
address the foregoing fears, it was decided to acknowledge right from the
------ onset the notion that bias could creep in, other than eliminate it altogether.
That made it easier to exercise constant restraint and self-control.
There are four other strategies that were also used to minimise bias.
• Each respondent was interviewed privately to avoid his/her opinions
being affected or adulterated by the presence of some third person.
In addition, interviews were themselves conducted in an informal,
conversational manner in an effort to harness and achieve the best
possible rapport.
• Particular attention was paid to the dress code. All rural based
interviewing was characterised by inconspicuous dressing to avoid a
situation where the researcher's clothes and appearance would
otherwise influence lower-class respondents who predominated
among the Local Council One Executive Committee members.
• Some deliberate effort was made to ensure that the question content
was not biased or loaded in one direction because, for
unstructured/open-ended questions, this would mean that answers
obtained would unduly favour one side of the issue, but where such
loaded questions could not be avoided, accompanying questions
were added to balance the emphasis.
• Regarding the Interview Schedule, biasing factors, though
impossible to overcome completely, were greatly reduced by
standardising the interviews so that the interviewer had as little free
choice as possible. This, coupled with the fact that all interviews
were physically conducted by the researcher meant that any
emerging bias might be consistent and could therefore go unnoticed.
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4.7 Ethical Issues
As Coolican (1992:249) observes, it is easy to think of ethics being
important in natural sciences, such as medicine, but even in the social
sciences, it is difficult to conduct research without running into ethical
arguments.
Given this reality a number of different ethical issues had to be considered
and rules to guide the research had to be established at the early stages of
the study design to prevent the study running into problems in the early
stages of its inception. It is well known in the study area for example, that
the maxim "Government is always right" is deeply rooted and all-pervasive
especially within the lower echelons of society, yet it was government
performance in terms of good governance, service delivery and
empowerment that was at the centre of every interview conducted.
Therefore, to forestall some of these stereotypes from affecting the quality
of the research output, a comprehensive, concise code of practice was
established with the aim, among others, of ensuring that all participants
were made fully aware of the purpose of the research and understood their
rights. To this end both the Interview Schedule and Guide contained a brief
protocol designed to be read out at the start of the interviews explaining
that participation was voluntary and that participants were free not to
answer any questions they felt unable to. The purpose was to get the
informed consent of those to be interviewed.
Finally and most important was the promise of confidentiality and
anonymity. This encouraged respondents to give more open and honest
responses than would otherwise be the case. Some questions to Local
Council One executives and civic and opinion leaders for example, touched
on performance and service delivery at sub-county and district levels of
governance, where some respondents had acquaintances whom they
would not feel free to talk about negatively. In such cases prejudiced views
were greatly minimised by strictly avoiding mentioning of names and
conducting interviews in a generic way.
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4.8 Limitations of the study
Although the study generally applied a methodological triangulation
approach, the phenomenological paradigm dominated the process of data
collection and analysis. This meant that some key shortcomings of this
paradigm were automatically incorporated into the study. Given that the
location of the study was a natural setting i.e, the study was taking place in
the field, various socio-cultural stereotypes that would naturally impinge on
the attitudes of respondents could not be avoided. The negative impact
arising out of such stereotypes could have been reasonably neutralised
through use of a relatively large sample but this was not possible due to
a narrow sampling frame.
Another limitation related to the phenomena under study. Decentralisation
and good governance being fairly recent phenomena on the Ugandan
political landscape meant that most of the responses from respondents
were heavily subjective in the sense that they depended on individualistic
experiences and perspectives which, besides spanning over a shorter
period, could be different from the real situation on the ground.
Consequently the level of reliability of the research findings might have
been negatively affected by this scenario.
Another key aspect was that of generalisation of the research findings
premised on the assumption that it is possible to generalise from a few
cases if your analysis has captured the interactions and characteristics of
the phenomena you are studying. Given the recent nature of the
decentralisation policy in Uganda, and the insufficiency of literature
available, generalisation of the findings had to be undertaken cautiously.
It is also important to point out that it would never have been possible to
guarantee the attendance of participants without an undertaking by the
researcher to compensate them for their time and resources spent in order
to be available for the interviews. The need for funds therefore, to payout
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transport and lunch refund to respondents meant that the sample size had
to be kept at the minimum.
4.9 Data analysis
A qualitative approach was applied. Analysis of data was based on the
principle of classification and coding. Responses to unstructured questions
were grouped into main categories and coded. The 666 responses
obtained during data collection were reduced into a limited number of
categories based on the research questions and themes that had been
formulated earlier in the study. Classification led to establishment of
category sets based on explicit references to the various themes
highlighted by the research questions. Each category set met the following
basic rules:
• The set of categories was derived from a single classificatory
principle.
• The set of categories was exhaustive, that is, it was possible to
place every response in one of the categories of the set.
• The categories within the set were mutually exclusive, in other
words, it was not possible to place a given response in more than
one category within the set.
Frequencies were applied to determine the prominence of various themes
and concepts. Frequencies are numerical values which represent the total
number of observations in respect of variables or phenomena under study.
Although a preserve for univariate and bivariate analysis of quantitative
data, they were incorporated in this research methodology because of their
usefulness in enabling data to be presented in a more compact form to aid
full comprehension. Tabulations were made to determine the number of
responses that belonged to the various categories and in some
circumstances cross-tabulation was applied to establish the relationship
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between the responses obtained and the gender of respondents.
Percentages were then used to summarise the data by describing the
portion or part of the frequencies in every 100.
Data from the interview guides was transcribed in English in the course of
every interview, while key concepts and themes gathered from the data
were coded.
Finally, as the entire data had been collected in extended text which was
not the most suitable form in which it could be analysed, it had to be
detextualised by converting the text into diagrams, tables, and other
illustrations for presentation and analysis.
4.10 Summary
This chapter specifically dealt with the research methodology applied, the
research paradigm adopted, and the general paraphernalia that
underpinned the entire research process. It gave a detailed description of
the study area and highlighted the key features of the research design. It
defined the nature and size of the population and sample under
consideration and factors that were considered in determining the sampling
frame and size prior to the commencement of data collection.
The chapter also outlined the different data collection methods used and
outlines several concepts related to data collection, such as the research
instruments applied and how they were pretested. Also highlighted are data
from the literature, their sources and relevance in understanding the
importance of the research problem. The main methods used to collect and
record data were examined, some ethical issues highlighted, and
limitations identified and mentioned.
Finally, in readiness for the next stage that dwelt with data analysis, the
chapter besides looking at how data was classified and coded also
emphasised the importance of categorisation in understanding the thematic
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patterns arising out of the 666 responses obtained. The chapter concludes
with a mention on the purpose of detextualisation and establishment of
frequencies in the course of data analysis, and how these proved vital in
determining- the prominence and recurrence of certain themes and
concepts.
4.11 Projections for the Next Chapter
Chapter five will outline the research results based on eleven thematic
areas highlighted in section 1.9. The narrative and tabular modes of
presentation will be concurrently used to elucidate on comprehension of the
findings. The chapter will also outline data from the National Service
Delivery Survey conducted by the Ministry of Public Service in the year
2000. The survey was aimed at collecting information on perceptions of the
population on the quality and quantity of services delivered by government
. in the areas of crime prevention, justice, transport , education, water and





This chapter deals with the presentation of the results of- the study. The
results arise out of research undertaken in Hoima District, and constitute a
point of departure to a deeper comprehension and understanding of the
critical themes and concepts that formed the basis of the-study. Section
5.3 outlines data from the National Service Delivery Survey conducted by
the Ministry of Public Service to establish the extent, quality and
sustainability of public services delivered in Uganda. Its relevance to this
study is borne out of the need to compare Hoima case study findings with
the national situation.
5.2 Results of the Study
The results are presented under 11 different thematic categories, with each
category representing a major theme within the broad framework of the
research questions. The categories are divided into two to form a set of
those responses that were in the affirmative to a group of questions relating
to a particular theme and those that were in the negative regarding that
same theme. The eleven thematic categories are:
a) Understanding of stakeholders' responsibilities under devolution;
b) Understanding of Central Government roles;
c) Understanding of Local Government (District, SUb-County) roles;
d) Attitudes towards the effectiveness of service delivery;
e) Attitudes towards community participation;
f) Knowledge of effective planning and budgeting skills;
g) Attitudes towards adequacy of local financial resources;
h) Visibility and strength of the civil society;
i) Awareness of democratic methods of work;
j) Presence of Non-Governmental Organisations; and
k) Knowledge of existing devolution obstacles.
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All the 666 responses that came out of the questions in both the Interview
Guide and Schedule were fitted in the above 11 categories as already
explained in section 4.9
5.2.1 Understanding Stakeholder Responsibilities Under Devolution
In order to assess the leveis of awareness and appreciation of the
devolution process, questions were built in both the Interview Guides and
Schedule to probe the respondents' extent of understanding the various
stakeholder responsibilities under devolution. It was important to get more
information on this issue because role conflict had in the past often been
cited as one of the key stumbling blocks against decentralisation. The study
however revealed that in general terms there were relatively high levels of
understanding of various stakeholders' responsibilities under devolution
with a higher understanding level among political leaders and civil servants
than the civic and opinion leaders.
Tables 25 and 26 summarise these findings.
Table 25
Understanding Of Stakeholder Responsibilities
Understanding of stakeholder Frequency Percentage
responsibilities under devolution
Respondents understood various stake
holder responsibilities under devolution 232 68%
Respondents did not understand various
stakeholder responsibility under devolution 109 32%
TOTAL 341 100%
Table 26
Responses of the Civic and Opinion Leaders on the Understanding of
Stakeholder Responsibilities Under Devolution
Understanding of stakeholder Frequency Percentage
responsibilities under devolution
Respondents understood various stake
holder responsibilities under devolution 193 59%
Respondents didn't understand various
stakeholder responsibilities under devolution 132 41%
TOTAL 325 100%
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It can be seen from Table 25 that only 68 percent of the people interviewed
through personal in-depth interviewing understood the various stakeholder
responsibilities under devolution. They were able to point out clearly some
of the key roles of Central Government as opposed to those of the District
and Sub-County Local Governments on one hand and those of the
communities, on the other. 109 or 32 percent of the respondents did not
understand the various stakeholder responsibilities under devolution. in all
these cases the responses obtained indicated that respondents did not
know what devolution meant and were not aware that, besides the Central
Government in Kampala, there were Local Governments in Hoima District.
Regarding responses obtained from civic and opinion leaders on the same
theme, Table 26 shows that 193 respondents or 59 percent of all
interviewees in this category understood the various stakeholder
responsibilities under devolution, while 132 or 41 percent did not. The
findings further indicated some unique variations within the responses
obtained based on gender as Table 27 demonstrates. For example, while
the general level of understanding stakeholder responsibilities under
devolution was 68 percent among personal in-depth interviewees, gender-
oriented cross-tabulation put the percentage at 72 for men and 28 for
women. A similar trend occurred for the structured Schedule interviewees
with cross-tabulation showing a marked increase in male understanding of
stakeholder responsibilities to 85 percent up from 59, while female
understanding level fell to 15. In both groups, male understanding of
various stakeholder responsibilities under devolution was much higher than






Gender-related Findings on Respondents'
Various Stakeholder Responsibilities Under
Research Gender of No of Frequency of Percentage
Instrument respondents respondents understanding-
Male 247 167 72
Interview Guide Female 94 65 28
Interview Male 275 234 85
Schedule Female 50 8 15
5.2.2 Understanding of Central Government Role
Devolution and empowerment imply a high degree of dispersal of authority
and responsibilities from the Centre to the Periphery. In order to assess
their knowledge on this view, respondents were probed on their
understanding of the role of the Central Government as distinguished from
the roles performed by the district, sub-counties and the community.
The findings indicate that respondents were generally well informed on the
key roles of central government, with lack of understanding concentrated
more among the civic and opinion leaders than among civil servants and
politicians.
Tables 28 and 29 encapsulate these findings. From Table 28 it can be
seen that 198 or 58 percent of the people interviewed using personal in-
depth Interview Guides understood the key responsibilities of Central
Government in detail.
Table 28
Responses From Personal Indepth Interviews on Understanding
Central Government Role
Understanding of central government role Frequency Percentage
Respondents understood central
government role 198 58%
Respondents did not understand central
Igovernment role 143 42%
TOTAL 341 100%
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This was 10 percent less than the number shown in Table 25 to have
understood the role of Central Government.
143 respondents or 42 percent of the -people interviewed by Interview
Guide on this theme showed lack of knowledge of the key role of Central
Government.
Table 29
Responses of the Civic and Opinion Leaders on the Understanding of
Central Government Role
Understanding of central government
Role Frequency Percentage
Respondents understood central
government role 176 54%
Respondents did not understand central
tgovernment role 149 46%
TOTAL 325 100%
They either exhibited total ignorance or were hesitant when probed on the
matter. As regards the Interview Schedule responses from civic and
opinion leaders, a similar trend was observed, as shown in Table 29. 176
respondents or 54 percent of the interviewees had knowledge on the key
role of Central Government. This was 5 percent less than the number seen
to be generally knowledgeable on stakeholder responsibilities under
devolution in Table 26 above. 149 people or 46 percent of the respondents
in this group did not understand or had no knowledge of the key role of
Central Government.
5.2.3 Understanding of Local Government (District, Sub-County) and
Community Roles
The results revealed a much higher level of understanding of roles
performed by the district, sub-county and community in comparison with
the level of understanding of the roles performed by the Central
Government. The results further showed the level of understanding to be
much more skewed towards the district than towards the sub-county and
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community. The responses obtained indicated a much higher level of
awareness of district roles, followed by the sub-county with the community
. coming last. Tables 30, 31 and 32 illustrate these findings further. Judging
from Table 30, it can be seen that 282 or 82.7 percent of respondents
interviewed using personal in-depth Interview Guides understood the key
roles performed by iocal governments, while 59 or 17.3 percent of the
respondents did not. Even for the 82.7 percent who understood, there was
a tendency to assign most roles to the district and fewer to the sub-county
and community. It was also noted from the findings that some critical roles,
especially at the community level were still unknown to some stakeholders.
Question 29 of the Interview Guide for Local Council One executives for
example, sought to establish from respondents what normally dominated
the agendas of their village council meetings and multiple alternatives were
given to this effect.
Table 30
Responses From Personal Indepth Interviews on the Understanding
Local Government Roles (District, Sub-County and Community)
understanding of local government Frequency Percentage
roles (district, sub-county, community)
Respondents understood local government
roles (district, sub-county, community) 282 82.70%
Respondents did not understand local
Igovernment roles. 59 17.30%
TOTAL 341 100%
Interestingly, out of the 260 respondents interviewed, only 8 or 3.1 percent
mentioned the expenditure of 25 % local revenue from the sub-county as a
key item on their agenda, yet one would have expected this matter to take
centre stage in an era where accountability for public resources is high on
the agenda. Table 31 illustrates these findings.
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Table 31
Responses of 260 Local Council One Executives on Expenditure of 25
% Local Revenue From Sub-County
Expenditure of 25% local.revenue Frequency Percentage
from sub-county
Respondents mentioned it as a key item on
the agenda of their village council meetings 8 3.10%
Respondents did not mention it at all. 252 96.90%
TOTAL 260 100%
Turning to structured interviews administered to civic and opinion leaders,
the results revealed a much lower level of understanding of the roles of
local governments than in the earlier group. This can be seen from Table
32 below. Only 209 or 64.3 percent of the people interviewed knew the
roles performed by local governments at various levels, while 116 or 35.7
percent did not. This group also found it difficult to separate roles
performed by the district from those of the sub-county, but ably identified
those performed by the community. Like other respondents, civic and
opinion leaders also exhibited an immense lack of awareness of some
critical roles supposed to be performed by the community. This could be
told from their responses to questions 24 and 25 of the Interview Schedule.
Table 32
Responses of the Civic and Opinion Leaders on the Understanding
Local Government Role (District, Sub-County and Community)
Understanding of local government role Frequency Percentage
:(District, Sub-County and Community)
Respondents understood local government role 209 64.30%
Respondents did not understand local
!government role 116 35.70%
TOTAL 325 100%
On being asked for example, whether their communities were satisfied with
the way the 25% local revenue remitted to their villages by sub-counties
was spent, 263 or 81 percent of the respondents said they were not
satisfied. Asked further, whether they, as members of their respective
village councils, had ever rebuked their Local Council executives over
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misuse of their hard-earned resources, still 250 or 76.9 percent said they
had never, an indication yet again of how unconscious they were of their
key obligations under devolution.
5.2.4 Attitudes Towards the Effectiveness ofServices Delivered
Analysis of responses regarding attitudes towards the effectiveness of
services delivered was also categorised to separately depict views
projected out of the in-depth personal interviews and structured interviews
on the other. Five key thematic areas were identified to aid the analysis.
They were: water provision, health, community/access roads, agricultural
extension, and universal primary education (UPE). As Table 33 shows, the
results reveal a depressing picture regarding the general level of service
delivery in Hoima District. This is exemplified by the fact that 214 or 62.8
percent of the 341 respondents said they had no access to clean drinking
water, while only 127 or 37.2 percent confirmed having access to clean
water. To avoid being frivolous, the study construed clean water simply as
water from one of the following sources: Bore-hole, Protected Spring Well,
Piped Water, Rain-harvesting Tank, or Hand-augured Well. Deeper probing
of the 37.2 percent who said they had no access to clean drinking water
revealed their major source of water as local wells, rivers and swamps and
these were also the places where herdsmen watered their animals. 241 or
70.6 percent of the respondents said they had no adequate health facilities,
with the percentage rising among Local Council One executives, where out
of 260 people interviewed, 244 or 93.8 percent said they never see any
health workers in their villages. Only 100 or 29.4 percent of the
respondents said they had adequate health facilities.
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TabJe 33
Responses From Personal Indepth Interviews on the Effectiveness of
Services Delivered
Service Responses Frequency Percentage
Respondents said they had
Water provision enough clean water 127 37.20%
Respondents said they had
no clean water 214 62.80%
Respondents said they had
Health facilities adequate health facilities roo 29.40%
Respondents said they had
no adequate health facilities 241 70.60%
Status of accessl Respondents said their
community roads access roads were good 127 37.20%
Respondents said their
access roads were not good 214 62.80%
Respondents said they




Respondents said they never
received agric. extension
officers 247 72.40%
Provision of Respondents said they were
Universal Primaryhappy with UPE 208 61%
Education (UPE) Respondents said they were
not happy with UPE 133 39%
Regarding the community or access roads, 214 or 62.8 percent of the
respondents said their access roads were bad and needed urgent
attention, while only 127 or 37.2 percent were satisfied with the condition of
their access roads. It was of course ironical but interesting to see these
answers coming from Local Council One executives whose responsibility it
is to coordinate maintenance of community roads in their areas of
jurisdiction.
On provision of agricultural extension services, 247 or 72.4 percent of the
respondents said they had no access to extension services, while only 94
or 27.6 percent said they regularly received extension services. Many of
them thought that lack of extension services was a major setback since
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most of them were farmers who depended on agriculture for their
livelihood. On provision of universal primary education (UPE), 208 or 61
percent of the respondents said-they were happy with the programme while
133 or 39 percent were dissatisfied. Reasons for dissatisfaction ranged
from lack of classrooms to lack of qualified teachers.
Similar trends were also reflected among the structured Interview Schedule
respondents as Table 34 shows.
Table 34
Responses of the Civic and Opinion-Leaders on the Effectiveness of
Services Delivered
Service Responses Frequency Percentage
Respondents had access to
Water provision a protected water source 117 36.00%
Respondents had no access
to a protected water source 208 64.00%
Respondents attended Govt
health units for good
Health services medication 101 31.00%
Provision Respondents attended
private
Clinics for qood medication 224 69.00%
Respondents regularly
received agricultural
Agricultural extension officers 98 30.00%




education was better with
UPE 224 69.00%
Universal Primary Respondents said primary
Education education was worse than
before UPE 94 29%
Respondents said primary
education was the same as
before 7 2%
On analysing data from Table 34 it can be seen that only 117 or 36 percent
of the 325 respondents agreed having access to a protected water source,
while 208 or 64 percent said they had no access to any form of clean
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water. Further probing of the 36 percent who had access to clean water
revealed that the authorities had not been solely responsible for its
provision, but had worked hand-in-hand with the communities. Table 34
further shows that many people in Hoima District do not depend on public
health services for their survival. This is particularly true when one
observes that 224 or 69 percent of the respondents said they did not attend
government health care centres due to the perpetual lack of drugs in them
and preferred instead to go to private clinics. Only 101 or 31 percent of the
respondents said they attended government health centres and received
proper medication.
Agricultural extension services were also characterised by the same trend.
227 or 70 percent of the respondents said they were never visited by
agricultural extension officers, while only 30 percent or 98 respondents
agreed having regularly hosted these officials in their homes. Regarding
primary education, 224 respondents or 69 percent said the quality of
primary education was better with the on-set of UPE, while 94 or 29
percent said it was worse. Only 2 percent of the respondents said they did
not see any change.
5.2.5 Attitudes Towards Community Participation
Only Local Council One executive committee members, sub-county chiefs
and chairpersons were interviewed on this theme. In all they were 282




Responses of 282 Sub-County and Local Council One Executives on
Attitudes Towards Community Participation
Community participation Frequency Percentage
Respondents said community members !
149.10%willingly and actively participated in 138
local development projects.
Respondents said community members
didn't willingly participate in local - --
development projects and had to be
coerced. 144 50.90%
Total 282 100%
As can be noted from Table 35 it is evident that the majority of the
respondents-50.9 percent acknowledged the fact that members of their
communities did not willingly participate in development projects carried out
in their own areas and had on several occasions to be coerced before they
could participate. Only 138 or 49.1 percent of the respondents said their
community members actively participated in local projects.
Of the 144 respondents who said their community members were not
willing participants in local development projects, 60 could not give reasons
for their views, but 84 attributed the trend to lack of motivation. They
argued that many people would be willing to participate once they were
assured of payment in return for their labour. This partly explains the bad
state of most community roads in the study area where it is the
responsibility of the local population to maintain their community roads.
5.2.6 Knowledge of Effective Planning and Budgeting Skills
A total of 57 respondents made up of 27 District level politicians
(Councillors) and 30 District top management members were interviewed
on this theme at district level, while at sub-county level, 24 respondents
were interviewed composed of 11 Sub-County Chiefs, 11 Sub-County
Chairpersons and 2 Town Clerks. Table 36 captures the outcome of
respondents' views on this theme.
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Table 36
Personal Indepth Interviews With District Officials on Knowledge of
Effective Planning and Budgeting Skills
Knowledge of effective plannlngand Frequency Percentage
Budgeting skills.
Respondents knew how to plan and 42 73.70%
budget well.
Respondents did not know how to plan 15 26.30%
and budget well.
Total 57 100%
Out of 57 respondents interviewed, 42 or 73.7 percent had high levels of
planning and budgeting skills compared to 15 or 26.3 percent who did not
know how to plan or budget. Further-more, analysis based on role
differentiation revealed that lack of planning and budgeting know-how was
more skewed towards the politicians than towards the technocrats. Indeed
out of 27 Hoima District Council members who were interviewed, 12 or 44.4
percent did not know how to plan and budget. This compared quite
unfavourably with technocrats all of whom-3D or 100 percent, showed
adequate knowledge of planning and budgeting skills. Both scenarios, i.e.,
of knowledge of budgeting and planning skills, and lack of it, were
attributed to experience. All of the civil servants who were knowledgeable
on the theme had worked for long in the District and were therefore quite
familiar with the practice, while most of the un knowledgeable councillors
were recent entrants in the political field.
As already pointed out, 24 respondents were interviewed at sub-county
level and the results can be seen from Table 37 below. Out of the 24
interviewed, 16 or 66.6 percent had moderate knowledge about planning




Personal Indepth Interviews With Sub-County and Town Council
Officials on Knowledge ofEffective Planning and Budgeting Skills
Knowledge of effective planning and Frequency Percentage
budgeting skills.
Respondents knew how to plan and 16 66.60%
budget well.
Respondents did not know how to plan 8 33.40%
and budget well.
Total 24- 100%
Findings further revealed that some core planning committees that were
quite active at District level were perfunctory at the SUb-County. For
example while the District Technical and Planning Committee was core to
Table 38
Level of Sub-County Technical and Planning Committee in Sub-
Counties













Kigorobya Town E I
Buseruka E I
Key: E =Existent NE =Non existent I =Idle A =Active
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the planning and budgeting process at the district; it was found out during
the study that its counterpart at the Sub-County-the Sub-County Technical
Planning Committee-was idle in some Sub-Counties and non-existent in
others. Table 38 analyses the operational status of SUb-County-Technical
Planning-Committees in Hoima District. Inadequate planning and budgeting
skills at Sub-Counties could also be discerned from the time it took them to
pass their annual budgets. Tabte 39 shows that in FY 2002/2003 none of
the 11 Sub-Counties and 2 Town Councils met the legal deadline of June
15th by which local governments are required by law to have their budgets
passed by their respective councils." Three SUb-County Councils had not
passed their budgets even at the time of conducting this research
(November 2002), and were therefore spending public funds in violation of
the law.
Table 39
Hoima District: Date of Approval of SUb-County Budgets for 2002/2003
Financial Year
Sub-County Date of Approval Sub-County Date of Approval
Kyangwali Jul-02 Kyabigambire Jul-02
Not Approved by
Kabwoya Jul-02 Kitoba Nov-02
Kiziranfumbi Aug-02 Kigorobya Aug-02
..
Bugambe Aug-Q2 Kigorobya Town Jul-02
Not Approved by
Buhanika Nov-02 Hoima Town Jul-02
Buhimba Aug-02 Buseruka Aug-02
Not Approved by
Busiisi Nov-02
Among the key reasons advanced for delayed budget approval were late
assessment of graduated personal tax, and lack of funds to meet
councillors' allowances.
27 Section 83(4) ofthe Local Governments Act (1997) says, "The Chairperson ofa Local Government shall not
later than the fifteenth day ofJune, cause to be prepared and laid before the Council estimates ofrevenue and
expenditure ofthe Council for the next ensuing financial year.
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5.2.7 Attitudes T-owards Adequacy of Financial Resources Mobilised
Locally
The survey covered all the sampling units with the exception of the Civic
and Opinion Leaders. Views were sought from a total of 341 respondents.
The results are laid out in Table 40.
Only 61 people representing 18 percent of all respondents interviewed
thought local revenue collected was sufficient to cover the expenditure
pertaining to service delivery. This contrasted sharply with 280- or 82
percent of the respondents who thought local revenue was too insuffiCient
to cover all expenses of service delivery at local level. The acuteness of the
problem however varied from level to level, but the effects were mostly felt
at the sub-county level because here, unlike at the district, there was total
dependency on local revenue.
Table 40
Attitudes Towards Adequacy of Local Revenue in Hoima District
Attitudes towards adequacy of
local revenue Frequency Percentage
Respondents said local revenue was
sufficient to cover expenses on services 61 18%
Respondents said local revenue was not
sufficient to cover expenses on services 280 82%
Total 341 100%
The findings further revealed a high degree of non-compliance with the
Local Governments Act in terms of revenue-sharing. For example, of the
260 Local Council One executives interviewed, 203 or 78 percent said they
had never received the 25% local revenue from the Sub-Counties in spite
of being entitled to it. Only 57 respondents or 22 percent agreed receiving
the money. Details are given in Table 41 below.
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Table 41
Hoima District: Remittance Of 25% Local Revenue to the Local
Council One (Villages) By Sub-Counties
Remittance of 25% local revenue to Frequency Percentage
local council ones (villages)
Respondents said they had never received
25% local revenue from the sub-counties. 203 78%
Respondents said they regularly received
25% local revenue from the sub-counties. 57 22%
Total 260 100%
Sub-County administrators instead spent the money at source and only
sent reports to the bona fide beneficiaries. Data obtained from the District
Treasury also indicated that 3 of the 11 Sub-Counties had diverted to their
use 35% of local revenue meant for the District. Findings further revealed
that at Sub-County level there were no alternative sources of revenue to fill
the budgetary gaps, thus forcing Sub-Counties either to defer activities to
subsequent years or to incur debts that would be settled later. This is
confirmed by answers given by all the Sub-County Chiefs that in cases of
insufficient revenue to cover expenditure, they left some activities undone
or incurred debts and carried them forward. The findings also show a
generally low level of revenue collection with estimated local revenue
collected in Financial Year 2001/2002 of Uganda Shillings 347,816,533/=
or 57% of total local revenue planned for under the budqet,
Table 42 shows the key reasons attributed to the poor revenue collection
by 54 respondents who were interviewed on this matter. The 54 included




Hoima District: Reasons Given For Poor Revenue Collection
By 54 Respondents
Reasons given for poor revenue Frequency Percentage
collection in Hoima District
Poor assessment of graduated personal
tax and other direct and indirect levies. 2 4%
Political interference in revenue collection
proqrammes. 32 59%
Low taxable incomes resulting from a
narrow tax base. 15 28%
Tax evasion 5 9%
Total 54 100%
It is evident from Table 38 that the majority of the respondents, 59 percent,
felt that interference by politicians was a primary cause of poor revenue
collection. Respondents explained that politicians did not want their voters
harassed by tax collectors for fear of being denied votes in future elections.
Another notable observation was the fact that 28 percent of the
respondents attributed poor revenue collections to low taxable incomes as
a result of a narrow tax base. Only 4 percent attributed poor revenue
collection to poor assessment of graduated tax.
5.2.8 Visibility and Strength of the Civil Society
Assessment of the vibrancy and strength of the Civil Society was based on
responses obtained from 325 Civic and Opinion Leaders. Three questions
were asked aimed at establishing how influential Civic and Opinion Leaders
were in shaping public opinion in societies where they lived. Question One
was to do with the regularity of village council meetings and how people
reacted when they were not regularly convened. The other two questions
sought respondents' views on how satisfied they were with the expenditure
of 25% of local revenue remitted to their villages by the Sub-Counties, and
if not, whether they had ever rebuked their Local Council One Chairpersons
over any misuse of the funds. The findings are summarised in Tables 43,
44,45 and 46 below:
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Table 43
Responses From Civic and Opinion Leaders on the Regularity of
Village Council Meetings
Regularity of Village Council meetings Frequency Percentage
Respondents said meetings were held quite 118 36.40%
regularly.
Respondents said meetings were not so 140 43.20%
regularly held (held bi-annualiy)
Respondents said meetings were rarely held 52 15.90%
(once in two years)




Reactions of Civic and Opinion Leaders on the Irregularity of Village
Council Meetings
Respondents' reaction when village Frequency Percentage
council meetings weren't regularly held
Respondents said they insisted on 103 31.90%
meetings being held.
Respondents said they did not talk in fear 140 43.20%
of their Local Council One Chairpersons.
Respondents said they usually complained 52 15.90%
to other authorities.
Respondents said they did not know what 30 9.00%
to do
Total 325 100%
All the four tables reveal quite interesting observations regarding the status
of the Civil Society in Hoima District. It can be seen from Table 43 for
example that a total of 207 People or 63.6 percent of all the respondents
interviewed were not satisfied with the regularity of Village Council
meetings. This number was made up of the 140 respondents who said
meetings were not regularly held, 52 respondents who said meetings were
rarely held and the 15 respondents who said no meetings were held. But
when asked what action they had taken to rectify the problem, Table 44
shows that only 103 or 31.9 percent of them said they insisted on meetings
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being held. On the other hand 140 or 43.2 percent of them said they did not
talk, as doing so would antagonise their Village Chairpersons.
Table 45
Respondents Views on The Degree of Community Satisfaction
With Expenditure of 25% Local Revenue Remitted to Villages
-By Sub-Counties
Respondents' views on community Frequency Percentage
satisfaction with 25% expenditure
Respondents said they were satisfied with
the way 25% local revenue was spent. 118 36.40%
Respondents said they were not satisfied
with the way their 25% revenue was spent. 199 61.30%
IRespondents did not know what to say. 8 2.30%
Total 325 100%
Table 46
Responses of the Civic and Opinion Leaders on the Misuse of 25%
Local Revenue
Response to misuse of 25% local Frequency Percentage
revenue by LC one Executives.
Respondents said they rebuked their local
council one executives over the matter. 62 31.10%
Respondents said they did not rebuke
their Local Council Ones over the matter. 137 68.90%
Total 199 100%
52 respondents or 15.9 percent said they complained to other authorities,
while 30 respondents or 9 percent did not know what to do. In other words,
only 155 respondents (constituted by 103 respondents who insisted on
meetings being held and 52 respondents who complained to other
authorities) or 47.8 percent of the interviewees said they took action, while
a whole 170 or 52.2 percent of the respondents looked on helplessly. The
same trend was realised when analysing respondents' views on the degree
of community satisfaction with expenditure of 25% local revenue remitted to
Villages from Sub-Counties. Table 45 shows that 118 respondents
representing 36.4 percent of the people interviewed were satisfied with the
expenditure, while 199 respondents representing 61.3 percent of the
People interviewed said they were not. Only 8 respondents representing
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2.3 percent of the interviewees-did not know what to say. Interestingly the
study further revealed that out of the 199 (61.3%) respondents who were
dissatisfied with the expenditure of 25% local revenue, as Table 46 shows
only 62 of them (31.1%) admitted ever rebuking their Local Council One
executives over the misuse. The remaining 137 or 68.9% did not bother,
arguing that the money involved was after all-very small. Others said they
could not be aware of the misuse because it took them long to learn of the
arrival of the funds from the Sub-Counties, which in itself was further
evidence of lack of vigilance among members of the Community.
5.2.9 Awareness ofDemocratic Methods of Work
The two research instruments used included questions which were
designed to provoke respondents' sentiments on local democracy and
democratic methods of work generally. The questions were of a probing
nature and specifically sought the views of respondents on the manner in
which Community Leaders and Citizens conducted themselves on matters
of public interest. A total of 609 respondents were interviewed on this
theme. They included 260 Local Council One Executive Committee
Members, 11 Sub-County Chiefs, 11 Sub-County Chairpersons, 2 Town
Clerks and 325 Civic and Opinion Leaders. Regarding the Civic and
Opinion Leaders the research instrument used was the interview schedule,
and their views have already been captured by Tables 43 and 44. As far as
the remaining sampling units are concerned, in-depth personal interviewing
was applied, and Tables 47 and 48 encapsulate the findings that accrued
from interviewing these 284 respondents.
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Table 47
Responses From 284 Indepth Personal Interviews on the Regularity of
Holding Village Council Meetings
Regularity of Village Council meetings Frequency Percentage
(how regular were they)
Respondents said meetings were regularly
Held 98 34.40%
Respondents said meetings were-not
regularly held. 173 61.10%
Respondents said meetings were not held
at all. 13 4.50%
Total 284 100%
Given the nature of the study and the respondents' level of
conceptualisation, it was felt that a simple parameter such as the
convening of Village Council meetings was viable enough to form a basis
on which participants' awareness-of democratic methods of work could be
tested, and from Table 47 it can be seen-that 173 People or 61.1 percent of
the respondents felt Village Council-general meetings were held irregularly,
while 98 people or 34.4 percent felt they were held regularly. Only 13
people or 4.5 percent of the respondents said village council meetings were
never held at all in their villages. A more depressing picture emerged when
data on the irregularity of meetings was further disaggregated to allow for
depiction of variations in the relative irregularity of Village meetings. The
findings are shown in Table 48 below:
Table 48
Responses from 186 Indepth Personal Interviews on the Variations in
the Irregularity of Village Council General Meetings
Variations in the irregularity of Village Frequency Percentage
Council meetings
Respondents said meetings were held
Quarterly 46 24.70%
Respondents said meetings were held
bi-annually. 37 19.80%
Respondents said meetings were held
once a year. 90 48.40%
Respondents said meetings were never held. 13 7.10%
Total 186 100%
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It is clear from details shown in Table 48 that village council meetings are
rarely held, implying in general that members of the community are not part
and parcel of the decision-making process and rarely participate in the
discussion of issues affecting their lives. Analysis of responses from the
interviews of Civic and Opinion Leaders also posted similar results as was
reflected in Tables 43 and 44. Quite clearly, people are not consulted on
matters affecting their daily lives and general well being. The Leaders do as
they please. Indeed, 52 or 20 percent of the Local Council One Executives
interviewed said they had never held any village council meeting since they
were elected in November 2001. A similar number could not recall ever
holding an executive committee meeting for the village. Both scenarios
pointed to one conclusion, that village matters were most of the time
singularly handled by the chairpersons.
5.2.10 Presence ofNon-Governmental Organisations
Two groups were interviewed on this theme. One was of the Local Council
One Executive Committees because, being closer to the ground than any
other group within the sampling frame, it was easier for it to establish
whether or not Non-Governmental Organisations were present and
operational in the study area. The second group interviewed was that of
Sub-County Chiefs because of its pivotal role in service delivery. In all 271
respondents were interviewed on this theme, and Tables 49 and 50 below
show the findings:
Table 49
Hoima District: Views of 260 Local Council One Executives on the
Presence of Non-Governmental Organisations
Presence of Non-governmental Frequency Percentage
organisations in their areas
Respondents said NGOs were present and
operational in their areas of abode. 74 28.30%
Respondents said NGOs were not present




Hoima District: Responses from 11 Sub-County Chiefs on the
Presence of Non-Governmental Organisations
Presence of Non-governmental Frequency Percentage
Organisations in their areas of abode
Respondents said NG0s were present
and operational in their areas of work 4 36~60%
Respondents said NGOs were not
present in their areas of work 7 63.60%
Total 11 100.00%
Table 49 shows that of the 260 respondents interviewed only 74 or 28.3
percent admitted they had operational non-governmental organisations in
their areas of abode, while 186 or 71.7 percent said they did not have
them. The same trend is reflected in Table 50 where out of 11 respondents
only 4 or 36.4 percent accepted having fully-fledged NGOs operating in
their Sub-Counties, while 7 or 63.6 percent of the respondents said they did
not have NGOs in their Sub-Counties.
In general therefore, the situation depicted by the Survey is one
characterised by a low level of Non-Governmental Organisations in Hoima
District and heavy dependency on the State (Central and Local
government) for the provision of most of the essential services. This is
confirmed by the finding that the 74 Local Council One committee
respondents and the 4 sub-county chiefs who admitted having NGOs
operating in their areas of jurisdiction cited only one NGO, World Vision
International. Study findings further show that indeed World Vision support
is quite substantial in the education sector where the organisation has
helped in the construction of primary school classrooms and supported
many financially-handicapped orphans within the district.
5.2.11 Knowledge of Existing Devolution Obstacles
In-depth Interview Guide questions for District Councillors, District top
management, Sub-County Chiefs and Chairpersons were designed to
generate respondents' feelings on the Devolution policy, process and on
210
obstacles it was encountering since its inception. The findings, as Table 51
will show, revealed that while some devolution obstacles were well-known,
others were not.
Table 51
Perceptions of 54 Respondents On Revenue Collection
Perceptions on adequacy of locally Frequency Percentage
raised revenue.
Respondents thought locally-raised
revenue was sufficient. 0 0
Respondents thought locally-raised revenue
was insufficient (extremely low). 54 100%
Total 54 100%
In Table 51 the 54 respondents were of the view that locally- raised
revenue was too little to satisfactorily fund decentralised services. Asked
how they coped given such meagre local resources, most of the District
level respondents (24 out of 30) said they depended on conditional grants
from the Centre to offset budgetary deficits, while Sub-County Chiefs and
Town Clerks said they deferred unfunded activities to subsequent financial
years. The study also revealed excessive over dependency by the District
on Central Government transfers to finance local expenditure, as can be
seen from Table 52.
Asked if it was okay for the district to be so dependent on the Centre for its
funding, only 7 People or 13 percent of the respondents could see it as a
problem. The rest had no idea at all, confirming yet again the extent to
which people were unaware of some of the major obstacles to devolution,
despite being key stakeholders. The 7 People who saw over dependency
on Central Government transfers as a problem argued that it suppressed
the District initiative to plan, since most of the activities implemented
through conditional grants were planned by the Centre.
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Table 52
Hoima District Local Government: Sources of Revenue for Financial
Year 2001/2002
Type of Revenue Amount in Ug_anda Percentage of
Shillings Total Budget
Local Revenue 610,204,444/= 4.00%
Project Funds 4,409,074,574/= 30%
Central Government Transfers 9,656,975,422/= 66%
Total 14,676,254,440/= 100%
The study also established that there was a lot of defeatism among
revenue collectors in respect of raising the level of local revenue
collections. The bulk of the problem was attributed to political interference
evenly spread outat all levels of District, Sub-County and Parish. Sub-
County Chiefs openly confessed that past efforts to increase revenue, more
often than not, ended up putting them on a collision path with their political
masters.
The findings on community participation indicated on average that
respondents had mixed feelings regarding the extent to which it could be
considered a problem to devolution. Judging from Table 35 we can see
that 50.9 percent or 144 of the 282 respondents said community members
did not willingly participate in development programmes in their areas, and
only participated after being coerced. Participation and empowerment are
two sides of the same coin. It is therefore difficult to see how a community
that resented participating in its own development programmes could be
empowered.
5.3 Data From the National Service Delivery Survey (NSDS)
5.3.1 Background
Besides data obtained from the Hoima case study, additional primary data,
for comparative purposes, was obtained from the results of the Uganda
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National Service Delivery Survey (NSDS). The NSDS was conducted in
the year 2000 by the Ministry of Public Service with the aim of collecting
information on perceptions as well as satisfaction of the population with
regard to the quantity and quality of services delivered by government,
ranging from crime prevention, delivery of justice, good governance,
transport services, water and sanitation, education, health services to
agricultural extension services.
The NSDS was carried out from July to August 2000 and the sample
design was based on a two-stage stratified district-wide independent and
representative sample of households. The total realised sample size was
13,604 households country-wide as shown in Table 53.
The majority of respondents were male, representing 79.7% of the total
sample and married respondents constituted 75.6%, while the widowed
made up 9.7%. Nearly 64% of households members were below 18 years
of age.
Table 53
Marital Status of Respondents in the NSDS Sample
Marital Status Number % Weighted % Unweighted
1. Married 10,410 75.6 76.5
2. Single 893 7.2 6.6
3. Divorced 414 3.2 3.0
4. Widowed 1,295 9.9 9.5
5. Separated 386 2.8 2.8
6. Other /Not stated 206 1.5 1.6
TOTAL 13,604 100.0 100.0
5.3.2 Objective of the NSDS
• The main objective of the National Service Delivery Survey was to
supplement the District Resources Endowments Study (DREPS)
with data on resource utilisation and aimed at documenting the
extent of service delivery, access to identified services, their
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utilisation and satisfaction of the people with reference to these
services.
• The second objective was to generate data to enhance better
planning at both Central and local government levels, resource
allocation and monitoring of service delivery by government.
5.3.3 Findings of the NSDS
The results of the National Service Delivery Survey highlight the follow ing
findings in respect of the study:
Table 54
Uganda: General Feeling of Safety From Crime
65.5% of households on average felt generally safe from crime
14.3% of Households on average felt generally unsafe from crime
69.3% reported less crime than 5 years ago
Figure 15
Uganda: General Feeling of Unsafety Disaggregated into regions
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5.3.3.1 Crime, Justice and Good Governance
• In general, households felt safe from crime and violence with
65.6% of the respondents country-wide saying they were safe.
Nearly 64% of Ugandans reported that the level of crime had
declined over the past five years. Confidence in government to
protect the communities from crime and violence was high at the
time of the Survey with 73% of the respondents stating that they
had trust in government with regard to protection from crime and
violence. Almost 70% felt that if they were wronged, formal
institutions could offer opportunity for recourse and redress in their
favour.
• However, with almost 30% of respondents feeling unsafe, the
Northern Region of Uganda registered the largest degree of lack of
confidence in government to protect them from crime. Its level of
non-confidence contrasted sharply with the Central, Eastern and
Western regions where the percentage of respondents feeling
unsafe stood at 6%, 11 % and 10% respectively. This is attributed
to war in the northern Uganda where for the last 18 years rebels of
the Lords's Resistance Army have been battling government
troops.
• Access to courts of law was within 5km for over 50% of the
respondents while only 22.2 % reported that they live within 5km of
the nearest magistrates court. Most Ugandans (71.5%) stated that
a hearing at the Magistrate's court is obtained in less than 6
months.
• The Local Council system (LC) received a very favourable rating
among Ugandans. The majority of the National Services Delivery
Survey (NSDS) respondents stated that the Local Council (LC)
officials were more responsive at the time of the survey than five
years earlier (89.6%). The LC courts were judged by 65.5% of the
respondents to offer better prospects for a fair and transparent
treatment ahead of the courts of law presided over by the Judge or
Magistrate (18.4%). Many Ugandans still believe in the traditional
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courts as 84.7% stated that a hearing by community elders is
delivery of justice. Corruption in the Police, LCs and Magistrate
Courts was perceived to be high by respondents.
Table 55
Uganda: Level of confidence in government protection against crime
72.6% of the respondents were confident of qovernrnent protection from crime
27.4% of the respondents did not believe that government could protect them from
crime.
68.9% of the respondents were confident of redress in case of being wronged.
31.1% of the respondents doubted government's ability to avail them redress in the
event of beinq wronoed
Table 56
Uganda: Accessibility to, and Quality of the Justice system
More than 50% of households live within 5km of formal court
71.5% said hearlno in a formal court takes place quickly or 'not long' «6 months)
67% of the respondents considered LC courts as the best institutions for fair and transparent
treatment of offenders.
89.6% said LC officials were more responsive than 5 years ago
Figure 16
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Uganda: Relative Responsiveness of the LCI Central and
Administration Police
67.4% of the respondents said LC1s were more responsive than 5 years aQo
39.5 %said the central police was more responsive than five years aoo
37% said the administration police mor-e responsive than 5 years ago
• 'Many more Ugandans would rather see the Police stationed in
their community (51.6%) than they would the Army (11.5%) and
the areas which expressed the strongest need to have the army in
their communities were those which have suffered from insurgency
and mainly included the Districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Bundibugyo.
• Results from the NSDS also show that nearly 51.7% of Ugandans
believe that the abuse of human rights has decreased over the
past five years and that there has been improvement in the time
for hearing a court case as compared to five years ago. In the
latter case 45.3% of the respondents confirmed so. Figures 15
and 16 and Tables 54, 55, 56 and 57 provide more details in
respect of findings.
5.3.3.2 Water and Sanitation
The National Service Delivery Survey findings on water and sanitation are
highlighted by Figures 17 and 18 and Tables 58, 59, 60 and 61.
• The Survey showed that mean distance to the water source increased
from 1.16km in the time of the wet season to 1.47 km during the dry
season and the time to collect water increased from 42 minutes in the
wet season to 64.4 minutes during the dry season. Only one major
explanation can be attributed to the increase in distance and duration
to water sources during the dry season. Most water sources were of a
temporary nature and tended to dry up during the hot season thus
forcing the communities to walk longer distances in search of water
sources. Up to 46% of Ugandans did not boil water before drinking it,
while nearly 30% shared their main water source with animals. Many
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respondents (56.5%) had received advice from government or NGO
officials on the protection of water sources and nearly 62% on the
construction of latrines. Nearly 63% of Ugandans were visited by a
public or NGO official to enforce by-Laws for the construction of
latrines.
Table 58
Uganda: Availability of Refuse Collection and Sewage Disposal
Service
Data showed that majority of households (60.7%) had no refuse
collection services of any type
Data showed 83% had no sewaqe system
Data showed that 90% had no cesspool emptying facilities




Less than 10% of households had piped water inside the houses
However, more than 60% had access to protected water source
30% of Ugandan households shared their main water source with
animals
• The Survey revealed majority opinion suggesting that latrine coverage
has considerably improved in Uganda over the last five years (55%
said yes). However, provision of clean water was perceived to have
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Table 60
Uganda: Mean Distance to Water Source and Mean time to Collect
Water
Mean distance to water source Mean time to
collect water
Wet season 1.17 km Wet season
41.7 minutes
Dry season 1.44 km Dry season
64.6 minutes
• Regarding other sanitation facilities, the Survey results indicate that
facilities for garbage collection, cesspool emptying, and piped water
inside houses were not available to the majority of respondents.
Nearly 27.9% of Ugandans had a borehole within quick proximity; but
only 22.1% had a protected spring! well close by and worse still, only
8.7% of Ugandans had access to piped water either inside their houses
or on taps within their vicinity.
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Figure 18
Uganda: Percentage of Households That Boiled Drinking Water,




















Uganda: Advice Received From Government Officials and NGOs on
Protection of Water Sources and Construction of Latrines.
Majority of respondents (56.5%) had received advice from government and
NGO on protection of water sources
62% had received advice on construction of latrines
65% were of the view that latrine coverage had improved in the last five
years
5.3.3.3 Health Services
• On health services, data generated by the NSD Survey indicated that
nearly 42% of Ugandans were sick during a single month but failed to
get treatment. Amongst the households which had a sick person, 41.8
percent failed to get the patient treated because of lack of money; and
32.4% used self medication. Those who failed to pay medical bills had
been asked an average of Uganda Shillings.18 .7001= per patient.
HIV/AIDS awareness was fairly high in the communities in Uganda, as
78.5% said they understood how AIDS is spread. But less than 50 %
of Ugandans believed that change of behaviour in response to the
AIDS pandemic had taken place; only 48.2% reported that men tend to
avoid widows and 46.1 % reported that women avoid widowers.
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Table 62
Uganda: What Happened When a Person Fell Sick and Could
Not Get Treatment Due to Lack of Money
42% of households had a person falling sick and not getting treatment
due to lack of money
VVhathappenedthen?
• Self medication 32.4%
• Traditional Medicine 17.9%
• Not treated at clinic 22.2%
• Sought no treatment 22.2%
Table 63
Uganda: Perception on Affordability of Medical Expenses
Only 13.3 %of households have always been able to afford medical
expenses.
82% of respondents cited the main reason for lack of affordability of
medical expenses as poverty
69% cited the most common illness treated by self medication as
malaria
• Findings also indicated that Ambulance services are extremely scarce
in most communities in Uganda and traditional methods of carrying the
sick to health units and hospitals still dominated.
• The most recent vaccination campaign at the time of the Survey was
reported to have been very well attended although up to 40% of the
NSDS respondents in VVestern region reported that some effort had
been made by some people to discourage others from attending.
• The survey further revealed the cost of medical care as being beyond
the reach of the majority of households as only 13.3% of the
respondents said they were always able to afford.
Table 64
Uganda: Mode of Treatment
• Modern health care 44%
• Self medication 39.9%
• No treatment 16%
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Table 65
Uganda: Perceptions on HIV/AIDS
78% of respondents said people understood how HIV/AiDS was spread
64.7% said efforts had been made by authorities to warn people about
HIV/AIDS
Only about 50% thought there had been behaviour change
• The Survey also found out that when some one is ill in the community,
the most common method of treatment is modern health care, as
reported by 44.4% of the respondents. 30.9% of the respondents
reported dependency on self-treatment as a mode of dealing with
disease in the community and this could have implications for disease-
resistance to drugs in Uganda. The single most important illness that
was treated through self-medoation or by traditional herbs was
reported to be malaria/fever (69.3%), followed by diarrhoea (11.0%).
Tables 62 to 67 encapsulate most of the key findings.
Table 66
Uganda: Perceptions on Ambulance Services and
Vaccination Campaigns
Respondents said ambulance services were available to only 14% of
households
82.5% said vaccination campaigns were well attended.
However 33.4% of said people discouraged other from going for
immunization
Table 67
Uganda: Attitudes on health workers in government health units
50% said health workers in government health units levied extra charges.
62.4% said health workers in government health units sent patients to
buy drugs from their own pharmacies and clinics.
66% said health workers in government health units were harsh to
patients.
5.3.3.4 Education
• The most important reason for a child to drop out of school was given
as lack of money (this was cited by 75.4% of respondents). Other
factors which affect school attendance were ranked in this order: (a)
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poor health (cited by 63.7% of respondents (b) failure to pay extra
charges at school 51.7%, (c) lack of school uniform (41.6%) and (d)
rainy season (26.9%).
Table 68
Uganda: Factors Negatively Affecting School Attendance
The main reason for children droppinq out of school
Factors negatively affecting school attendance
Sickness 63%




Uganda: Respondent's Attitudes Towards Sending a Child to School
80.6% of respondents believed sendlnq children to school would help
them in future
85% said they would still send a child to school even if they knew
he/she would not find a job after school
• Data from the Survey indicate that the majority of Ugandans (85.8%)
would still send a child to school even if they know that he /she would
not find employment afterwards. Universal Primary Education (UPE)
was highly appreciated all over the country because it increased
opportunities for reducing illiteracy in Uganda. UPE was appreciated
by 90.6% of the respondents. But many respondents thought that the
quality of UPE could be improved. Almost half (47.8%) agreed that
parents should contribute towards the cost of maintaining teachers so
as to improve UPE.
Table 70
Uganda: Attitudes Towards UPE (Universal Primary Education)
• Is well appreciated 90.6%
• Should be improved with parental contribution 47.8%
• Cost still high 21.4%
• Classes too large 89.3%
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Table 71
Uganda: Suggestions for Reducing Class Size
• Put up more- classrooms 94%
• Hire more teachers 92.7%
• Introduce double shift 43.4%
• Charge for improving facilities 38.8%
• Suggestions to improve UPE in order of importance were: (a) put up
more classrooms (this was suggested by 96.4%) of the respondents;
(b) train and hire more primary school teachers (92.7%) and (c)
introduce double shift (43.4%).
• The idea of automatic promotion in UPE was rejected by 78.4% of the
respondents and that of employing unqualified teachers was rejected
by 82.3%. The Survey found the cost of secondary education to be
prohibitively high in Uganda, as 73.5% felt it was not affordable.
Boarding secondary schools were the most preferred post-primary
institutions in Uganda. Nearly 54.6% of Ugandans said secondary
school education had improved over the past five years. Other key
findings are encapsulated in Tables 68 to 72.
Table 72
Uganda: Views on Affordability of Secondary Education
• Post-primary education was considered expensive by 80% of the
Respondents
• Overwhelming reason was school fees (95%)
• Preferred type of secondary school was boarding secondary
School
• 54.6% said secondary school education had improved over the
last 5 years.
5.3.3.5 Agricultural Extension Services
• As can be deduced from Tables 73 to 76, the findings of NSDS
suggest that a lot of work should be put into the improvement of
extension services in Uganda, in order to increase accessibility to




Uganda: Coverage and Quality of Agricultural Extension Services
• Coverage was low with only 29.2 of households visited in the last 1
year
• Only 27.1 said quality had improved over the last 10 years
• Only 29% thought extension staff were dedicated to their work
• Responses from the NSDS suggested that the Plan for Modernisation
of Agriculture (PMA) would be supported by the majority of households
through adoption of improved seeds (88.7), payment for mechanisation
(61.1%) and adaptation of new rules for land ownership (47.2%).
• The Survey revealed that post-harvest management in Uganda is not
seriously considered as a means of improving food security.
Communities would be willing to contribute to communal stores and
warehouses for food storage.
Table 74
Uganda: Respondents' Views on PMA
(Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture)
PMA would be supported if it involved
• New rules on land ownership 47.2%
• Application of improved seeds 88.7%
• Application of fertilizers 81%
• Paying for improved technology 61%
Table 75
Uganda: Views on Post-Harvest Loss
• 82% of the Respondents said post harvest loss affected food
availability in households
• 66.4% said they grow crops subject to heavy post harvest
management loss
• Only 19% said they received government advice on post harvest
management loss
• Majority said they would like to see stores and granaries for
minimizing post harvest losses
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• Many farmers (41.4%) said they would be willing to pay for increased
market outlets for their farm produce. They also observed that more
investment needed to be made in finding markets for Ugandan
agricultural produce abroad.
Table 76
Uganda: Respondents' Views on Market Outlets for Their Produce
• 26% of Households were not satisfied with market outlet for their
produce
• 40% said they would be prepared to pay some money for getting
more market outlets for their produce.
• 58% of respondents said their households always experience
food shortaqes
5.4 Summary
This Chapter dealt with presentation of the results of the study. A dual-
pronged mode of presentation was used with the results from each
thematic analysis first represented in tabular form followed by an
interpretation of the findings on each theme. The results provide findings on
eleven themes identified earlier in the study and portray in a consistent way
respondents' thinking pattern on the status of devolution and empowerment
in Hoima District Local Government.
Cross-tabulation has been-applied to a limited extent, and mainly under the
theme of understanding various stakeholder responsibilities in devolution.
The purpose here was to highlight the prominence and impact of some of
the key variables such as gender in the answering pattern of respondents.
The last part of the chapter dwells on data from the National Service
Delivery Survey. Consistency in the presentational format earlier used is
maintained, save that the thematic areas outlined in this case related only
to service delivery and good governance, leaving out other key ones such
as community participation, planning and budgeting, Resource
Mobilisation, depth of local democracy and visibility and strength of the civil
society.
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Generally, data from primary sources reveal some striking similarities
between the status quo in Hoima regarding the levels and quality of service
delivery and the national situation.
5.5 Projections for the Next Chapter
Chapter six will discuss the results of the study based on ten broad themes
established in accordance with the research objectives. The results of the
National Service Delivery Survey outlined in this chapter will be compared
and contrasted with findings from the Hoima Study and similarities and
differences if any, highlighted.
The outcome of the discussion will be used to draw conclusions, make
recommendations and help in identifying areas of further research in the





This chapter discusses the results of the study. The thematic pattern
adopted in the previous chapter is largely maintained with minimal
alterations on the nomenclature previously used.
A few themes are amalgamated and discussed concurrently particularly in
situations where the analytical framework is closely linked. The results are
discussed based on ten broad themes established in consonance with the
research objectives and questions.
The discussion also incorporates an analysis of data and findings arising
out of the National Service Delivery Survey and uses them to highlight the
juxtaposition of the two situations (Hoima and National), particularly in the
areas of service delivery.
6.2 Stakeholder Responsibilities Under Devolution
In the discussion of results, this thesis puts emphasis on role differentiation
by examining how the key stakeholders, namely the State (central
government), local governments and the communities undertake their
complementary roles in support of devolution. As this chapter discusses,
the State will deliver more effectively to all its citizens, but to local people in
particular, if
• State institutions are made more accountable and responsive to
local people in the communities; participation of local people in
political processes and local decision-making is strengthened, and
social barriers that result from distinctions of gender, ethnicity,
religion and social status are removed;
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• Central and local governments utilise the decentralised mechanisms
for broad participation-in the delivery of public services and minimise
the scope for capture by local elites; and
.. Political regimes honour the rule of law, allow the expression of
political voice, and encourage the participation of local people in
political processes.
This study acknowledges that actualising the above theoretical premise
would entail intensive sensitisation of the people as a starting point to their
deeper conceptualisation and appreciation of their role in the
decentralisation set up. It is for this reason that the theme of understanding
of stakeholder responsibilities under devolution was seen as an essential
parameter for measuring the extent to which decentralisation had taken
root and blossomed in Hoima, and by extension, in Uganda.
Data derived from the study indicates that the level of understanding of
various stakeholder responsibilities under devolution was relatively high,
with higher understanding among political leaders and local government
staff than among civic and opinion leaders. At 59 percent, the level of
understanding of stakeholder responsibilities by civic and opinion leaders
was 9 percent less than that of political leaders and civil servants. This
disparity in understanding of the decentralisation process among its
stakeholders is attributed to deficiencies in the formulation and
operationaHsation of the policy.
Looking at the objectives of decentralisation, one sees much more focus
being put on addressing institutional rigidities and limitations occasioned by
centralised planning than enhancement of popular participation and
empowerment of the local people. Because of this trend far more emphasis
has over time been put on sensitisation and indoctrination of local
government managers at the expense of the local population, and Sarnoff
(1990: 523-524) warns that when decentralisation is not understood and
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does not correspond with the interests of those who have to apply it, it is
not well-effected.
Cross-tabulation of data on this theme to highlight some gender aspects of
the findings had even more depressing results on the women's level of
understanding of devolution. Within the civic population, only 15 percent of
the women have heard about decentralisation and are aware of the various
stakeholder roles under it. The rest, 85 percent, have no idea at all. The
study found out that this disappointing but not completely unexpected
scenario is caused by both cultural and socio-institutional factors. The
cultural dimension is succinctly illustrated by Wakabi & Kwesiga
(1991 :23):
A woman is bound to obey her husband in everything by virtue of the bride
price that her husband's relatives paid to her family. The payment of bride
price entitles a man to the woman's labour, her sexual services, and her full
obedience.
The study established that the majority of women have not been able to
benefit from decentralisation sensitisation seminars and workshops
because they are not allowed to attend them by their husbands, and
women in Hoima will rarely attend public meetings or other social
gatherings without their husbands' consent. The socio-institutional factor
manifests itself through the existing social structures that are heavily
underpinned by patriarchal power relationships encompassing dominance
and subordination of women in the institutional, economic and political
arenas as well as in every day life. On the basis of analysed data the study
found that this conceptual problem acknowledged by much feminist
thinking as well as non-feminist approaches regarding the acceptance of a
public/private dichotomy, whereby men inhabit a 'public,' more social
sphere, while women are confined to a 'private' sphere more close to
nature (Stamp, 1989:19), is a negation of the principle of empowerment as
espoused under the decentralisation programme in Uganda.
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In summary therefore, two key findings are noteworthy under this theme.
First, it has been established that while knowledge and understanding of
various stakeholder roles is substantial, it is concentrated among men, yet
for devolution to take root and blossom, women who constitute more than
50 percent of the population must be broughton board.
Secondly, there is less knowledge on devolution among the civic population
in Hoima District as compared to the local political leaders and managers.
Again, such a situation is unhealthy and detrimental to a decentralisation
process that seeks to empower local people by building their capacity to
enable them effectively take charge of their own affairs in the future.
Corrective action will need to be undertaken if devolution is to be effectively
implemented.
6.3 Effectiveness of Service Delivery
Data derived from the study portrayed a largely gloomy picture regarding
the general level of service delivery in Hoima District. This is exemplified by
findings from personal in-depth interviews where 62.8 percent of
respondents said they had no access to clean water, 70.6 percent had no
adequate health facilities, 62.8 percent had Bad access roads, while 72.4
percent of the respondents had no access to agricultural extension
services. For civic and opinion leaders, 64 percent said they had no access
to clean water, 69 percent said they did not attend government health units
due to the perennial absence of drugs in those units and instead preferred
private medical clinics, while 70 percent said they were rarely or never
visited by agricultural extension officials. The only area where a positive
trend was registered in terms of service delivery was education where
findings from in-depth interviews showed 61 percent of the respondents
happy with the Universal Primary Education Programme. In many cases
respondents cited lack of funds for allowances and fuel as the reason given
by local government officials for not delivering the required services. This
reason was uniformly given by almost all respondents.
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The argument of insufficient facilitation of civil servants greatly contributing
to inadequate levels of service delivery would appear to be strongly
vindicated by a key finding in the study to the effect that there has been a
steady but consistent substitution of graduated tax collection with central
Government transfers. The effect is the shortage of sufficient locally-
generated financial resources on which Hoima District could depend to
fund service delivery. Over dependency on Central Government transfers
has not been without ramifications, and most prominent are the
conditionalities attached to these funds that deprive districts of the
discretion to allocate them according to local prioritisation. With locally-
raised revenue in the district constituting only 4.2 percent of the total
budget, it is indeed quite difficult to see how the district can effectively
render services to the population in line with the mandate accorded by
decentralisation. Indeed the fear of Allen (1990:10-12), cited in Reddy
(1999:19), hold true for Hoima in particular, and Uganda in general.
Local authorities cannot command sufficient resources to provide adequate
services. Their revenues are too small and too precarious to make them
credit worthy and qualified personnel are attracted to more lucrative and
secure positions in central government, parastatal institutions and the
private sector.
It is therefore a key finding on this theme that the levels and quality of
service delivery are still deplorably low in Hoima, with the only exception
being the education sector. This means that the benefits of devolution are
yet to accrue to the local population here. While the problem is largely
attributed to lack of financial resources, there is also an institutional
dimension that underscores the need to bring alignment, coherence and
synergy to the existing implementation structures in ways that will minimise
waste and enhance value for money from the available limited resources.
232
6.4 The National Service Delivery Survey: Comparison with
Hoima Findings
Data derived from the National Service Delivery Survey reveals some
striking similarities with some key findings of the research conducted in
Hoima. In the discussion below, these similarities and other issues are
analysed following the thematic categorisation adopted in section- 5.3.
6.4.1- Crime, Justice and Good Governance
There wasn't much similarity between the National Service Delivery Survey
data on crime, justice and good governance and Hoima research findings
on the same theme. While the Local Council (LC) received a very
favourable rating among Ugandans, and the majority of NSDS respondents
stated that the Local Council Officials were more responsive today than five
years ago (89.6%), findings in Hoima showed Local Councils there as
generally non-responsive, lethargic and, at times, inundated with
incompetent officials who could not properly plan for their areas. Such
trends were discernable from the holding of Local Council meetings, where
63.6% of respondents in Hoima confirmed that LC meetings in their areas
were rare and only 36.4% reported regular Local Council meetings. The
fact that over 60% of respondents in Hoima were not satisfied with the way
their local revenue was spent also cast a shadow of doubt not only on the
integrity of LC officials, but also on their potential as agents of social
change and good governance. The high rating on good governance and
responsiveness of local councils registered by the National Service
Delivery Survey could be attributable to the indicators used. It is noted for
example that the number of "crimes reported in the last 12 months" was
used as a determinant of the level of crime and good governance, yet such
a quantitative and generally subjective criteria may not be a suitable
parameter to use when analysing a largely qualitative concept such as
good governance.
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6.4.2 Water and Sanitation
Data derived from the National Services Delivery Survey depicts an equally
gruesome picture and to a large extent confirms the findings accruing from
the Hoima case study. The data shows a very pathetic situation nationally
regarding availability of clean water for domestic consumption, in -spite of
evidence of gradual improvement over the- past five years. The difficulties
encountered in the search for water (which is even not clean) can be
discerned from the average time it takes Ugandans to collect water from
the nearest source. Judging from data provided by the national survey, it
can be noted that the mean distance to the water source increased from
1.16 kilometres during the wet season to 1.47 kilometres during the dry
season, while the time spent to collect water also increased from 42
minutes in the wet season to over one hour during the dry season. The
implication here is that most water sources (local wells, rivers and swamps)
are seasonal and their sustainability is highly influenced by the weather
pattern. The National Survey also shows nearly 30% of the population
sharing their main water source with animals. There is a similar finding on
this issue in respect of the survey done in Hoima, where 37.2% of the
respondents who said they had no access to clean drinking water revealed
their major source of water as local wells, rivers and swamps, the same
places used by herdsmen to water their animals. With 37.2% of
respondents in Hoima having no access to clean water against the national
average of 30%, one clearly sees an urgent need to tackle the water
problem both in Hoima and nationally. The need for action becomes even
more acute in view of data from the National Service Delivery Survey,
which at some point indicate that up to 46% of the Ugandan population did
not boil their water before drinking it, and although people periodically
received advice from government and NGO officials, it was mainly to do
with protection of water sources (56.5%) and construction of latrines (63%),
and hardly any on boiling of drinking water.
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6.4.3 Health Services Provision
As in the case of water and sanitation, there are striking similarities
between the National Services Delivery Survey data on provision of health
services and research findings in Hoima District reqardinq this area.
Nationally amongst all households which had a sick person for example,
41.8% failed to get the patient treated due to lack of money, while another
32.4% used self-medication. In other words, at a total of 74.2% of
Ugandans nationally were found by the Survey not to have access to
publicly-provided medication in the event of falling sick, which compares
evenly with findings derived from the Hoima district research where 70.6%
of the respondents said they had no adequate health facilities. The NSDS
findings that taking an under-dose is a common practice (53.5% of the
respondents said so) underscores another key dimension of the qualitative
aspect of service delivery and highlights the need for expansion of the
analytical framework for empowerment to include aspects such as
education and community mobilisation as vital ingredients of the
empowerment process. Data obtained both at micro-level (Hoima study)
and macro-level (NSDS) point to an even graver problem, namely that of
implementation.
Berman (1978:164), poses an interesting question of why authoritative
decisions (laws, policies, and plans) do...or, more likely, do not ... lead to
expected results. In his view, the reasons go beyond the aspirations of the
policy goal per-se because, to paraphrase a biblical admonition, a goal
("faith") without action ("works") is dead. Policy exists only as it is
implemented and, therefore, the "goodness" of most ideas cannot be tested
apart from their implementation. Thus, the two relationships, a policy's
technical validity and its implementational effectiveness, cannot be
divorced. Taken together, they constitute the domain of implementation
analysis. The health sector, more than any other sector, is afflicted by the
implementation problem because it seems to be the only sector
characterised by a diverse implementation framework with national and
regional referral hospitals under direct control of the Centre while district
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hospitals and local health care centres are under local government
jurisdiction, relatively independent of Central control. Whereas the diversity
in the implementation structure may in itself not be a serious problem, it
creates the need for clarity and conciseness in terms of tracing and locating
the paths of decision points all the way from the national-policy making
level down to the level of district, sub county and ultimately community
service managers. The duality of the situation means that local
governments are at some stage unable to take corrective measures to
ameliorate shortcomings within the implementation process, without
agreement from the Centre.
6.4.4 Education
The result of the National Service Delivery Survey on education concurs
with what was established by research done in Hoima. Analysis of available
data shows while the National Survey found out that UPE was highly
appreciated all over the country because it increased opportunities for
reducing illiteracy in Uganda (UPE was appreciated by 90.6% of
respondents), in Hoima 61% of the respondents said they were happy with
UPE, while 69% agreed that Primary Education was much better with UPE.
Interestingly, both the National Survey and the Hoima research found out
that Ugandans would still send their children to school in spite of the
knowledge that those children would not find employment afterwards. The
citing of poor health as a major factor affecting school attendance (63.7%)
highlights the central position occupied by health service provision within
the decentralisation process.
While the situation regarding UPE is generally seen to be impressive, there
is still room for improvement, especially in respect of the qualitative aspect
of service delivery in this sector, and one way to improve on the quality of
output from UPE classrooms is to address the issue of leadership in
schools, among others. Burki et. al. (1999:60) observe that strong leaders
have the capacity to effectively develop and communicate a school-wide
and a community-wide commitment to a common mission and vision for the
•
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school, and to manage the implementation of the Schools Improvement
Plan. The common-mission and vision fosters teamwork inside and outside
the school and, most importantly, the process of developing them makes
teachers and parents the owners of efforts to improve learning. They add
that leadership is especially important in a service industry like education,
wher-e the contribution of individual teachers is difficult to measure, and
thus difficult to directly reward. They argue that in the absence of strong
individual incentives, leaders must motivate teachers to improve and these
characteristics can be stimulated through decentralisation, as summarised
in Table 77.
Table 77
Characteristics of Effective Schools That Can Be Stimulated Through
Decentralisation
Characteristic of Decentralisation variables that can
effective schools contribute to specific characteristics of
effective schools
Leadership School directors are selected by the
community using transparent criteria. School
improvement plans are developed locally.
Resources are transferred to schools for the
implementation of school plans.
Skilled and committed Schools are given the authority to make
teachers curriculum and pedagogic changes. Teachers
have significant responsibility for developing
school improvement plans. Directors are given
. -------- the authority to provide a substantive
evaluation of teachers performance. Schools
are given the authority (and resources) to
make their own decisions about the type of
training to be given to teachers.
Focus on learning results The school improvement plan emphasises
goals of improving learning (and associated
results, such as reducing dropout and
repetition). Information on learning at the level
of the school is transparent.
Responsibility for results Directors have fixed-term appointments that
may not be renewed if improved learning goals
are not met.
Source: Burkietal. 1999: 61
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In essence, while decentralisation cannot, and will not convert school
directors who are used to passively following ministerial orders into
dynamic leaders overnight, it can and often does provide a transparent,
competitive selection process for school directors, with the overall effect of
improving the quality of leadership in schools.
6.4.5 Agricultural Extension Services
Like the education and health sectors, there are also similarities between
the national and Hoima trends in respect of-agricultural extension. Data
from the NSDS succinctly shows that agricultural extension coverage is
low, with only 29.1% of households visited by extension workers. In the
same vein only 27.2% of the respondents said the quality of services had
improved over the last 10 years, while only 29% thought extension staff
were dedicated to their work. Research in Hoima show that 72.4% of the
respondents never received agricultural extension officers to advise them
on farming practices.. Other key issues identified in the Hoima study that
also feature prominently in the National Service Delivery Survey include
post-harvest loss, with 82.6% of Ugandans saying it affects food availability
in households, 66.4% saying they grow crops subject to heavy post harvest
loss, and the majority saying they would like to see stores and granaries
built for minimising post-harvest losses.
Ironically, failure to minimise post-harvest losses by an effective agricultural
extension system indirectly triggers off a multiplier effect that grossly affects
the levels of household income and consequently the levels of revenue
collection.
The limited level of discrepancy between the national and Hoima trends,
particularly in the field of service delivery, is a clear reflection of the existing
dichotomy and confirmation of the extent to which the latter is a microcosm
of the general situation countrywide.
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6.5 Community Participation
Data derived from the study shows more than half (50.9 percent) of the
respondents acknowledging the-fact that members of their communities did
not willingly participate in development projects of their areas and on many
occasions had to be coerced. Only 49.1 percent said their community
members actively participated in local development programmes.
Respondents attributed this trend of affairs to lack of motivation. They
explained that local people were not willing to participate in activities that
had no monetary gain. Kellerman (1997:52) asserts that participation
fuelled and driven by monetary gain and where participants have no say
over project activities is not participation. He contends that community
participation is a complex and ongoing process through which people are
enabled to exercise varying degrees of influence over development
activities that affect their lives. Therefore, insisting on being paid before
engaging in any community activity or having to be coerced into
participation as revealed in the study is a negation of the principle and spirit
of community participation. This also explains the bad state of most
community roads in Hoima District, despite the fact that their maintenance
is a function devolved to local communities by the District Council under
part 4(20) of the Second Schedule of the Local Governments Act, 1997.
Accordinq to Wallis (1995:35), the objectives of community participation in
relation to development should be viewed as empowerment, beneficiary
capacity- building, and increasing project effectiveness. The general view is
that community participation can contribute to local development depending
on the measure of influence people exercise over development activities
affecting their lives. But this will only happen in situations where the people
themselves are willing participants in local development initiatives and are
not coerced into participating in activities not of their interest.
The study established that the level of community participation in the
context espoused by Kellerman (1997:52) is still lacking in Hoima District.
If devolution is to be effective, this problem will have to be rectified. In order
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to participate meaningfully community members need both to be fully
informed but also sufficiently mobilised for inclusive local decision-making.
6.6 Planning and Budgeting
Overall, data obtained from district-based respondents depicted an
unsatisfactory picture while the situation in the sub-counties is quite
pathetic. Further analysis of disaggregated data based on role-
differentiation revealed lack of planning and budgeting skills being more
severely descriptlve of politicians than of the civil servants. This scenario is
vindicated by the finding that out of the 27 senior district politicians
interviewed, 12 or 44 percent lacked sufficient knowledge in planning and
budgeting. This compared quite unfavourably with the civil servants all of
whom displayed adequate know-how in this area. While the lack of
planning and budgeting skills among politicians was blamed on experience,
it is postulated in this thesis that humble educational levels, given that there
is no educational standard required for anyone to seek elective office at
district or sub-county level, have a significant bearing on this scenario.
Politicians whose planning and budgeting knowledge was scanty attributed
this deficiency to lack of experience, arguing that civil servants were more
knowledgeable on the theme because they had worked long in the district
compared to them, most of whom had just been elected into office. Data on
the sub-counties situation was even more disillusioning. The level of
inadequate planning and budgeting skills far exceeds that at the district.
The situation is worsened by the condition of key planning committees
supposed to link up with the DTPC, these are either absent or inactive. As
a result, the ensuing gap caused by lack of an effective planning unit at the
sub-county to coordinate and amalgamate community needs and ensure
their incorporation into the district development plan renders the bottom-up
planning process both incomplete and disjointed. It has to be emphasised
that with decentralisation, the development planning function that used to
be carried out wholly by Central Government is now carried out at local
government level as well, and the Local Governments Act designates the
district council as the planning authority of a district. Indeed according to
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section 36 (3) of the LGA, it is a cardinal requirement for the district council
to prepare a comprehensive and integrated development plan incorporating
plans of lower level local governments for submission to the National
Planning Authority, and by extension, it is also mandatory for lower local
governments (sub-counties) to prepare plans incorporating plans of lower
councils (parishes and villages) within their areas of jurisdiction.
In principle, and as envisaged by the LGA, planning should start at village
level and move upwards, with village development plans being
incorporated into parish development plans, which are incorporated into
sub-county plans, which are themselves incorporated into the district
development plan. The practice is however different. It is a key finding of
this study that due to institutional weaknesses arising out of insufficient
planning skills and knowledge at the district and sub-county levels, real
bottom-up planning remains a mirage. This inadequacy constitutes a major
impediment to an effective development planning process, itself a key
cornerstone to meaningful devolution and empowerment.
Rondinelli (1981 :133) tells us that decentralisation is necessary because it
increases the scope of decisions, and thus incentives available to local
participants and builds institutions that encourage, structure, focus and
stabilise such participation. While it may be premature to dispute his
contention, data derived from this study indicates that the extent to which
the above will happen will depend on the level of knowledge and skills of
the stakeholders of decentralisation, who in this case are the local
politicians, the local government managers and the community. While
legislation itself is important in terms of provision of an enabling
environment, real empowerment will accrue from physical and direct efforts
aimed at building the capacity of local people to make informed decisions.
On the basis of the study findings in Hoima District, one can say that
decentralisation cannot and will not increase the scope of local decision
making unless local people, both the leaders and the led, are well equipped
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with knowledge and information on their various roles and obligations within
the framework of a decentralised environment.
6.7 Resource Mobilisation
Judging from data derived from-the study, there is consensus that local
revenue is too insufficient to cover all expenses of service delivery. The
problem of insufficient revenue is more acute in the sub-counties because
here, unlike at the district which is cushioned by inter-governmental grants,
there is total dependency on local taxation. Findings also revealed a high
degree of non-compliance with the LGA on matters of revenue-sharing,
which in some cases has led to a spate of discordant relationships between
the district and the deviant sub-counties. It is evident from the available
data that insufficient local revenue is a direct consequence of the low levels
of revenue collection. Figures obtained from Hoima District Local
Government Treasury for example put local revenue collections for FY
2001/2002 at 57 percent of the budgeted total, and while political
interference was largely cited as the key cause of poor local revenue
collection, the study found it closely related to the all-pervasive scenario of
low taxable incomes, which in turn was heavily determined by the local tax
base.
The tax base paradigm and its relevance to the financial viability of local
governments has been underscored by many a writer. Rondinelli et. al.
(1989:69) argue that if decentralisation is to have a real impact on enabling
local organisations to provide service and infrastructure more effectively,
then they must have stronger authority to raise revenues and to generate
large amounts of those revenues. In the case of Hoima however, the issue
at stake is not one of legal authority, as this exists under the LGA where it
is clearly stipulated that in rural areas revenue shall be collected by the
sub-county councils who shall retain 65% of the revenue collected and
pass on the balance to the district.
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While it is true that politicians in pursuance of their short-term interests
(votes during elections) have, to a large extent, influenced the trend of local
revenue collection, the real causative agent would appear to be the narrow
tax base that has impeded levying of taxes beyond certain levels. It is the
hardships encountered by tax payers in the process of compliance to their
tax obligations that compel the politicians to intervene on the latter's behalf
for short-term tactical advantages.
While poor assessment of graduated tax was ranked last by respondents
as a reason for poor revenue collection, two local revenue enhancement
studies, the first conducted in 1996 by Crown Agents, and the second in
2000 by the Local Government Finance Commission, all identified poor tax
assessment as a vital setback in local revenue mobilisation. The studies
also revealed that the revenue sources at the disposal of local
governments have a high potential of yielding more revenue than is
currently being realised, but they are generally under exploited. While this
dimension (viability of local revenue sources) was not addressed by the
study, it is acknowledged in this thesis that optimum exploitation of local
revenue sources is a subject that has come to dominate many local
governance fora in contemporary times. Further, the subject cannot be
discussed in isolation, especially of the peasant agriculture-oriented tax
base whose inelasticity means in principle that there is a limit beyond which
it cannot expand to generate additional revenue.
Data obtained from the District Treasury department also highlighted the
strong correlation between the increase in numbers and sizes of Central
Government transfers and the constantly dwindling local revenues. While
for example, in the year ending 30th June 1996 the District was able to
collect 77% of the budgeted local revenue against total Central transfer
receipts of Uganda shillings 1.789 billion, this percentage had by so" June
2002 drastically fallen to 57%, as central receipts reached a Uganda
shillings 7.940 billion mark. This finding is also confirmed in a Local
Government Development Programme (LGDP) review Report of 2002
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where it is suggested that the increase in numbers and volume of Central
Government transfers to local governments could also be contributing to
the poor performance of local revenues. It has to be noted that there is a
wide range of national priority policy areas in Uganda in which local
governments, in conjunction with the Central Government, have an
important role to play in terms of delivering public services. It has already
been noted that local governments are supposed to maintain schools,
public health centres, dlstrlct feeder roads etc. It is therefore argued in this
thesis that as long as the status quo remains, we shall continue to witness
further expansion of Central grants, especially those of a conditional nature
as a means of funding local services.
6.8 Visibility and Strength of the Civil Society
Tables 39, 40, 41 and 42 in chapter five depict the status of the Civil
Society in Hoima District. The data captured portray a depressing picture of
resignation, defeatism and melancholy. A case in point is the holding of
village council meetings. While 63.6 percent of respondents interviewed
were dissatisfied with the regularity of village council meetings, more than
half of them could not take action to ameliorate the problem, with some
(43.2%) fearing their chairmen, and others (9%) not knowing what to do.
This element of defeatism was not limited to village council meetings alone.
A similar situation was discerned regarding expenditure of 25% local
revenue. In this case 61.3 percent of the respondents were dissatisfied with
the way money was spent, but only 31.1 percent had rebuked their local
leadership over the misuse. The rest, 68.9, argued that the money involved
was too little to warrant any complaint. It should be noted that weakness of
the civil society in the form seen above is not confined to Hoima District.
The Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations-DENIVA
in its 2002 report identifies the high degree of malaise among the civic
populations in the Districts of Rakai, Ntungamo, Katakwi and Gulu, among
others, as one of the major contributory factors towards the failure of
decentralisation to promote popular participation through empowering the
people to take charge of affairs that affect their livelihood.
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Lack of information featured prominently as a reason for the invisibility and
weakness of the Civil Society. Respondents said they could not acton their
errant local leaders because they lacked information, and in cases where
they had, it was received belatedly.
The argument of this thesis is that participation is a vital sine qua non for
effective devolution, but without the necessary information local people will
find it increasingly difficult to get involved in the devolution process. The
problem seems to lie with the local leaders who tend to view local people
as undesirable elements only to be brought on board when it is
unavoidable. DENIVA (2002:14) concurs and argues that strengthening
participatory governance requires a change of attitude on the part of the
Centre and that of local governments to be able to acknowledge more
enthusiastically the role and contribution of citizens and the Civil Society in
the country's decision-making process. DENIVA (2002: 15) adds that this
change of attitude could manifest itself through conducting educational
programmes and dissemination of information to stakeholders.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the key findings on this theme are
that the Civil Society in Hoima, in particular, and in Uganda generally is
weak, and this weakness is predominantly caused by lack of information
and education among the civic population. While some civil society
organisations are visible in some districts, their participation in district
planning processes have largely remained symbolic with very minimal
involvement, if at all, in the development process (DENIVA, 2002:14).
Given this kind of weakness on part of the civil society, it is certainly not
possible for devolution to result in more accountable government.
6.9 Local Democracy and Democratic Methods of Work
Local democracy which Reddy (1999:13) terms as decentralised decision-
making and management is the level of democracy that is closest to the
people and allows the local populace to actively participate in affairs which
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affect them directly. Thematically it was seen to be a significant yardstick in
determining the extent to which local government was useful as a means of
enhancing local decision-making, thus empowering the local population. In
assessing the level of local democracy and democratic methods of work,
the parameter used by the study was the regularity of village council
general meetings. The argument of this thesis is that having regular village
council general meetings was the main way of involving local citizens in the
performance of local public duties, widening the basis of political
participation, and facilitating problem-oriented grass root approaches which
are appreciated by the citizens. Looking at the study however, the findings
show that village council general meetings are not regularly held. 61
percent of the respondents confirmed that village council general meetings
were irregularly held. Among this sub-group 48.4 percent said the meetings
took place once a year, 19.8 percent said the meetings took place twice a
year, while 7.1 percent said the meetings were never held at all. The
findings of USAID (1996:69), in a study on Democracy and Governance in
Uganda are similar to the above. They found out that after elections village
executive committees assume responsibilities of the village councils and
very rarely convene general meetings where all members would be
involved. In the same study USAID (1996:70), when members of the
electorate were asked whether they participate in the decision-making
process of their councils, 63 percent said they did not, while 37 percent
said they did, thus confirming the view that participation at village level
appears to end during elections.
There is at the moment no remedy in sight to cure this malady because
both the Local Governments (Resistance Councils) Statute of 1993 and its
successor, the Local Governments Act (1997) are silent about the
frequency of village and parish council meetings. The law only pronounces
itself on local government councils and says that these must meet at least
once every two months. The USAID study emphasises the inherent
contradiction embedded in the local democratisation process whereby the
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role of local government councils as channels for local democratic decision-
making is embellished in spite of their remoteness to the citizens.
Arising from the above, it is clear that decentralisation has not really
enhanced citizen participation in local decision-making at the basic levels of
the village and parish. This lack of citizen participation in decision-making
underscores the paradox of representative democracy and testifies to the
principle of Michels's iron law of oligarchy that states that democracy is the
dictatorship of the delegates over the delegators, and the delegates will
desire to stay in office unless removed by extraordinary means.
6.10 Presence of Non-Governmental Organisations
Data derived from the study shows a nominal presence of non-
governmental organisations, with only 28.3 percent of village executive
committees and 36.4 percent of Sub-County Chiefs acknowledging the
presence of NGOs in their areas of operation. Even where they were
available and vibrant, the study could only identify activities of one major
NGO, World Vision, whose activities are prominent in the education sector.
The implication of this finding is that Hoima District is overwhelmingly
dependent on the State (Central and local government) for the provision of
essential services, besides lacking the vital input of NGOs in the public
policy and programme design through their interface with people in local
communities. The situation is worsened by the fact that Central and local
government agencies despise and ridicule local NGOs and respect and
would prefer to deal with international NGOs (DENIVA, 2001:15). However,
Kagonyera (2001:14) warns against the above trend and advises that,
Within the framework ofthe Decentralisation Act, involving the Civil Society
can strengthen the planning process at the local government level. The
NGOs operating at the community or grass roots level are well placed to
appreciate the needs and problems of the communities. Therefore, local
governments need to exploit this opportunity offered by the experience and
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close contact between the civil society and the local community in
developing district plans so as to ensure improved social services provision
and delivery.
With limited activities of NGOs in districts, as is the case in Hoima, it is not
possible to harness this vital advantage. What emerges from the above
analysis is that the absence of effective NGOs on the ground coupled with
a weak Civil Society has only served to reinforce the top-down approach in
the development process, and in so doing negated the principle of
empowerment which entails, among other issues, that development should
be undertaken with the direct aim of increasinq the power and control of
groups of intended beneficiaries over-the circumstances of their own lives.
6.11 Knowledge of Existing Devolution Obstacles
Data derived from the study revealed that devolution stakeholders in Hoima
District are yet to internalise vital decentralisation obstacles as an initial
step towards addressing the challenges facing the District within the broad
framework of better service delivery, empowerment and sustainable local
governance. Three parameters, namely local democracy, resource
mobilisation, and community participation are used to analyse this theme.
Judging from available data it has already been noted (Table 44) that 52.2
percent of the respondents did nothing when village council general
meetings failed to be convened by the respective chairmen. It is already
argued that failure to convene village council meetings constitutes a major
infringement on local people's right to participate in taking decisions that
affect their lives, and is therefore seen in this study as a major obstacle to
the devolution process. It is the argument of this thesis that the omission
occasioned by the respondents' inaction when village council meetings
failed to be convened is itself testimony of the extent to which the
population is unaware of the key obstacles militating against their own
empowerment and the need to remove them.
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Resource mobilisation is another area where people's unawareness of
existing devolution obstacles can be discerned. Data from Tables 44 and
45 shows that after 199 respondents (61.3%) said that the community was
not satisfied with the expenditure of 25% local revenue remitted to villages,
only 62 of them (31.1 %) said they rebuked their local chairmen over the
issue. There was no action from the remaining 137 respondents (68.9%),
evidence that they possibly did not see misuse of their local resources as a
hindrance to development of their area. Findings further show that
unawareness of devolution obstacles is not confined to the iocal people in
the communities only. When 54 district-based respondents were asked if it
was in order for Hoima District to over depend on the Centre for its funding,
only 13 percent of the respondents could see it as a problem.
Findings on community participation revealed a similar trend. It is noted
from Table 35 that more than half of the respondents said community
members did not willingly participate in local development programmes in
their areas and had to be coerced.
A devolution process that is not underpinned by a strong wave of
community participation can be equated to a vehicle that attempts to run
without fuel. Reddy (1999:14) is even more emphatic when he says that it
is only when maximum participation is ensured that self-help can become a
. reality. Viewed in this light, it can be argued that the devolution process in
Hoima, in particular, and in Uganda in general, may be doomed to failure
as long as vital obstacles are not identified in time and addressed
accordingly. On the basis of what has already been observed, it would be
sheer romanticisation of the achievements of decentralisation to assert that
the cardinal objectives of the policy have been attained. The
decentralisation process in Hoima and indeed Uganda is still characterised
by a high top-down orientation which has led local people to increasingly
retreat from the task of local development, and this has by extension
resulted in gradual dissolution of the Civil Society. This argument is backed
by data in this study which shows local people constantly insisting on being
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paid for their labour whenever they are called upon to participate in
community activities.
6.12 Summary
In this chapter, the results of the study have been discussed on the basis of
the thematic categorisation adopted in chapter five. In the course of the
discussion key findings of the study have been analysed against the
background of the research questions set out. The causes of some findings
have been discussed in an effort to broaden the scope of analysis and
contextualise the themes under discussion. In the course of discussing the
study findings, a number of views and observations have been generated,
and these will form the basis for the conclusions and recommendations
that constitute the next chapter.
The chapter has also incorporated an analysis of findings arising out of the
National Service Delivery Survey and compared them with findings on the
Hoima research to establish the relationship between the two. Some
similarities are noticeable, particularly in the area of service delivery, and
this goes a long way to prove that problems in local government
management and development are not confined to just a few areas but
span the breadth and width of the entire country.
6.13 Projections for the next chapter
Chapter seven will be the last chapter. Besides containing the conclusion
of the study, it will be comprised of recommendations categorized into two
to feature those based on thematic findings and those that focus on areas
of further research. The chapter will also emphasize the role of institutional
support and performance monitoring in the strengthening of local
government and highlight the significance of strengthening financial
resource bases of local authorities, staff training and public accountability
institutions in improving the out come of devolution. There will be emphasis
on the need to nurture a symbiotic situation regarding inter-governmental
relations entailing managing the dynamics of power-sharing in a way that






This chapter forms the conclusion of the study. It is basically made up of
recommendations that are divided into two to separately feature
recommendations based on thematic findings and those geared towards
further research. It ends with an overview on the need to strengthen the
local government system through institutional support and constant
monitoring of performance.
7.2 Recommendations Based on Findings
In conformity with the nomenclature established in chapter one and
maintained in chapters five and six, recommendations based on findings
are presented based on seven thematic areas, and these are:-
• Stakeholders' responsibilities under devolution
• Service delivery
• Community participation
• Planning and budgeting
• Resource mobilisation
• The Civil Society, and
• Local democracy
7.2.1 Stakeholder Responsibilities Under Devolution
Despite the twelve years of devolution in Uganda, it is apparent from the
study that there is still very little understanding of the basic tenets, let alone
the responsibilities of those whom devolution is meant to benefit, especially
the women. This kind of situation has ensured that the devolution process
remains supply-oriented and therefore top-down. Yet for devolution to
succeed in empowering the grass-root population, it should be demand-
driven and manifest itself in a manner that allows the people to own the
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process. There is therefore a strong need to reverse the situation in Hoima
through an intensive sensitisation programme so that people and all
stakeholders are made aware of their various roles under a decentralised
arrangement. Such sensitisation needs to focus a lot on the existing socio-
cultural factors, such as the public/private dichotomy, that-have impended
women's understanding of their enormous role in decentralised local
governance.
While the existing legislation is sufficient enough to secure people's
compliance, the decentralisation process can only move forward if key
stakeholders are made aware and know what they are supposed to do
when, why and how. Until that is done one cannot meaningfully talk of a
bottom-up development approach.
This thesis argues that the first level, which urgently needs re-orientation in
order to move the process of devolution forward, is the national one. While
the immediate challenge for national development as a whole is to translate
any success in the macro-economic arena into greater success in
improvement of people's lives, value for money in expenditures, quality of
budget execution, effectiveness in public service delivery still remain a
serious concern. Observed from an analytical perspective, the major
problem is that both information management and decision-making are
focused on the administrative process of expenditures and activities rather
than on the developmental outcomes, impacts and goals that are being
pursued. The World Bank (2001 :22) notes that in Uganda, recurrent and
development expenditures to date continue to be reviewed separately,
rather than for their combined impact in achieving overall developmental
goals; monitoring and evaluation remain overly centred on compliance with
the Central Government requirements and regulations rather than end
results of policy, programme and project efforts, while civil servants get
rewarded for doing paper work well rather than for making a difference in
people's lives.
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The current modus operandi regarding Central transfers, under which
strong Central control is exercised over conditional grants to districts,
undermines the ability of decentralised service providers -to tailor their
actions to the nature of local demands.
From the political and socio-economic perspective therefore, deepening of
devolution will entail redressing most of the above-mentioned setbacks in a
way that will help re-align the distributive and allocative priorities of the
Centre with the broad objectives of decentralisation.
7.2.2 Service Delivery
In principle, delivery of public services is supported by a number of systems
whose effective functioning requires adoption of best practices in their
administration. This however is contingent upon presence of factors
ranging from transparency and accountability, targeted planning and
implementation of services, and the general availability of financial and
human resources among other things. Service delivery therefore is more
than just the use of established service delivery units but extends also to
the systems associated with the services. This is a pre-requisite for more
efficient, effective and sustainable delivery of public services. As a bottom
line therefore, service delivery should not occur merely for service
delivery's sake, there should be an ultimate objective of improvement of the
socio-economic conditions of recipient communities.
Judging from the Hoima case study it is notable that the problem of a low
level of service delivery is closely linked, not only to inadequate local
revenue collection, but also to shortcomings related to some of the above
mentioned factors. The situation is worsened by the ever-increasing
number of Central Government grants to fund central priorities without
providing for administrative costs of local government implementers in the
hope that local revenue would take care of them. There are two ways
through which service delivery will improve both in Hoima and other local
governments. The first is by Central Government availing 100 percent of
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the funds required to implement national priority programmes which
include, water provision, primary health care, rural feeder roads, universal
primary education and agricultural extension. The failure by the Centre to
fulfil the above means that Hoima and other local governments have to
seriously consider reintroducing cost-sharing in services such as provision
of primary health care, water and rural feeder-roads maintenance as one
way of strengthening its resource base. Until the 1996 presidential
elections, cost- sharing existed within the country's health care system and
this had not only ensured better service provision through steady supply of
drugs in the units, but also kept the morale of health workers high through
prompt payment of their top-up allowances. However, health being an area
of national interest, any attempts to reintroduce cost-sharing will have to be
preceded by negotiation and/or clearance from the centre.
Water provision is another area where cost-sharing would help a lot in
strengthening the local resource base. During the study it was noted that
while billions of shillings had been spent on construction of bore holes in
Helma District in the period 1998/2001, most of them had by the time of
conducting this research fallen into disrepair due to poor maintenance. In
Ecuador for example, communities maintain water systems through local
water boards that collect fees from each househoid and installation charges
for those who join the system after initial construction. In this way
communal participation has managed to reduce construction costs alone by
nearly 18 percent (Rondinelli, 1991 :442). The starting point in Hoima could
be through opening of water source bank accounts where money
equivalent to at least 2% of the capital cost of a particular water source
would be deposited before construction to cater for its maintenance. In
vehemently supporting the case for cost-sharing as one way of improving
the quality of decentralised services, this thesis fully concurs with Bird's
arguments as summarised by Hartley in Reddy (1999:85) that:
.. .attempts to meet the needs of the poor for minimal essential services by
giving them away without charge is almost always a failure. For example,
,
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suppose the water-is provided free of charge through connections. When
the water is free there is no incentive to use it sparingly although it is
scarce. That is to say, supplying free water involves the heavy cost of
building more dams to increase the available supply. With free water the
investment in dams is excessive and alternative investments, such as
roads, may be inadequate. That isoto say, had the water been sold at a
cost, less water would have been used, fewer dams would have been built,
and the savings achieved with respect to water supply when applied to
more road improvements would be valued more highly by the citizens than
the water foregone.
While availing 1-00 percent funds required to implement national priority
programmes will help strengthen the administrative and operational
capacity of local governments and enable them deal with the key
responsibilities and functions assigned to them, ambiguities that still remain
in the design as well as allocation of tasks, especially between local
governments and administrative units, will need to be resolved. The
research found out, for example, that many functions and services
entrusted to sub-county local governments to execute would be better
handled by the parishes and in some cases, the village councils. A case in
point is local revenue collection. While this is a function categorically
assigned to sub counties, in reality sub county officials are too detached
from the ordinary people to effectively perform this function, and
consequently their officials remain out of touch with the situation in the
countryside. This has left the parish chiefs and other- parish-based officials
as the only meaningful linkage between the sub-county and the
communities. The second way of improving service delivery is directly
related to the broadening and enhancement of community-based adult
education and literacy programmes and introduction of competitive politics.
Both of these in practice have a vital synergistic effect. Education
contributes directly to the effectiveness of the devolved service delivery
process by bringing on board actors (both deliverers and recipients of
services) who are eloquent in terms of utilising and sustaining a multi-
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sectoral service delivery system. Sri Lanka provides a good example of a
country where a comprehensive user-friendly education system has largely
been responsible for the emergence and sustainability of the most effective
health care delivery system in the whole of South East Asia (Bjorkman,
1993:10-13).
This system has become so accessible and acceptable that today three-
quarters of all births now occur in health institutions of one kind or another
under the supervision of trained midwives (recently renamed Family Health
Workers) (de Silva, 1982:131). It is also estimated that a State-supported
health care facility of one type or another is located at an average
maximum distance of three miles from any habitation, a sharp contrast with
the situation in Uganda, where the average distance is ten miles. Indeed,
by including all practitioners of traditionaJ medicine, Wolffers (1987:53)
argues that "within a radius of 0.8 miles some form of health-care service
is available to every one" in Sri Lanka. The lessons that derive from the Sri
Lankan experience are simple and succinct: the high rate of literacy, the
intensely competitive political system, and the resulting politicisation all
provide palatable opportunities to articulate popular demands and enhance
political participation. Political awareness and mass mobilisation are all vital
prerequisites to achieving more distributive equity in the delivery of
services, both in Hoima, and the rest of the country. In essence the current
no-party arrangement in Uganda which has left political parties in abeyance
for the last 17 years is viewed by many as the antithesis of the vital need
for competitive politics.
In concluding this point, it should be noted that all these arguments
presume a world in which democracy works well, and in which Central-local
relations are characterized by an equitable dispersal of resources and
responsibilities. If there is the risk that local elites will curtail or even
capture local decision-making, then there is a high probability that services
and other aspects of social welfare may not improve, and this risk will be
higher in societies with little experience in participative democracy at local
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level. Noteworthy also is the fact that behind the promises made by
competing political parties, lie diverse ideological orientations with their
various value-commitments and causal logics as well as their preferred
agents and modes of action. Nevertheless, the vigour of public
participation within a competitive democratic environment will ensure that
the overalJ pattern of an effective service delivery system is maintained
through application of the usual array of checks and balances.
Thirdly, Burki et. al. (1999:5) see a possibility of devolution improving the
quality of services but only if various responsibilities for performance are
clearly established (accountability), while sufficient authority is allocated to
deliver results. They cite the Latin American experience, where for
example, in the case of roads, some success has been achieved in Peru,
Bolivia, Venezuela and Colombia, by allocating responsibility for the
different parts of the road network to the level of government that best
represents the roads users. Thus rural roads are assigned to rural local
governments, urban streets to urban local governments, secondary
highways to provincial governments and major intercity highways to the
national government. Their view on roads is also extended to the education
and health sectors where they argue that devolution in these sectors can
improve performance but only if it extends to the level of individual schools
and health units. Where for example the school director is made
accountable to the parents (through a school board) and has the authority
to make key management decisions (including who gets hired and how the
curriculum is adapted to meet the particular needs of the student body)
improvements can be expected. By the same token, in the health sector,
the benefits of decentralisation do not appear until responsibility and
authority are extended beyond the level of local government. In their view
one of the most effective forms of health care decentralisation is to shift
power to the patient by changing the focus of government funding from
inputs (salaries and allowances of health workers in government hospitals
and health units) to outputs (reimbursements to providers, whether public
or private), thus allowing patients to choose where they will go for
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treatment. It has to be emphasised that whereas some of the measures
advocated by Burki et. al. are viable and could generate positive results for
service delivery in local governments in Uganda, it would be dangerous to
apply them across-the-board, as some of the issues raised would appear to
be irrelevant to the Ugandan situation. Indeed, looking at the Second
Schedule of the Local Governments Act (1997), where the functions of the
Centre and various local governments are clearly stipulated, one sees that
inadequacies in service delivery are not due to lack of authority to deliver
results, but rather are a result of a mixed web of deficiencies, primary
among which is the lack of resources to carry out decentralised functions.
In many respects therefore, the way forward is the continuation of the
current structure of devolved governance that consists of a complex set of
principal-agent relationships, in which local governments act both as
agents of the Centre and as principals (or more precisely as agents of their
constituents) in the delivery of local services. With key services such as
education, health, roads and agricultural extension legally unbundled in a
way that has allowed the Centre and local governments to divide aspects of
service delivery according to capacity and comparative advantage, the
Centre should continue to find itself playing a key financial and regulatory
role - providing financing to maintain at least a minimal level of social
services in all Jurisdictions, but leaving detailed management decisions to
local governments. Fortunately, between the centre and local governments
the role of each tier is fixed, the division of roles among various tiers of
government is clear and local governments have sufficient authority to
perform the roles assigned to them.
Finally, there is urgent need to shift emphasis from the quantitative aspects
and focus on quality issues across the broad spectrum of service delivery.
In order to achieve this, it is recommended in this thesis that there be
regular studies on how local government political and administrative
structures can better support the quality of service delivery especially in the
major sectors of water, health, education and agricultural extension.
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In the same vein the stakeholder relationships between users and service
providers as well as between managers and service providers need to be
critically examined and revaluated with an aim of determining the causes of
failure to significantly and effectively impact on service delivery.
A number of issues with regard to the manner in which devolution has
impacted on service delivery need increased clarity. While a lot has been
documented as having happened during the implementation of devolution
in Uganda, there is need to determine issues around the reform process
and delivery of services with the purpose of informing future
implementation. For instance, does the existence of sector-wide
development approaches contribute to more and better service delivery? In
what manner - managerial, monitoring or support supervision skills - can
the stakeholder groups responsible for ensuring more efficient and effective
service delivery, be assisted for that to happen? One way forward could be
by commissioning more studies and research to critically examine and
analyse most of the issues highlighted above in order to come up with the
most appropriate conclusion. Alternatively, the focus could be put on
particular aspects of devolution that need to be reviewed so as to establish
its linkage with improved service delivery. The latter would appear to be a
better option because it shifts the argument from securing proof that
devolution has indeed led to improved service delivery, to putting in place
mechanisms that will lead to strengthening the linkage.
7.2.3 Community Participation
It is evident from the case study that the biggest setback to devolution in
respect of community participation is the lingering notion that only experts
from the Centre and the District can make decisions on development
matters, and that these experts can be identified by their formal educational
qualifications. While a convenient legal framework for promotion of
community participation exists, the above mindset has, to a big extent,
jeopardized efforts to foster empowerment of local people as a way of
enlisting their participation in local development programmes. As a result
people see themselves as detached from the devolution process with
259
voluntary participation at times replaced with coercive villageisation
(Sarnoff, 1979:37). Since the problem is not less decentralisation, the
remedy lies in mobilization. Popuiar participation in local development
initiatives is important, as it is a means of obtaining information about local
conditions, needs and attitudes. Massive mobilization of the population is
therefore needed so that local stakeholders are made aware of their
enormous role in decentralised governance. Nevertheless, it has to be
reiterated that the first step in achieving genuine participation is a process
in which the rural people themselves become more aware of their own
situation, of the socio-economic reality around them, of their real problem
and the causes of these problems, and what measures they themselves
can take to begin changing their situation. This process of raising of levels
of consciousness, or conscientisation, constitutes a process of self-
transformation through which people grow and mature as human beings
(Burkey, 1993:57). Consequently the poor levels of community
participation observed in Hoima should not lead to despair, but rather,
stimulate higher levels of synergy among local and national managers with
the aim of intensifying community development programmes aimed at
mobilizing the rural population to collaborate with government development
plans.
In maintaining this argument, this thesis disagrees with Rahman (1984:65-
67), who argues that participation is a process whose course cannot be
determined from outside since it is generated by the continuing praxis of
the people by a rhythm of collective action and reflection. He believes that
this is what makes the process the people's own as opposed to the people
being mobilised, led or directed, by outside forces.
In the debates on the meaning of people's participation, there has been
much discussion as to whether participation is a means used to achieve
development - or an end in itself such that, by establishing a process of
genuine participation, development will occur as a direct result. The
proponents of the second view, which this thesis does not support, believe
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that development for the benefit of rural people cannot occur unless the
people themselves control the process through the praxis of participation.
Oakley-and Marsden (1984:37) point out that until recently the notion of
participation as a means to achieving development has dominated
development practice. According to them, the two main vehicles for
implementing this notion of participation include community development
programmes which are aimed at preparing the rural population to
collaborate with government development plans; and the establishment of
formal organisations (cooperatives, farmers' associations etc.) which are
able to provide the structure through which the rural people can have some
contact with, and voice in, development programmes.
On the basis of extensive studies of participatory organisations, Oakley
and Marsden (1984:41) have formulated a set of principles, which can be
useful in enhancing community activities so that these are consciously
related to the strengthening of the process of participation. These are:
Involvement; The community as a whole must be involved in the basic
aspects of project or programme formulation, decision-rnakinq and
implementation, and the whole operational base of the programme or
project must be organised with this principle in mind; data obtained in
Hoima showed that district technocrats and managers were the major
players regarding the planning function and this had significant negative
ramifications for the level and quality of community participation as a whole.
Minimise dependence; every effort must be made to minimise the
dependence of the activity, either in material or human terms, on
assistance from outside, in a bid to enhance autonomy of the communities
in various aspects, yet in a relationship which is still fundamentally top-
down, data in Hoima showed that both the community and sub-county were
still heavily dependent on the District for material and human resources.
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Sustainability, the activity must be able to be sustained in the context of
locally-available resources. It must represent an initiative, which can be
taken up, by the community itself and further developed. In other words, it
must not be beyond the capabilities of the community; a good example
here is the maintenance of boreholes. The- study established that while it
cost an average of Uganda shillings 15 Million (U$ 7,500) to construct a-
single borehole, in many cases, it was proving extremely impossible for the
community to raise shillings 300,000/= (U$ 150) for maintenance. As a
result, many boreholes fell into a state of disrepair soon after instaHation, to
the disappointment and disillusionment of local and Central planners.
Next step; similarly, the activity must represent technologically, the next
step forward for the community, and not be a technological advance which
is beyondthe natural development of the community.
Effective as opposed to efficient; it may be necessary in the short-term to
forego the slavish adherence to the economic principle of efficiency, and
undertake economic activities which are an effective use of resources and
can bring about some economic advance, although this may not represent
the most efficient use of those resources.
While recognising that the above principles cannot be used as a universally
applicable model, it is an argument of this thesis that local development
activities in Hoima and Uganda, if they are to develop the community's
ability to participate as a collective unit over time, cannot be undertaken in
a purely mechanical way. Communities should not only consider questions
of practicability and viability, but should also reflect upon how
developmental activities undertaken can best be served to strengthen self-
reliance and participation as a spring board towards better and more
effective service delivery.
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7.2.3.1 The Role of Government Officials
The uneasy and sometimes cold relationship between government officials
and local people are encapsulated- in the following words of an Indian tribal
peasant quoted by Bhasin (1997:80):
"Government officials are like dogs. They go after those who throw pieces
ofbread at them. They bark at and bite those who cannot feed them"
Such opinions are not always apparent to Central and local government
officials who, together with parish and community leaders, are given warm
and friendly receptions during their brief and ceremonial visits to villages.
These reception committees are usually headed by the village elites who
have learned to profit from their good relations with government officials.
Local people, however, have usually adopted one of two strategies for
dealing with such visits. They either melt into the background, try to remain
invisible, passive and unseen, or they assume a role of submissive
ingratiation in an attempt to curry favour and advantages. They seldom
express their true feelings for fear of possible negative consequences.
Jesta Akello Okori cited in Burkey (1993:162) a change agent working
with Can Deg Ming Men's group in the West Ni1e region of North Western
Uganda agrees, and summarises her experience with local communities in
West Nile in the following way:
'Village people often have a bad opinion of government servants. Some of
the peasants whom I met said that the officers came as masters to push
and order them around. They seldom had the time to sit down to talk to
them, to live with them. They came in their awe-inspiring attires and were
always afraid of dirtying them in the dirt and dust of village problems. All
they were interested in was good reports from their bosses and not good
relations with the poorer people. Each visit of an official could mean a loss
of at least two chickens, which had to be cooked to entertain the officials
and earn the village people a good name"
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It is true to state that government development programmes and projects
are supervised, and in many cases executed by government officers
working at sub-county, county or divisional, district and ministerial levels
and as MacDonald (1981 :19) has indicated, these are part of a system
which is hierarchical and downward flowing as a communication process
while, on the other hand, peoples' participation implies decision-making at
the grassroots level and horizontal and upward flowing communication.
It is therefore incumbent upon central and local government officials to
reverse the above trend and work for better and improved relations with
local people. The local democratisation process cannot proceed well if
people are in basic conflict with their government, and have basically
negative attitude towards its representatives. Ultimately, mutual trust and
respect must replace fear and suspicion. In that way, the development
process will be driven by positive impulses, as there is no people's
organisations is going to achieve local government development on its
own. A partnership of the people with their government must be forged.
Peter Quennwell quoted in Cohen (1980:33), an evaluation officer with
UNDP has expressed this clearly in the following words:
II local community development programmes proceeding, regardless of the
wider context, are something of a myth. No serious development
practitioner would today dispute that the bottom-up approach is the only
one that remains viable. All recent evidence points in this direction. But
also, it is true that such developments cannot simply, on their own account
provide the roads, the transport communications, or the water and fuel
essential to their own success or for that matter, the credit, agricultural
inputs, marketing, or the basic education and health services. These can
for the most part only be made available through government programmes.
Grassroot developments may point to the needs but they cannot hope to
meet thema/l on their own".
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It has been argued in this thesis therefore, that what is needed in order to
invigorate the community participation process is a genuine partnership
between the people, working for their own development in their local set-
up, and a government structure which is truly responsive to the needs and
priorities of its people as expressed through their own local institutions.
7.2.3.2 Fostering State-Community Synergies to Promote Local
Development
The State being central and all-encompassing can facilitate interaction
between local governments and the communities to engender
development. According to Das Gupta etal (2000:35), there are two main
aspects to this role: reducing obstacles to collective action in communities
and encouraging greater collaboration between communities and local
governments. In order to forge ties within communities and facilitate local
collective action, the State can initiate programmes that build up the assets
of local people and make public services more accessible. These should be
programmes that reduce the perception among local people that their
survival depends on reduced or limited interactions with their patrons, thus
releasing their energies to pursue action for upward mobility and to
collaborate with others on a more equal footing.
The combination of a more egalitarian social organisation at the community
level and better local government enables the creation of a powerful
coalition for rapid development. While the study found such a scenario
generally absent in Hoima, it is a well established view that strong links
between local governments and communities improve service delivery and
reduce the potential for local capture of development programmes.
According to Tendler (1997:57), Whang (1981 :25-30) and Fel et. al.
(1979:88) this arrangement has been used successfully in very different
and diverse political and administrative settings: Brazil in the 1980s, the
Republic of Korea in the 1960s and 70s, and Taiwan, China, in the 1950s.
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Das Gupta (2000:41) suggests several key actions-that the State (Central
Government) can undertake to foster development synergies between
communities and local government as illustrated in Figure 19. These
include:-
• Generating community demand for better public administration and
service delivery through intensive dissemination of information;
• Forming dense networks between the State and communities and
making available to communities the information and technical
support they need to implement programmes;
• Change local agencies' mode of operation by putting pressure on
them from above and below. In Brazil for example, the State used
official job recognition to motivate staff;
• Motivating grassroots workers and leaders through positive and
negative sanctions including respect from peers. Where the
workers are also community members, as in the Republic of Korea,
the potential sanctions are especially strong; and
• Adjusting the roles of higher levels of government ,training and
motivating their staff to focus on managing overall strategy, and
providing technical support regulations, and facilitation.
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Figure 19
State-Community Coalitions Can Foster Rapid Development and
Better Service Delivery
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Source: Das Gupta, et al. 2000 : 42
Pressure for quality services and
peer monitoring
While this thesis agrees with Das Grupta et. al. (2000 :41) that changes
are incremental and take time, it also notes that, as success stories
accumulate in a given setting, they create a demonstration effect forothers.
The examples highlighted above suggest that is possible, in a space of
decades to reengineer State institutions to quicken the pace of
development. They also show that with creative political thinking these
changes are possible even in relatively weak institutional setting like those
observed in Hoima District Local Government.
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7.2.4 Planning and Budgeting
The biggest setback to the planning process in Hoima District has more to
do with the nature of the development planning process itself that
essentially continues to be top-down, despite the declared objective of
bottom-up planning. Most of the business including the allocation of
resources is determined at the district with little involvement of sub-
counties, parishes and villages. It has to be emphasised that planning
requires as a first condition, not a staff of economists trained in
development economics, nor an input/output table, but the will to make all
development decisions consistent with ultimate goals. The existing situation
in Hoima will improve by building the capacity of sub-county technical
planning committees through availing them with planning skills they so
badly need at the moment. As far as possible, the obscurity and confusion
currently endemic in the district/sub-county planning relationships should
be replaced by as open and transparent a system as possible. In many
ways, a key characteristic of underdevelopment is lack of information; in no
area is this more true than with respect to decentralised planning. In order
for the district and sub-counties to operate effectively and efficiently,
planners at both levels should know from day-to-day the extent of
resources they have at hand, what they can expect to get the following
month, exactly how their use of these resources will be assessed, and so
on. In this kind of situation that Caiden & Wildavsky (1980:72) call
'repetitive budgeting' it will be possible for local planning officials to ensure
implementation of the set goals. Kumar & Moodley (2003:76-78) highlight
three modes of budgeting that characterise local authorities budget
processes:
• Incremental budgeting, which uses the previous year's expenditure
as a yardstick to determine the expected expenditure for the
following year. The estimated sum on an item in the budget is
merely adjusted by a percentage to allow for anticipated increases.
The budget for the next financial year is based on the actual income
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and expenditure of the previous year and is adjusted for expected
price increases.
• Programme budgeting, where the activities performed by
departments are classified as programmes that describe a
department's anticipated achievements. Budgets are then prepared
for each programme rather than each department. Programme
budgeting differs from incremental budgeting because, contrary to
the latter, its emphasis is not only on inputs but also outputs.
• Zero-based budgeting, which virtually ignores past council
performances on expenditure and involves a critical assessment of
only those expenses which are necessary to operate the council
efficiently. This method of budgeting requires a lot of time, thought
and research.
Many district local governments in Uganda, including Hoima, have been
using and continue to use the incremental system of budgeting. As a result
their budgets tend to be either bloated or with inbuilt deficits, despite being
balanced. Consequently most activities remain unimplemented by the
financial year's end and are either frozen or deferred to the following year.
Given the precarious nature of sources of local revenue in all of Uganda's
local governments, it is extremely unwise for districts to continue to apply
incremental budgeting in their budgeting processes. It has therefore been
recommended in this thesis that local governments should instead apply
the programme budgeting approach when carrying out their bUdgeting,
particularly in view of its emphasis on tying inputs to outputs.
Eventually the application of this output-oriented budgetrng will lead to
reduced wastage, massive drop in operative costs and turn district budgets
into true instruments of local development.
Finally, it is essential as well to build the capacities of both the village and
parish development committees by training and sensitisation, to make them
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aware of the need to ensure that the plans they initiate are consistent with
the needs, problems and priorities of the people they lead. In all this, the
bottom line is to ensure that decentralisation does not stop at the district
but percolates through to the lowest level of organisation, namely the
village.
7.2.5 Resource Mobilisation
This thesis proposes that in light of the current inelasticity of local
government tax bases in all district local governments, including Hoima, the
way forward is through reform of the existing tax structure. and
administration by introduction of what the Local Government Finance
Commission refers to as the best practices. Best practices refer to those
methods and ways of mobilising and generating local revenues that
effectively use the scarce resources (manpower and money) available in a
council to enhance tax administration and promote awareness in a manner
that reduces the cost of compliance and maximises the revenues collected.
7.2.5.1 Strategy for Improving Local Taxation Administration and Revenue
Generation By District Local Governments.
Precise estimation of the revenue base by district, which also would have
been needed for estimation of district revenue potential, is possibie in
principle, but currently unfeasible in practice due to some crucial
information gaps and a notable absence of coordination, interpretation and
utilisation of existing informational sources, both within Central Government
and between Central Government and local governments.
As Zake (1994:103) correctly notes, production of usable revenue base
potential information by district requires an attention to existing statistical
data and other information about the structuring of local economies,
particularly in relation to the distribution of agricultural land that remains
scattered between different ministries and between published and
unpublished reports. Crucially, this essential tax base potential information
is consistently unavailable in, and therefore largely inaccessible to, the
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districts themselves. It is imperative that this situation be redressed
immediately. The district specific tax base and taxation potentiality data
should in tum be utilised to underpin a progression supported and directed
by the Central Government toward a significantly reformulated local
taxation system. This should be based on the Central Government
established taxation policy and on the principle of administrative simplicity
in management and operation, and of equitability and fairness in incidence.
While this thesis has highlighted considerable inter-district variation in
respect of the potential to increase locally raised revenue in the short term
(as some districts may already have reached_the practical limits of their
taxable capacity), it has still been argued that, overall, there is considerable
scope for increasing locally-raised revenues, particularly over the medium
to long term. This thesis concurs with Zake (1994:103) in his observation
that such an increase can most appropriately and expeditiously be
achieved through a twin element policy strategy.
The first element centres on improvement in the administration and
management including, where appropriate and feasible, privatisation and
contracting out of the existing major instruments of local taxation and
revenue generation. This element principally involves improving the
effectiveness and efficiency of two major current sources of local revenue,
Graduated Personal Tax and property rates, but also involves addressing
the administration and management of all other presently existing and
widely used revenue instruments, whether in the form of taxes, charges,
licences, permits or fees. The second element involves shifting the
incidence of taxation away from the less well-off. This could be achieved
by both reducing regressivity through exempting the poorest Ugandans
from most of the existing charges, fees and taxes, and securing enhanced
progressivity in the local taxation system through an expanded district-wide
property rating programme for commercial and larger residential houses.
Research conducted in Hoima District revealed a high incidence of
recalcitrance on the part of tax prayers to meet their tax obligations.
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However, combined with prioritised attention to efficiency and effectiveness
in local service delivery across all existing local council services, an
appropriately reformulated and refocused local taxation system would go
far toward addressing existing "willingness to pay" problems in district local
governments. -------
Criticisms have, for example, been expressed regarding the fact that
Graduated Personal Tax is imposed largely on males and that although it is
applied to women in paid employment and business activities, it is less
strongly pursued in the case of the latter. It is recommended that such
pursuit be taken up more seriously, given the significant role of women in
business, but taking into account the proposed exemptions at the lower
levels of income which are the levels earned in many of the marginal
activities, such as flour selling, in which women are engaged. Within the
rural sector, the tax should be based on the head of household, whether
male or female, the amount paid depending only on estimated income.
Additional adult males within the household subject to tax would be liable
only on the basis of independent income.
Smoke (1993:907-908) also raises an equally pertinent point in respect of
avoidance of competition between districts and instead proposes overt
encouragement and promotion of cooperation between districts as a key
component in a concerted strategy to raise administration standards and
improve management capacities regarding local taxation. Although the
deep-seated and wide-spread administrative, financial and management
weaknesses of local governments in Uganda clearly require initial capacity
building efforts to be Centrally-driven, it is equally vital to establish district
involvement in, and increase ownership of relevant capacity-building
strategies at the earliest stage possible.
Zake (1994:101) further notes that the sustainability of any coordinated
national strategies for enhancing local revenue generation and for
improving local taxation administration in Uganda is crucially dependent on
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close consultation with, and cooperation between districts. At district level
what is required as a priority is the transformation of existing limited and
constrained inter-authority cooperation and consultative fora into strong,
institutionalised and mutually supporting professional associations. These
should be capable of responding positively and creatively to Central
Government policy initiatives and increasingly formulating and presenting
their own preferred policy strategies. This, in turn, would secure and under
pin local authority representation and direct involvement in the process of
formulating an increasingly well-integrated system of local and Central
taxation policy and administration.
Regarding the problem of poor tax assessment which was highlighted
during the study, Hoima and other equally affected local governments have
to critically re-examine their tax assessment mechanism, more especially
the tax register system with a view to adopting a card system to manage
records on graduated tax payers. It has been noted from a USAID report
(2002: 23), that a card system to manage records on graduated tax payers
without having to write new registers every year was introduced in
Nakasongola and Luwero Districts in central Uganda in the FY 2001/2002.
The system provides quick information about liabilities of tax payers and
allows for easy management of records of incoming and departing tax
payers. As a result of this system, revenues were recorded to have
increased by 20% in these two districts within a time frame of one year. In
the shorter-term, Hoima could adopt this system as one way of improving
its tax assessment procedure and in so doing enhance its local revenue
collection levels.
In the long term however, the real remedy lies in the development of a
progressive tax policy that clarifies the sources of revenue, sets tax rates,
clarifies on the practices for administering the taxes, and assigns revenue
administration functions to specific officials.
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7.2.5.2 The Local Government Finance Commission
The Local Government Finance Commission (LCFC) is ideally placed to
encourage the rapid development of horizontal institutional links and
professional networks between and arnonq districts and- municipalities,
while also ensuring retention and guaranteeing the health of appropriate
vertical linkages between local governments and the Central Government.
Such institutions and networks both vertical and horizontal are essential for
the rapid diffusion of the desired innovations and for effective
implementation of all the relevant facets of taxation policy and
administration. Smoke (1993:906), writing on Kenya's experience of local
governments revenue generation, notes that, even when similar resource
bases exists for a particular type of council, levels of taxes, fees, and
charges vary dramatically and unsystematically across local authorities.
He further observes that it is not unusual, for example, for two comparable
councils to charge very different fees for the same licences or service,
without apparent justification on the basis of population, wealth or costs of
service provision. Such a situation of inter and intra-jurisdictional
differences in local tax bases and rates, which also exists in Uganda, tends
to affect the composition and location of consumption and production
activities, as well as create vertical and horizontal inequities across and
within local authorities. In Uganda it also reflects some failure of the Local
Government Finance Commission in the execution of its mandate which,
among others, includes ensuring standardisation of local taxation and
advising local governments on appropriate tax levels to be levied. The
proposed revenue enhancement strategy of this thesis therefore envisages
a comprehensively enhanced role for the Local Government Finance
Commission to an extent that is not only in conformity with its mandate, but
also enables it to overcome the aforementioned weakness .
It should be noted that the Local Government Finance Commission also
provides an institutionalised mechanism for the coordination of revenue
generation strategy among districts and entails an appropriate forum for the
discussion of associated issues that are neither wholly local nor Central.
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The LGFC is therefore strategically placed to mediate between- and
encourage the development of relationships of cooperation among the
different units and levels of local governments in Uganda.
Unfortunately, the Local Government Finance Commission, for
administrative and institutional reasons, has to date not embraced this role.
Remaining at the headquarters or in principle a Kampala-based
organisation, and only depending on periodic meetings as the main mode
of dialogue and interface with local governments, has detached the
Commission from the practical situation in the countryside and deprived it
of the legitimacy to fuliy represent local government views. There is
therefore an acute need for rejuvenation on the part of the Local
Government Finance Commission. There is no way it can effectively play
the advisory role to Central and local governments on revenue and taxation
matters while it remains so remote and isolated from the reality in the
countryside. While this may not "necessarily entail organisationally
expanding the LGFC to districts it certainly calls for re-orientating its
instructional structures in a way that would substitute its current top-down
approach with a bottom-up orientation.
7.2.5.3 Tax assignment between Central and Local Governments
As already observed in section 3.8 of chapter three one of the most
persistent financial problems in Uganda is that the central government has
tended to monopolise the progressive sources of revenue such as sales tax
while leaving the non-elastic sources like market dues and trading licences
to local authorities. In principle, however, though the centre monopolises
the progressive sources of revenue, the most important thing is for it and
local governments to share the revenue collected equitably. Basing on
Musgrave (1983:45)'s principle of equity (consistency of revenue means
with expenditure needs) and efficiency (minimising resource cost), this
thesis proposes a number of broad principles that could be followed in tax
assignment between central and local governments. As a basic principle it
is vital for all progressive redistributive taxes to be centralised. A
progressive personal income tax should for example be imposed by the
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central government which is primarily responsible for income redistribution.
GTven that many parts of Uganda experience a lot of tax evasion because
many people are engaged in the informal sector whose activities defy
accurate identification and concretisation, the capacity of income tax as a
redistributive mechanism is to this extent limited.
In view of this problem, the central government should retain the exclusive
authority to determine the tax base but should allow sub-national
governments, that is, the local and lower local governments to levy
supplementary rates, preferably flat rate charges on the central tax liability.
In the same vein taxes on mobile factors of production such as corporate
income tax should remain a responsibility of the centre simply because if
local governments impose such taxes corporations may shift income to
lower taxing jurisdictions through transfer pricing practices and this could
prove detrimental to local efforts at tax base expansion. Import and export
duties would also remain centralised because they affect macro-economic
variables and involve inter-state relations. Taxes on capital wealth, wealth
transfers and inheritances should also be a responsibility of the central
government to avoid tax competition among sub-national jurisdictions and
the resulting mis-allocation of capital.
On the other hand, local authorities should levy taxes on completely
immobile real property such as land and buildings. Property tax is a
significant source of revenue especially for local urban authorities, but the
problem with this tax especially in the countryside is that most peasants do
not have land titles, yet for purposes of taxation, it is essential to establish
the owner of the property. Because many peasants in Uganda cannot
afford to pay for land surveying and title deeds, it is necessary for the
country to adopt a simple general boundary survey for purposes of getting
land titles in the countryside.
There are cheaper methods of levying property taxes such as land tax. It is
recommended in this thesis that the village councilor Lei be relied upon in
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accomplishing this exercise. At the local village council level the villagers
could get together and with the help of experts, establish the percentages
of the land they own vis-a-vis the total land of the community. The next step
would entail establishing whether the quality or value of the land is good,
fair or poor. In other words, land taxes should be assessed according to
quality and quantity of the land.
It has to be emphasized that property taxes have many advantages
including the fact that immovable properties are clearly located in specific
jurisdictions so that there can be no argument about which local authority
should get the money. And unlike most taxable objects, land and buildings
cannot be hidden from the assessor's view, though ownership might not be
easy to identify. The many advantages of property tax however need not
overshadow the defects of the tax some of which are encapsulated in the
words of Davey (1974:151):
Property taxes are the most direct and visible of all taxes - neither passed
on nor deducted from earnings - and therefore the most politically
sensitive. Assessments tend to be complex and therefore infrequent so that
the base declines in real terms; elasticity can only be maintained by forms
of indexation that are rarely practiced outside the Americas.
On the basis of the citation above, it is evident that owners of property
wield so much power that it is usually difficult to have adequate taxes from
this source. At the same time, people who acquire this property usually
work very hard in order to earn it. The bottom line in this regard is to avoid
overtaxing property owners in order to benefit those who depend on the
state to solve problems which could be addressed through individual hard
work. In essence it is important to strike a balance between the interests of
the entrepreneurs and those of the powerless rural people.
Until it is replaced graduated tax should continue to be imposed by local
authorities along side other user charges such as market dues, water and
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sewage charges, rents and fees. It should be noted that some of these
taxes can also be levied by the centre provided there is no double taxation
and the combined tax burden is not too much for the tax payer.
7.2.5.4 Taxing the FarmSector
Agricultural incomes are effectively exempt from income tax-and there are
no taxes on land in Uganda. The large proportion of land, almost half,
currently farmed as commercial enterprises of 5 acres and above indicates
the clear need for income tax, or an income tax equivalent, to be applied to
very significant incomes currently derived from large-scale farming. It is
recommended in this thesis that for the time being, as a contribution to
local government revenues a rural development charge be levied on a per
acre basis on farms exceeding one acre in size. During the research
conducted in Hoima, service delivery was found to be a crucial independent
variable in defining people's willingness to pay taxes. The low voluntary
compliance rates that currently characterise both the local and national
taxation systems were found by the research to be an additional constraint
on effecting increases in local taxation revenues. It is postulated that a
simplified, fairly administered local taxation system, operating as a low cost
service to the country's taxpayers could be one of the many necessary
improvements to the standards of local service delivery that are required if
willingness to pay local taxes is to raise significantly.
7.2.5.5 Privatisation and Contracting Out of Revenue Collection
The pattern of high administrative costs and low returns (indicative of low
taxation efficiency) combined with low levels of voluntary compliance
(indicative of low taxation effectiveness), illustrated above for Graduated
Personal Tax in particular, applies widely to the other major taxation
instruments currently utilised by districts (markets) and by municipalities
(markets and property rates) as well as to other, more minor, sometimes
idiosyncratic, instruments chosen to raise local revenues. Conversely
where, as in the case of markets, privatisation and contracting out had
been widely implemented among both districts and municipalities in
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Uganda, taxation efficiency has clearly increased significantly with
administrative, particularly staff, costs markedly reduced and revenue from
privatised markets markedly up.
In an environment where revenue collection is privatised or contracted out,
issues of effectiveness (the extent to which compliance is voluntary or
coerced) also immediately become less problematic for local taxation
administration, although it would be unwise to suggest that local
governments could or should evade or avoid these monitoring and
regulatory regimes. Zake (1994:102) argues that a successful revenue
collection privatisation process must be preceded by establishment of a
well-managed competitive bidding system. Nevertheless, the wider
relevance of and further potential for taxation-related privatisations in
Uganda is clear. Indded in relation to Graduated Personal Tax, this thesis
has argued that most, if not all, the stages of the existing system could in
principle be privatised with some significant advantages beyond the
obvious ones of administrative cost reduction, perhaps most notably in
terms of freeing up sub-county and parish chiefs to perform their other
important tasks, notably those relating to mobilisation of the population for
agricultural production, health, sanitation and community development,
more effectively.
7.2.6 The Civil Society
In section 2.11 of chapter two, it was observed that decentralisation can
only serve as a tool of empowerment if institutions at the lower levels as
well as the people at the grassroots are invested both with the
responsibilities and the authority to decide and commit available resources
in discharging those responsibilities. It was however noted from analysed
data that local people in Hoima are involved in societal affairs to a very
limited degree primarily due to lack of information, but also on account of a
general wave of resignation, defeatism and malaise that characterise the
social realm. This scenario where the civic population is confined to the
periphery as local and district leaders ride roughshod could be ameliorated
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through a gradual process of empowerment that is underpinned by an
intensive sensitisation and capacity-building programme that seeks to
awaken the population to their right to monitor and sanction government.
This argument is also vindicated by authors such as Friedmann (1992:77),
Bebbington et. al. (1993:12), and Lehmann (1990:84), all of whom concur
that an informed, mobilised Civil Society operating within the framework of
an invigorated NGO set-up would represent a positive attempt on the part
of the grassroots to assert greater control over the environments in which
they live. Once the population is sensitised to its roles and gets acquainted
with the process of governance through the relevant information (Landell-
Mills, 1992:443), then there will be increased calls for effective
accountability and transparency in the conduct of public affairs. The
emergence of NGOs and CBOs will be a natural outcome of a process in
which an empowered civil society as a political community is able to
organise itself and coordinate its activities independently of the State.
7.2.6.1 The Role of Civil Society in Enforcing Transparency and
Accountability in the Provision of Public Services
At a World Bank-sponsored workshop on the theme "Assessing public
sector performance - a role for civil society", held in Kampala, Uganda on
16 October 2000, the importance of mobilizing public service users
themselves as monitors of public service delivery was emphasized. It is
noted in the World Bank (2001 :20) report arising out of the workshop that
a number of NGOs and parliamentarians affirmed the role of civil society,
despite its weaknesses, in assessing public sector performance and in
enforcing accountability. In order to achieve this objective, the success that
has been had with the practice of public notices could be exploited and
expanded to its fullest. It could be replicated in a broad range of sectoral
and local government planning and management operations. The posting
of public notices could be applied not just for resource allocations, but also
for other aspects of local government operations such as appointments and
promotions, work planning and other decision-making criteria.
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In order to enhance the practice, this thesis recommends that all local
governments, both district and sub-county, be required to designate
appropriate spaces within their premises for posting of notices. A practice
of placing notices in newspapers and through radio broadcasts currently
practiced only by the Ministries of Finance and Local Government, would
give additional thrust if adopted by district local governments as well. And-
to enforce compliance, failure to facilitate appropriate public notices could
be made a sanctionable managerial responsibility, perhaps with NGOs also
involved in monitoring complianc-e.
Instant mini-surveys or client report cards - where service users upon exit
from a facility rate different aspects of facility service provision - should be
considered as a mechanism for direct end user feedback on service facility
quality both at the Centre and in local qovernrnents'", Report cards can be
used to monitor aspects of client satisfaction on a regular basis, can be
tailored to individual service facilities, and can be fed directly into frontline
operational decision-making (World Bank, 2001:21). In light of the above,
report cards could be useful in monitoring local performance relative to
national standards established through commitments made in client
charters and memoranda of understanding between line ministries and
district local governments.
This thesis also recommends that the Community-Based Management
Information System (CBMIS) initiative, which aims to help communities
articulate their developmental needs and priorities, as well as local
government efforts to mobilize communities in the local government
planning and management process, should be harnessed in strengthening
transparency and participation of all in local development initiatives, and in
order to maintain the credibility that initial transparency initiatives have
created, it is vital that both the Centre and local governments are seen to
28The practice ofsuggestion boxes iswidespread, but responses are reportedly not systematically analysed
oracted upon. Suggestion boxes are, in any case, highly vulnerable to biased sampling errors.
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act upon cases of malpractice that surface through civil society monitoring
of public services.
7-.2.7 Local Democracy
Direct citizen participation in locai decision-making is imperative for
democratic local government, and yet (as the Hoima case demonstrates)
the fact that village and other local level meetings are held irregularly or not
at all negates this imperative. If people are going to deliberate and find
solutions to their common problems, then they need to meet quite often.
Unfortunately, because of the lacuna in the law, which determines the
frequency of meetings for local government councils without doing the
same for administrative unit councils, convening of village and parish
council meetings has largely been left to the discretion of chairpersons,
most of whom, as the study revealed, are not very keen on convening
them. To ameliorate the situation, it is vital for the decentralisation law to be
amended to make it mandatory for administrative unit councils to convene
meetings at least once every month. That is the only way those with
political power - the chairpersons - will be prevented from maintaining the
prevailing pattern. While this will- take care of the quantitative aspect in
terms of the need to routinely convene meetings to enable community
members to interface and deliberate on developmental matters, there is
also the qualitative aspect of local democracy that must manifest itself
through the growth of participation (physical involvement in local decision-
making) and the strengthening of associational life, both of which are
crucial in empowering ordinary people, giving them the voice to demand for
more accountable government and ultimately building a stronger Civil
Society.
Dreze & Sen (1995:85) observe that strong Civil Society organisations can
promote the political empowerment of local people, pressuring the State to
better serve their interests and increasing the effectiveness of local
development programmes. They argue that what is needed is an enabling
institutional environment for civil society to develop and thicken. They
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contend that there are two main ways to strengthen the institutional
environments of the civil society to make it more effective in enhancing
local democracy. First, democratic processes must permit all major levels
of declslon-rnaklnq. Second, citizens must be given systematic access to
information so' that they can hold their civil servants and politicians
accountable. if information on budget and use of funds from Central
Government to local level is made available, people can hold their leaders
accountable for results.
This dissemination of information needs to be legally mandated so that it
does not stop with a change of government. Progress in information
technology and increasing exposure to global events should help create a
new environment of public awareness that will help reinforce local
. democratic politics.
Respect for the rule of law, an efficient public administration, and a high
quality political system, all facilitate the emergence of local democratic
institutions that include and cater for the local people. However, the impact
of these factors on local development depends on how effectively they are
translated into empowerment at the community level because even in
States with extensive political and civil liberties and with governments that
are neither captured by elites nor corrupt, local people are often voiceless,
and their interests figure little in public policy.
7.3 Recommendations for Further Research
A study as limited in scope as this one could not have exhaustively
analysed all paradigms and concepts pertinent to devolution and
empowerment and how the two impinge on effective local government. In
view of the need to limit the analytical focus of the study, there are
important dimensions relevant to the process of devolution and
empowerment that were not considered. These include the aspect of
accountability for public resources and the role of public accountability
institutions, such as the office of the Auditor General, the Inspector General
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of Government (IGG), the Local Government Public Accounts Committee of
Parliament and the District Local Government Public Accounts Committees
(LGPAC) in ensuring efficient and effective utilisation of resources in local
governments. This need arises given the fact that the almost euphoric
optimism that characterised much of the writing about Ugandan
decentralisation a decade ago has to some extent given way to detailed
criticism and unrelieved pessimism on account of reported rampant
corruption and sleaze in districts, so much so that it is not uncommon to
hear arguments attributing the success of the policy more to the creation of
"self-enrichment" opportunities for the local leaders than the real intended
objective of empowering the people. If devolution is to lead to more
accountable government, then watchdog institutions and agencies such as
those enumerated above have to play a more proactive role in ensuring
that local government operations are characterised by the principle of
'value for money'. This is therefore a dimension which needs to be
investigated as one way of enriching the findings of this study. The impact
of local and national accountability institutions on the strengthening of
devolution through better service delivery and optimum utilisation of
resources requires assessment, and it is such assessment that will help
establish whether or not one of the key decentralisation objectives - the
improvement of the capacity of local councils to plan, finance and manage
the delivery of services to their constituents - is being achieved.
7.4 Strengthening Local Government Through Institutional
Support and Performance Monitoring
It is apparent, both from analysed data on the Hoima case study and the
general literature available on Ugandan decentralisation, that the limited
capacities of local government have indeed restricted the potential for
democratic decentralisation. This points to one fact that effective local
government in Uganda will require a huge dose of institutional support
through strengthening of local authorities' financial resource bases, staff
training, especially of sub-county bureaucrats, and performance monitoring
in order to identify gaps left by the law and precedent and fill them in time.
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Furthermore effective decentralised planning at local level will require
Central Government sensitivity to the problems, needs, aspirations and
priorities of the grassroots (Reddy, 1999:89). Decentralisation alone,
whether it takes the form of allocating more expenditure responsibility,
more fiscal resources, or both, to local governments must be backed up in
these ways if the results are to be politically, socially, and economically
beneficial.
A United Nations Development Programme workshop on the
Decentralisation Process held in Berne, Switzerland between 20 and 23
April 1993 identified five key ways through which local government as an
institution could be strengthened and palatable conditions essential for its
sustainability cultivated. This thesis concurs with the UNDP position, and is
of the view that application of some of these recommendations which are
highlighted below would go a long way in improving the outcome of
devolution.
• First, it is important to build a strong national identity which all
people feel they want to belong to, so as to instil confidence that the
nation will endure whatever the power balance. Mutual respect
between the local and Centre should be established to create a
situation where the local feels the Centre speaks for it, and where
the national identity is built from its parts. Achieving this will entail
managing the dynamics of power-sharing in a way that will help
build a stronger rather than a more divisive Central-local
relationship. This could be achieved through:
designing boundaries which fractionise rather than polarize
potential conflict areas;
developing systems, such as national planning and policy
making systems, which transfer "influence" type of power
(contributing to Central decisions) rather than "control" type
of power (devolving Central decisions); and
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using the education system to build civic awareness and
positive societal values for cooperation and tolerance.
Centrist and sometimes intransigent tendencies that still
bedevil Central Government officials, and in the process
curtail local government development, could be relatively
eased through adoption ofthe above mentioned measures
• Second, political commitment needs to be supported by a local
basis of human and economic resources to sustain a diffusion of
power. Adequate capacity and sufficient financial resources are
essential elements to either have in place or to build up in any local
government development effort. In the case of Uganda this is a
short-fall that has consistently plagued the devolution process right
from its inception.
• Third, clarity is essential in establishing devolution goals, and in
building up a sense of direction and purpose. Clarity of the process-
a plan to reach the goals, and who is responsible for what-is also
important, keeping sight of the long-term so as not to be distracted
by short-term interests. Consequently, an objective and critical look
at the country should be a starting point so as to define the real
need for and commitment to devolution.
• Fourth, devolution arrangements should focus on obtaining agreed
boundaries, based on sound, transparent criteria which set out the
roles and responsibilities of the different levels of government and
the various parties concerned. Equally crucial in terms of the need
to be defined are the areas of interaction between the levels,
including the building of formal linkages and informal networks
which ensure dialogue between the layers and interest groups, and
of mechanisms for conflict management and conflict resolution.
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• Finally, success for local government will depend on having
qualified and highly capable leaders and managers to implement
the devolution policy. These individuals must demonstrate integrity,
caution, consistency and transparency. There is therefore need to
have a minimum qualification threshold below which people should
not be eligible for election to district and sub-county councils. The
current arrangement where no qualifications are required for one to
be eligible for election to district and sub-county has led to councils
being stuffed with illiterate officials who have at times failed to cope
with the demanding tasks of policy formulation at those levels.
7.5 Summary
This chapter has mainly dwelt on recommendations and conclusions which
it has based first on the research findings, and second on the need for
further research. It concludes with a note of emphasis that underscores the
importance of institutional support and monitoring as a way of
strengthening local government structures throughout the country.
In general terms this study has sought to expand the understanding of
devolution as a concept and its relationship with the empowerment
process. It has built on past thinking on the theme and substantially
broadened and deepened what was judged to be necessary to meet the
challenge of enhancing the scope and extent of empowerment.
The study accepts the now established view of top-down planning as
encompassing not only a low level of local democracy but also low level of
community participation, leading to marginalisation of the local people, a
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Functions and Services of government and
Local Governments
PART 1
Functions and services for which Government is responsible.
1. Arms, ammunition and explosives.
2. Defence, security, maintenance of law and order.
3. Banks, banking, promissory notes, currency and exchange control.
4. Subject to the Constitution, taxation and taxation policy.
5. Citizenship, immigration, emigration, refugees, deportation,
extradition, passport and national identity cards.
6. Copyrights, patents and trademarks and all forms of intellectual
property, incorporation and regulation of business organisations.
7. Land, mines, mineral and water resources and the environment.
8. National parks, as may be prescribed by Parliament.
9. Public holidays.
10. National monuments, antiquities, archives and public records as
Parliament may determine.
11. Foreign relations and external trade.
12.The regulation of trade and commerce.
13. Making national plans for the provision of services and co-ordinating




2. Medical and health services including -
(a) hospitals, other than hospitals providing referral and
medical training;
(b) health centres, dispensaries, sub-dispensaries and
first-aid posts;
(c) maternity and child welfare services;
the control of communicable diseases, including HIV/AIDS,
leprosy and tuberculosis;
(d) control of the spread of disease in the District;
(e) rural ambulance services;





The provision and maintenance of water supplies in liaison with the
Ministry responsible for Natural Resources, where applicable.
4. Road services:
The construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of roads not under
the responsibility of Government.
5. All decentralized services and activities which include but are not
limited
to-
(i) Crop, animal and fisheries husbandry extension
services;
(ii) Entomological services and vermin control;
(iii) Human resources management and development;
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(iv) Recurrent and development budget;
(v) District statistical services;
(vi) District project identification;
(vii) District planning;




(xii) Forests and wetlands;
(xiii) Licensing of produce buying;
(xiv) Trade licenses;






(xxi) Probation and welfare;
(xxii) Street children and orphans;




(xxvii) District information services.
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6. Regulate, control, manage, administer, promote and license any of
the things or services which the Council is empowered or required to
do, and established, maintain, carry on, control, manage or
administer and prescribe the forms in connection therewith to fix
fees or charges to be levied in that respect.
7. Aid and support tha. establishment and maintenance of schools,
hospitals, libraries, art galleries, museums, tourist centres, homes
for the aged, destitute or infirm or for the orphans, and to provide
bursaries to assist in thee education of children of pers ,welfare.,
youth, persons with disabilities, women and sports organisations.
8. Preserve public decency, and to prevent offences against public
order in public places and to prevent damage to poverty of the
Central Government and the Council.
9. Undertake private works and services and to charge, recover the
costs and contract out public services to the private sector.
10.Sell all by-products resulting from carrying on by, or on behalf of the
Council, of any works or services.
11.Promote publicity for the Council and the District as a whole.
12.Promote schemes' of health, education and road safety
sensitisation.
13.provide and manage -
(a) Sporting and recreational facilities and programmes
of informal education for both adults and young
people including the running or provision of
community centres.
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(b) The development of social work among adults;
(c) Remedial social welfare programmes aimed at the
alleviation of social distress;
(d) The welfare of children and the elderly; and
(e) Public vehicular parking.
14.The registration of marriages, births and deaths for transmission to
the Registrar General.
15.Assist Government to preserve the environment through protection
of forests, wetlands, lakeshores, streams and prevention of
environmental degradation.
16.Any other service or function, which is not specified in the Second
Schedule of this Act.
17. Upon delegation by Government, identification and preservation of
sites and objects or buildings of historical and architectural value.
PART 3
Functions and Services for which Urban councils are responsible include
but not limited to -
1 Establish, acquire, erect, maintain, promote, assist or control with the
participation of the citizens -
(a) Lighting of streets and public places;
(b) Fire brigade services;
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(c)Amsulance services;
(d) Clinics, dispensaries, health and inoculation centres;
(e) Cemeteries, crematoria and mortuaries and auxiliary services, and
provide for the burial of bodies of destitute persons and of
unclaimed bodies;
(f) Omnibus stations and related office accommodation, cafes,
restaurants, refreshment rooms and other buildings;
(g) Offices, stores, workshops, depots and other building for the
purposes of the Council;
(h) Public halls, libraries, art galleries and museums;
(i) Slaughter houses, cold storage facilities and premises for the
inspection or processing of milk, meat or hides and skins;
0) markets and piers, jetties and landing places;
(k)Botanical and zoological gardens;
(I) Public baths and swimming pools;
(m) Laundries and other places for the washing of clothes;
(n) Canteens, social centres,c1ubs and hospitals, including such
facilities for employees and staff;
(0) Public lavatories and urinals;
(p) Pounds for stray animals and clinics for the treatment of sick
animals;





(u) Public weighing machines;
(v)Public monuments;
(w) Sanitary services for the removal and disposal of night soil;
rubbish, carcasses of dead animals and all kinds of refuse and
effluent;
(x)Water supplies-outside the jurisdiction of National Water &
Sewerage Corporation;
(y)Education services which cover primary and secondary schools,
special education, trade and technical schools;
(z)Maintenance of roads.
2 Establish, maintain or control public parks, gardens and recreation
grounds on any land vested in the Council and in connection with or for
the purposes of that public park, garden or recreation ground to -
(a).Establish, erect, maintain and control aquariums, aviaries, piers,
pavilions, cafes restaurants, refreshment rooms and other buildings or
erections that the Council may deem necessary;
(b).Reserve any portion of the public park, garden, or recreation ground for
any particular game or recreation or any other specific purposes,
exclude the public from those portions an provide for their renting and
hiring to the public, clubs or other organisations; and
(c).Provide or permit any other person to provide any apparatus, equipment
or other amenity.
3 Prohibit, restrict, regulate or license -
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(a) The sale or hawking of wares or the erection of stalls on any street,
or the use of any part of the street or public place for the purpose
of carryinqon any trade, business or profession;
(b) The depositing on any street, public palace or unoccupied land any
refuse, rubbish, derelict vehicles, or any other material or thing
whatsoever, and to provide-for the removal and disposal thereof;
(c)Street decorations and the erection of shelters, temporary buildings,
platforms, seats, and other structures at any entertainment,
procession, exhibition, ceremony or display, whether in a public
place or not;
(d) The placing of banners, wires, ropes or any other impediments
over or across any street or public pJace;
(e) The collection of money or goods in any public place for any
charitable or other purposes;
(f) The public exhibition or any monstrosity, freak of nature, or
abnormal person or animal;
(g) Singing, dancing, drumming, the playing of musical instruments,
the production of musical or the making of any noise likely to
disturb any person, or any performance for profit in any public
place;
(h) The storage or stacking of firewood or other fuel;
(i) The washing or drying of clothes other than on private premises;
U) The quarrying of stone, lime, clay, murram or other material;
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(k)The keeping of dogs, animals and poultry, and provide for the
seizure and destruction of ownerless, unlicensed, diseased or
dangerous dogs, and the seizure and disposal of stray animals and
poultry;
(I) Billiard saloons, dance halls and other places of public resort.
(m) Lodging houses;
(n) the burning of rubbish and grassland;
(0) prostitution and brothels;
(p) cinema and video halls;
4 Layout and adorn any street, square or open space vested in the
Council by the erection of statues, fountains or other structures or in
any other manner.
5 Decorate streets and public buildings, erect shelters, temporary
6 buildings, platforms, seats and other structures on public places.
7 Clear, level and maintain public and unoccupied land taken on lease
from a land board and to plant, trim, protect and remove, flowers, trees
and shrubs in or from any public place.
8 Identify streets and other public places by assigning names thereto and to
cause those names to be exhibited on posts or pillars or to be painted
or otherwise exhibited on any building or other erection fronting.
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9 Number, or otherwise identify any buildings fronting on any street or other
public place, and cause such identification to be exhibited on the
buildings or require the owner on a building.
10 Require the owner or occupier of any premises to remove or lower any .
fence or to remove, lower or trim any tree, hedge, or shrub
overhanging any street or interfering with the passage of traffic or
pedestrians, or any wires or other works or to require any owner or
occupier to perform the removal lowering or trimming which may be
necessary for the maintenance of public safety or amenity or build and
maintain the pavement boarding his or her property to the
specifications of the Urban Council.
11 Require the fencing or enclosing of plots and restrict the use of barbed
wire, broken glass or any similar substance on fences and walls.
12 Preserve public decency. And to prevent offences against public order
in streets and public places, and to prevent damage to or defacement
of poverty of the public or of the Council.
13 Prevent and extinguish fires, to remove buildings in order to prevent the
spread of any fire and to compensate the owner of any bUilding
removed.
14 Establish, maintain, hire, support or control bands and orchestras and
generally to provide for musical entertainment at public paces and
functions.
15 Undertake private works and services and to charge and recover costs
thereon and contract out public services to the private sector.
16 At the request of the owner of the land situate within its area of
jurisdiction construct, in such manner as the Council may think fit, by its
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servants or by contract, a footway or pavement along any street
contagious with such land or vehicular crossings over any footway or
pavement and to recover the whole or any part -of the cost of such
construction including the cost of supervision, plant, machinery and
tools from such owner in the manner as it may think fit.
17 Sell all by-products resulting from the carrying on, by or on behalf of the
Council of any works or services.
18 Promote publicity for the Council.
19 Promote schemes of housing, health education and road safety
sensitisation.
20 Make provision for the return of destitute persons to their homes.
21 Arrange for the insurance of all assets of the Council against financial
risks of any kind to which the Council may be subjected.
22 Layout land and provide and maintain necessary public services.
23 Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, sell or lease any plots of
land or any buildings thereon; and
24 Aid and support, whether by the grant of money or otherwise, the
establishment and maintenance of school, hospitals, libraries, art
galleries, museums, musical or scientific institutions, homes for the
aged, destitute or persons with disabilities, or for the orphans, and to
provide bursaries to assist in the education of the children of persons
residing in the area of jurisdiction to make donations to charitable and
philanthropic, welfare and youth organisations and to make
presentations to other local authorities or public bodies.
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25 Provide--
(a) Gowns, chains and badges of office lor Councillors and officers of
the Council;
(b) Badges, medallions or scrolls for presentation to persons who have
given meritorious service to the Urban Councils; and
(c)Flora!~tributes in memory of Councillors, officers of the Council and
persons of note
26 Obtain and protect armorial bearings
27 Regulate, control, manage, administer, promote or license any of the
things or services, which the Council is required or empowered to do
and establish, maintain, carry on. Control, mange or administer, and
prescribe the forms in connection therewith; and to fix fees or charges
to be made in respect thereof.
28 With the consent of a neighbouring Local Government, render advice
and or assist to control development and to administer town and
country
29 Planning schemes in any area within an agreed distance from the
boundaries of its jurisdiction.
30 Provide, control and manage the following services -
(a) Sporting and recreational facilities and programmes of informal
education for both adults and young people including the provision
and running of community centres;
(b) The development of social work among adults;
(c)Remedial social welfare programmes aimed at the alleviation of
social distress;
(d) The welfare of children;
(e) Public vehicle parking;
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31 Initiate and contract twinning arrangements with International Local
Governments or Local Authorities in consultation with the Minister.
32 Any other function or service incidental to the above.
33 Any other function not reserved for Government.
PART 4
Functions and Services to be devolved by aDistrict Council to Lower Local
Government Councils.
1 Provision of nursery and primary education.
2 The provision of agricultural auxiliary field services.
3 The provision and control of soil erosion and protection of local wetlands.
4 The control of vermin in consultation with the Ministry responsible for
Tourism and Wildlife and any other relevant Ministry.
5 The taking of measures for the prohibition, restriction, prevention,
regulation or abatement of grass, forest or bush fires including the
requisition, of able-bodied male persons to extinguish such fires and to
cut fire-breaks and general local environment protection.
6 The control of local hunting and fishing
7 The provision of -
(a). Hygiene services and health units other than health centres;
(b). Adult education; and
(c). Community based health care services.
8 The provision and management of ferries.
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9 The provision of measures- to prevent and contain food shortages,
including relief work, the provision of seed and the storage of
foodstuffs.
10 Markets establishment, management and collection of revenue.
11 The establishment, control and management of recreation grounds,
open spaces and parks.
12 The making, altering, diversion and maintenance of works, paths,
culverts, bridges, road drains and water courses, and the regulations of
the making of pits and other excavations.
13 Measures requiring owners and occupiers of land of premises to close
and keep free from vegetation any road adjoining their land or
premises.
14 The enforcement of -
(a).Standards of building and standards of maintenance of buildings
including dwelling-houses, latrines, kitchens and stables for
animals.
(b).Proper methods for the disposal of refuse, and the making,
improving, operation and maintenance of wells, dams and other
water supplies.
15 The control of trading centres, markets and landing sites; and the
carrying on the local industries and the organization and
encouragement of local trade.
16 The regulation of traditional liquor as defined in the Liquor Act.
17 The organization of social, cultural, and sporting activities and social,
cultural and sporting clubs.
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18 The publication of newspapers and periodicals and the provisions of
information services.
19 The provision of community development schemes as may be approved
by the District Council and the regulation of any labour reasonably
required as part of normal communal or civic obligations.
20 The maintenance of community roads (Bulungi Bwansi roads).
21 Protection and maintenance of local water resources.
22 Maintenance of community infrastructure
23 Any other functions which the District Council deem fit to devolve or as
agreed upon between the District Council and the Lower Council.
PARTS
(A) Functions and Services to remain at City or Municipal Council
(Not to be devolved to the Divisions).
1. Staff establishment structure and setting of remuneration levels.
2. Setting of service delivery standards.
3. Recruitment and payment of salaries of established staff.
4. Property valuation and valuation lists. (Valuation Court).
5. Setting of levels of trade licences and fees.
6. Monitor the general administration and provision of services in
Divisions.
7. Ordinances legislation.
8. Determination of taxation levels and supply of receipting media.
9. Procurement of drugs.
10.Central laboratory services.
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11. Mortuary and cemeteries.
12. Local examinations (schools).
13. Co-curricular activities.
14. Procurement and Management of refuse tipping sites.
15.Procurement and maintenance of heavy plant and equipment.
16. Loan repayment (external).
17. Construction and maintenance of major drains.
18. Installation of traffic signals.
19. Road Construction and maintenance (tarmac).
20. National and District functions.
21. Legal services (interpretation and prosecution).
22.Architectural and Design standards.
23. Approval of building plans.
24. Master structure plan.
25. Cadestral survey and mapping.
26.Approval of schemes.
27. City Councillors' expenses.
28. Street lighting energy charges.
29.Audit.
30. Tender Board expenses.
31.District Service Commission expenses.
32. Board policy and objectives guidelines.
33. Advertising standards.
34. Mailo land administration
35. Staff training.
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(B) Functions and Services to be devolved by a City or Municipal
Council to Divisions.
1. Payment of salaries for support staff.
2. Determination levels of staff numbers (support staff).
3. Division Council expenses.
4. Povertyeradication.
5. Administration of licences.
6. Assessment of graduated tax.
7. Revenue collection.
8. Health education and visiting.
9. Vector and vermin control.
10. Secondary drains.
11. Curative services (clinics).
12. Immunisation.
13. Food and drug inspection.
14.AIDS education.
15.Administration of markets.
16.Control of development - enforcement of building rules.
17. Primary and nursery education.
18.Monitoring the utilisation of grants to schools.
19.Grass cutting and maintenance of parks.
20. Road sweeping.
21. Repair of murram and earth roads.
22. Environmental care and protection.
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23. Neighbourhood structure plans.
24. Local land management.
25. Resolv-ing local land issues.
26. Law enforcement.
27. Welfare and community services.
28. Agriculture and veterinary extension services.
29. Youth, persons with disabilities, women and sports.
30. Co-operative societies and groups.
31. Spring protection and provision of drinking eater.
32. Any other service imposed by Parliament or agreed upon




INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTIONS (PERSONAL INTERVIEW) WITH
LOCAL COUNCIL ONE EXECUTIVES
INTRODUCTION
I have come from Hoima District Local Government Headquarters. For
quite some years I have worked for Hoima District as head of the District
Administration. Now I am on leave and currently involved in a study whose
overall objective is to evaluate/assess the impact of the decentralisation
policy in Uganda and more especially on the levels of service delivery,
good governance and general community participation in local
development programmes, here in Hoima. I could not afford to exclude you
from a list of people to be interviewed during the course of this study due to
an important leadership role you have been playing in the day-to-day
management of affairs of your village council. Your frank and candid
contribution will go along way in helping us attain the objectives of the
study.
Let me assure that whatever you share with me will be kept confidential for
the benefit of the study.
1. How old are you?
2. When were you first elected as a Chairperson/member of your village
executive committee?
3. Besides being the Chairperson/member of your village executive
committee do you have any other occupation?
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4. As a Chairperson/member of your village executive committee are you
paid any salary? If yes, how much? If no how does this affect your
effectiveness as a Chairperson/member of the village executive
committee?
5. As a Chairperson/member of the village executive committee, can you
explain to me the main functions performed by yourcommittee?
6. Are there any services rendered to the community by your committee?
7. How are such services/implemented?
8. Where do you get the resources from?
9. Does the community normally make a contribution to the services
rendered?
10. In what form does the community contribute
11. Is the community contribution effected/attained willingly or through
coercion?
12. Briefly outline other services rendered in your Village by state organs
other than your council.
13. Briefly outline those services rendered by non-qovemrnental
organisations (NGOs).
14. Does your village have access to a protected water sources?





(iv) Rain harvesting tank
(v) Gravity flow.scheme
16. How often do you receive in this village/community public/NGO
officials to advise on;
(i) Protection of water sources
(ii) Construction of latrines
(iii) Maintenance of access roads/community roads.
17. Do you have households in your village that use the
bush/field/lake/etc. because they don't have toilets?
18. How has the availability of clean water for household consumption
changed in your village over the past 8 years?
19. How has the number of useable latrine/toilet facilities changed in your
village over the past 8 years?
20. How has the number and quality of community/access roads in your
village changed over the past 8 years?
21. As executive committee for your local council one, do you collect any
revenue?
22. If yes, what kind of revenue is collected?
23. According to the decentralisation law, of the 100% total revenue net
that remain in the sub-county after remitting the district share, 5% is
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for-the county, 65% is for the sub county, 5% for the parish and 25%
comes to your village councils.
Does your council receive this money?
24. How often does it come?
25. How do you spend it?
26. Do you convene any village council general meetings?
27. If yes, how often?
28. How is the attendance of women on such meetings?




• Expenditure of 25% revenue from sub county
• Others
30. Generally, how have the conditions of liVing changed in your village
over the past 5 years?
,
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation and please rest




INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTIONS (PERSONAL INTERVLEWS)
FOR SUB COUNTY CHIEFS
I am currently involved in a study on the impact of the decentralisation
policy in Uganda particularly on the levels and quality of service delivery,
good governance and community participation in development matters. As
the head of all civic servants in your sub county you are at the centre stage
in the entire process of over seeing general implementation of government
programmes in your area of Jurisdiction. I would like to request you to
kindly answer the following questions. Please note that all answers will be
kept confidential.
1. What is your level of education?
2. For how long have you worked in this sub county?
3. As a sub county chief what are your responsibilities?
4~ You are supposed to have under your chairmanship a sub county
technical and planning committee. Is there one operational in this
SIC? What does it do?
5. What is its composition?
6. How reqularty does.it sit?
7. Did you hold any budget conference this year?
8. Who were the key actors? Did they understand the process?
9. Has your council approved your budget already? If no why? If yes
outline the process.
10. Do you normally inform the general public the details of your budget?
11. If not, does the public try to find out on their own?
334
12. Does the district assist you while you are budgeting?
13. In which areas does the district assist you?
14. What will be your total council expenditure under your budget this
year?
15. What are your sources of revenue?
16. Are your revenue sources adequate enough to finance your budget?
17. By law, all local government budgets must be balanced before their
respective councils approve them. Do you follow these provisions
while budgeting?
18. What happens in cases of insufficient revenue to cover expenditure?
19. The Local Government Act (1997) requires you to collect all revenue
in your sub county and remit 35% of such collected revenue to the
district. Is this done?
20. What is your view on this (above) arrangement?
21. Of the remaining revenue (after remitting the district share) the law
requires the sub county to retain 65% and remit 5%, 5% and 25% to
the county parish and village councils respectively. What is your view
on this arrangement?
22. Is the revenue you remain with sufficient enough to enable you deliver
services reserved for the sub county?
If not, from where do you get the balance?
23. Until about 8 years ago sub county officials other than the parish and
sub parish chiefs reported to their bosses at the district headquarters
who in turn also reported to their bosses at the Ministry (ies). Now all
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civil servants in your sub county by law- report to you. How has this
affected the delivery of services?
(Give details)
24. While all civil servants in the sub county are under you, they, including
your self, are not employees of the sub county and are merely
deployed there by the district.
(i) What effects does this have on service delivery?
(ii) How do you cope in such a situation?
25. Does your sub county counciJ sit regularly?
26. On average how many times in a year does your council sit?
27. Are you or your council in a position to discipline errant Civil servants
in your sub county? Or you refer such cases to the district?
28. In this sub country you have a sub county development committee
(SCDC) and a sub county integrated development association (SIDA)
what role do these 2 institutions play?
29. Are there any NGOs operating within this sub county?
30. Generally how has the condition of living changed in this sub county
over the past 5 years?
31. You know the services that as a sub county you are required to render
to the public. In your opinion does your sub county have capacity to
render those services? If no why?
32. How would you rate the people of this sub county in terms of their
participation in community development projects?
Thank you very much.
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Annexture F
INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTION (PERSONAL INTERVIEWS) FOR
LOCAL COUNCIL THREE (SUB COUNTY) CHAIRPERSON_
I am currently involved in a study on the impact of the decentralisation
policy in Uganda particularly on the level and quality of service delivery,
good governance and community participation in development
programmes.
I am requesting you to answer the following questions honestly without any
fear and hereby promise that all answers will be kept in confidence.
1. When did you first get elected as chairperson of this sub county local
council?
2. What was your occupation prior to your election?
3. Are you are a family man Iwoman?
4. How large is your family?
5. How big is your council?
6. What is its representation?
7. In the past political power like the one you have used to be seen as an
opening for eating and personal advancement. What is the position
today?
8. What in your view are the key qualities you posses that led to your
election?
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9. As the lowest level of government what function and services are
performed by a Sub county?
10. Who are the implementers?
11. As the political head of the Sub-county what role do you and your
executive committee members play in performance of the above
functions?
12. Do you have a Budget for 2002/2003?
13. (8)
(b)
If No why? If yes when was it approved by your council?
Briefly outlines the process you went through.
14. If you have already a budget (2002/2003) what is the total council
expenditure under that budget?
15. What sources of revenue are available to your council (list them)?
16. Are revenue sources sufficient enough to generate enough revenue to
finance your budget?
17. By Lawall Local governments' Budgets must be balanced before July
are approved by the respective councils.
Do you follow this provision while budgeting?
18. What do you do in cases of insufficient revenue to cover council
expenditure?
19. According to the decentralisation law the SUb-county local government
collects all revenues in rural Areas. What is the position in your Sub-
county?
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20. The law requires the sub. county to remit to the District local
Government 35% of all rev-enue collected within that Sub-county.
In your opinion is this fair? (Give reasons).
21. Out of the total revenue that stays at the sub county (after remitting the
district share) the law requires the sub county to retain 65% and remit
5%, 5% and 25% to the county, parish and village counclls
respectively. What is your view on this arrangement? (Give reasons).
22. Although it is a local government your sub county does not employ
civil servants of it own to implement its mandate, but depends on
those posted by the District. How do you cope in such kind of
situation? (Give details)
23. In this sub county you have a sub county development committee
(SCDC) and a sub county integrated development association (SIDA).
What roles do these 2 institutions play?
24. How many members are on your executive committee? Are there any
women?
25. Generally how have the condition of living changed in your sub county
over the past 8 years?
Mr chairman I thank you very much for you time and would like to once
again to assure you of the strict confidentiality with which all information




INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTIONS (PERSONAL/INTERVIEWS) FOR
SENIOR POLITICIANS AND TOP MANAGEMENT OF HOIMA DISTRICT
LOCAL COUNCIL
I am currently involved in a study on the impact of the decentralisation
policy in Uganda. Focus in this study is being put on evaluating the levels
and quality of service delivery, good governance and community
participation in development matters.
As a senior leader in the district, you are indeed at the centre stage in the
entire process of overseeing general implementation of government
programmes in this area. I wish to request you to answer a few questions I
will present to you. All answers will be kept confidential.
1. For how long have you served Hoima District Local Council?
2. What is your level of education?
3. In the position you hold in this Local Council what are your major
responsibilities?
4. Are you a full-time employee of this council? Who pays your salary?
5. Briefly explain to me the services rendered to the population by your
council.
6. How do these compare with the services rendered by the same
council before decentralization?
7. How does council fund these services?
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8. What percentage of the estimated local revenue was collected last
financial year?
9. It is said that Local Governments are finding it extremely difficult to
collect local r-evenue. Is this true?
10. If true, what is causing this problem?
11. What recommendations can you give to help solve the problems?
12. Does the Central Government give any grants to fund decentralised
services?
13. If yes how many does Hoima receive?
14. Is part of these grants sent to the sub counties?
15. According to the system of government in Uganda today, the Central
Government is charged with National Policy formulation, while District
Local Governments deal with implementation. Does the situation on
the ground reflect this principle?
16. If not what would you recommend as the way forward?
17. Does your District benefit from conditional grants?
18. What sectors are funded by those conditional grants?
19. According to the decentralisation policy and law districts evolve,
approve and implement their own plans and budgets yet conditional
grants are given to districts to fund priorities of the centre. What is
your view on this contradiction?
20. How big was the district's budget last financial year (2001/2002)?
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21. What proportion of that budget was funded by locally raised revenue'?
22:- What proportion was funded through Central Government transfers?
23. What generally is your view on local revenue sharing between the
district and sub county local governments?
24. Until about 8 years ago, all civil servants in this district were
employees of the Central Government. Now all civil servants with the
exception of delegated staff in hospitals and the police are district
employees. In your view how has this development affected the
delivery of services?
25. Generally how have the conditions of living changed in this district




INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR CIVIC AND OPINION LEADERS
I have come from Hoima District Head quarters and ! am involved in a
study whose aim is to evaluate the impact of th-e- decentralization policy in
Uganda. This study in particular seeks to examine the impact of
decentralization within the broad framework of improved service delivery,
food governance and the role of civil society. As respectable leaders of
society I wish to request you to answer a few questions touching very
important subject being probed into by the study. I also promise that
whatever you share with me will be handled with optimum confidentiality.
1. How regularly does your village council chairperson convene
meetings?
(a) Quite regularly (Once in every 2 months)
(b) Not so regularly (Bi-annually)
(C) Rearly (Once in 2Years)
(d) Do not know /Not shire.





(d) Do not know/not sure
3. Compared to 8 years ago how responsive is your sub-county





(e) Do not know.
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4. Compared to 8 years ago how responsive is Hoima District local





(e) Do not know




(c) Neither safe nor unsafe
(d) Very unsafe /generally unsafe
(e) Do not know compensation to the aggrieved party




(c) Neither confident nor otherwise
(d) Not confident at all
(e) Do not know
7. If you wronged how confident do you feel that formal institutions can
offer opportunity for recourse and redress in your favour?
(a) Very confident
(b) Generally confident
(c) Neither confident nor otherwise
(d) Not confident all
(e) Do not know
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8. What institutions do you perceive to offer better prospects for fair
and transparent treatment?
(a) Court presided over by a magistrate
(b) Local council (LC) court
(c) Traditional or customary court
(d) Others (special)
9. Would you consider any or all of these to be delivery of justice?
(a) A hearing in court
(b) A hearing by community elders
(c) A hearing without monetary compensation to the aggrieved
party
(d) A hearing where the transgressor is warned but no action is
taken.





(d) Do not know/not sure.





(d) Do not know /Not sure.
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12.Does your community have access to a protected water source
(a) No
(b) Yes (i) Borehole?
(ii) Protected spring?
(iii) Piped water?
(iv) Rain harvesting land?
13.lf yes to No.12, who organised that water source?
(a) Organized by the community
(b) Organized by the authorities
(c) Do not know the organizer.
14.What is the most common method used for treatment in your
community?
(a) Modern health care
(b) Traditional medicine
(c) Self treatment with shop bought medication
(d) Self treatment with traditional herbs Imedicine
(e) All utilized at the same time
(f) Do not know




(c) Not sure 100 not know
16.How would you characteristics your community in terms of it's ability
to pay for medical expenses?
(a) Always able to
(b) Sometimes can afford
(c) Always have difficulties.
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17.What would you regard as the main reason for failure to pay medical
expenses in your community?
(a) Many people are ill for along time
(b) Many people are too poor
(C) Many people expect to §et free medical treatment.
(d) Other (specify)
18.Which factors are likely to affect school attendance by children in
your community?
(a) The rainy season
(b) Insecurity




(g) Distance from school
(h) Other (specify)
19.Give me one importance why you would send a child to school
(a) Because it will help my child in future
(b) Because the child learns useful
(c) Because government says so
(d) Because school looks after the children during the day.
20. How has the publicity of primary education changed in the past 8
years in your Area
(a) Better now
(b) Same as before introduction of universal Primary education in
1996
(c) Worse now
(d) Not sure 100 not Know
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21. Does an Agricultural of Veterinary extension officer regularly visit
your community to advice on better agricultural practice?
(a) Yes
(b) No
(c) Do not know






23. How has the quality of extension services changed over the last 8
years?
(a) Same as 8 years ago
(b) Worse than before independence
(c) Better now
(d) Less good now.
24.ln your view in your community satisfied with the way your 25% local
revenue remitted to your village is spent?
(a) No
(b) Yes
(c) Do not know
25.lf no (to No 24) have you (member of the village council) ever
rebuked your LC One executive over such misuse of your money
and insisted on better expenditure
(a) No
(b) Yes
(e) Do not know.
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(b) Where the village Council meetings are not convened regularly
what is normally your reaction?
(a) Members insist on -meetings being held
(b) Fearful of the-chairperson's wrath members don't talk
(c) Members complain to other authorities
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